Tarski's Theorem, Supermodular Games, and the Complexity of Equilibria

Kousha Etessami, Christos Papadimitriou, Aviad Rubinstein, Mihalis Yannakakis

Introduction

Equilibria are paramount in economics, because guaranteeing their existence in a particular strategic or market-like framework enables one to consider “What happens at equilibrium?” without further analysis. Equilibrium existence theorems are nontrivial to prove. The best known example is Nash’s theorem , whose proof in 1950, based on Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, transformed game theory, and inspired the Arrow-Debreu price equilibrium results , among many others. Decades later, complexity analysis of these theorems and corresponding solution concepts by computer scientists has created a fertile and powerful field of research .

Not all equilibrium theorems in economics, however, rely on Brouwer’s fixed point theorem for their proof (even though, in a specific sense made clear and proved in this paper, they could have…). Many of the exceptions ultimately rely on Tarski’s fixed point theorem , stating that all monotone functions on a complete lattice have a fixed point — and in fact a whole sublattice of fixed points with a largest and smallest element . In contrast to the equilibrium theorems whose proof relies on Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there has been relatively little complexity analysis of Tarski’s fixed point theorem and the equilibrium results it enables. (We discuss prior related work at the end of this introduction.)

Here we present several results in this direction. Let [N]={1,…,N}[N]=\{1,\ldots,N\}. To formulate the basic problem, we consider a monotone function ff on the dd-dimensional grid [N]d[N]^{d}, that is, a function f:[N]d↦[N]df:[N]^{d}\mapsto[N]^{d} such that for all x,y∈[N]dx,y\in[N]^{d}, x≥yx\geq y implies f(x)≥f(y)f(x)\geq f(y); in the black-box oracle model, we can query this function with specific vectors x∈[N]dx\in[N]^{d}; in the white-box model we assume that the function is presented by a boolean circuitNaturally, one could have addressed the more general problem in which the lattice is itself presented in a general way through two functions meet and join;however, this framework (a) leads quickly and easily to intractability; and (b) does not capture any more applications in economics than the one treated here.. Thus, dd and NN are the basic parameters to our model; it is useful to think of dd as the dimensionality of the problem, while NN is something akin to the inverse of the desired approximation ϵ\epsilon.

Tarski’s theorem in the grid framework is easy to prove. Let 1ˉ=(1,…,1)\bar{1}=(1,\ldots,1) denote the (dd-dimensional) all-1 vector. Consider the sequence of grid points 1ˉ,f(1ˉ),f(f(1ˉ)),…,fi(1ˉ),…\bar{1},f(\bar{1}),f(f(\bar{1})),\ldots,f^{i}(\bar{1}),\ldots. From monotonicity of ff, by induction on ii we get, for all i≥0i\geq 0, fi(1ˉ)≤fi+1(1ˉ)f^{i}(\bar{1})\leq f^{i+1}(\bar{1}). Unless a fixed point is arrived at, the sum of the coordinates must increase at each iteration. Therefore, after at most dNdN iterations of ff applied to 1ˉ\bar{1}, a fixed point is found. In other words fdN(1ˉ)=fdN+1(1ˉ)f^{dN}(\bar{1})=f^{dN+1}(\bar{1}).

This immediately suggests an O(dN)O(dN) algorithm. But an O(log⁡dN)O(\log^{d}N) algorithm is also knownThis algorithm appears to have been first observed in .: Consider the (d−1)(d-1)-dimensional function obtained by fixing the “input value” in the dd’th coordinate of the function ff with some value rdr_{d} (initialize rd:=⌈N/2⌉r_{d}:=\lceil N/2\rceil). Find a fixed point z∗∈[N]d−1z^{*}\in[N]^{d-1} of this (d−1)(d-1)-dimensional monotone function f(z,rd)f(z,r_{d}) (recursively). If the ddth coordinate fd(z∗,rd)f_{d}(z^{*},r_{d}) of f(z∗,rd)f(z^{*},r_{d}), is equal to rdr_{d}, then (z∗,rd)(z^{*},r_{d}) is a fixed point of the overall function ff, and we are done. Otherwise, a binary search on the dd’th coordinate is enabled: we need to look for a larger (smaller) value of rdr_{d} if fd(z∗,rd)>rdf_{d}(z^{*},r_{d})>r_{d} (respectively, if fd(z∗,rd)<rdf_{d}(z^{*},r_{d})<r_{d}). By an easy induction, this establishes the O(log⁡dN)O(\log^{d}N) upper bound ().

We conjecture that this algorithm is essentially optimal in the black box sense, for small fixed constant dimension dd. In Theorem 4.1 we prove this result for the d=2d=2 case. We provide a class of monotone functions that we call the herringbones: two monotonic paths, one starting from 1ˉ\bar{1} and the other from Nˉ\bar{N}, meeting at the fixed point, while all other points in the N×NN\times N grid are mapped diagonally: f(x)=x+(−1,+1)f(x)=x+(-1,+1) or x+(+1,−1)x+(+1,-1), whichever of the points is closer to the monotonic path that contains the fixed point. We prove that any randomized algorithm needs to make Ω(log⁡2N)\Omega(\log^{2}N) queries (with high probability) to find the fixed point.

Can this lower bound result be generalized to fixed d≥3d\geq 3? This is a key question left open by this paper. There are several obstacles to a proof establishing, e.g., a Ω(log⁡3N)\Omega(\log^{3}N) lower bound in the 3-dimensional case (d=3d=3), and some possible ways for overcoming them. First, it is not easy to identify a suitable “herringbone-like” function in three or more dimensions — a monotone family of functions built around a path from 1ˉ\bar{1} to Nˉ\bar{N}. It nevertheless seems plausible that log⁡dN\log^{d}N should still be (close to) a lower bound on any such algorithm (assuming of course that NN is sufficiently larger than dd, so that the dNdN algorithm does not violate the lower bound). We prove one encouraging result in this context: We give an alternative proof of the d=2d=2 lower bound, in which we establish that any deterministic black-box algorithm for Tarski in two dimensions must solve a sequence of Ω(log⁡N)\Omega(\log N) one-dimensional problems (Theorem 4.7), a result pointing to a possible induction on dd (recall that this is precisely the form of the log⁡dN\log^{d}N algorithm).

Tarski’s theorem further asserts that there is a greatest and a least fixed point, and these fixed points are especially useful in the economic applications of the result (see for example ). It is not hard to see, however, that finding these fixed points is NP-hard, and takes Ω(dN)\Omega(dN) time in the black box model (see Proposition 2.1).

In terms of complexity classes, the problem Tarski is obviously in the class TFNP of total function (total search) problems. But where exactly? We show (Theorem 3.2) that it belongs in the class PLS\mathsf{PLS} of local optimum search problems.

Surprisingly, Tarski is also in the class PPPADP^{\mathsf{PPAD}} of problems reducible to a Brouwer fixed point problem (Theorem 3.3), and thus, by the known fact that the class PPAD\mathsf{PPAD} is closed under polynomial time Turing reductions () it is in PPAD\mathsf{PPAD} (Corollary 3.4). This result presents a heretofore unsuspected connection between two main sources of equilibrium results in economics.

Supermodular games — or games with strategic complementarities — comprise a large and important class of economic models, with complete lattices as strategy spaces, in which a player’s best response is a monotone function (or monotone correspondence) of the other player’s strategies. They always have pure Nash equilibria due to Tarski’s theorem. We show that finding an equilibrium for a supermodular game with (discrete) Euclidean grid strategy spaces is essentially computationally equivalent to the problem of finding a Tarski fixed point of a monotone map (Proposition 5.2 and Theorem 5.4). If there are two players and one of them has a one-dimensional strategy space, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be found in logarithmic time (in the size of the strategy spaces).

Stochastic games . We show that the problems of computing the (irrational) value of Shapley’s discounted stochastic games to desired accuracy, and computing the exact value of Condon’s simple stochastic games (SSG), are both P-time reducible to the Tarski problem. The proofs employ known characterizations of the value of both Shapley’s stochastic games and Condon’s SSGs in terms of monotone fixed point equations, which can also be viewed as monotone “polynomially contracting” maps with a unique fixed point, and from properties of polynomially contracting maps, see .

Prior related work: in recent years a number of technical reports and papers by Dang, Qi, and Ye, have considered the complexity of computational problems related to Tarski’s theorem . In particular, in the authors provided the already-mentioned log⁡dN\log^{d}N algorithm for computing a Tarski fixed point for a discrete map, f:[N]d→[N]df:[N]^{d}\rightarrow[N]^{d}, which is monotone under the coordinate-wise order. In they also establish that determining the uniqueness of the fixed point of a monotone map under coordinate-wise order is coNP-hard, and that uniqueness under lexicographic order is also coNP-hard (already in one dimension). In the authors studied another variant of the Tarski problem, namely computing another fixed point of a monotone function in an expanded domain where the smallest point is a fixed point; this variant is NP-hard (the claim in the paper that this problem is in PPA\mathsf{PPA}{} has been withdrawn by the authors ). In earlier work, Echenique , studied algorithms for computing all pure Nash equilibria in supermodular games (and games with strategic complementaries) whose strategy spaces are discrete grids. Of course computing all pure equilibria is harder than computing some pure equilibrium; indeed, we show that computing the least (or greatest) pure equilibrium of such a supermodular game is already NP-hard (Corollary 5.5). In earlier work Chang, Lyuu, and Ti considered the complexity of Tarski’s fixed point theorem over a general finite lattice given via an oracle for its partial order (not given it explicitly) and given an oracle for the monotone function, and they observed that the total number of oracle queries required to find some fixed point in this model is linear in the number of elements of the lattice. They did not study monotone functions on euclidean grid lattices, and their results have no bearing on this setting.

Basics

A partial order (L,≤)(L,\leq) is a complete lattice if every nonempty subset SS of LL has a least upper bound (or supremum or join, denoted sup⁡S\sup S or ∨S\lor S) and a greatest lower bound (or infimum or meet, denoted inf⁡S\inf S or ∧S\land S) in LL. A function f:L→Lf:L\rightarrow L is monotone if for all pairs of elements x,y∈Lx,y\in L, x≤yx\leq y implies f(x)≤f(y)f(x)\leq f(y). A point x∈Lx\in L is a fixed point of ff if f(x)=xf(x)=x. Tarski’s theorem () states that the set Fix(f)Fix(f) of fixed points of ff is a nonempty complete lattice under the same partial order ≤\leq; in particular, ff has a greatest fixed point (GFP) and a least fixed point (LFP).

In this paper we will take as our underlying lattice LL a finite discrete Euclidean grid, which we fix for simplicity to be the integer grid [N]d[N]^{d}, for some positive integers N,dN,d, where [N]={1,…,N}[N]=\{1,\ldots,N\}. Comparison of points is componentwise, i.e. x≤yx\leq y if xi≤yix_{i}\leq y_{i} for all i=1,…,di=1,\ldots,d. We will also consider the corresponding continuous box, [1,N]d[1,N]^{d} that includes all real points in the box. Both, the discrete and continuous box are clearly complete lattices.

Given a monotone function ff on the integer grid [N]d[N]^{d}, the problem is to compute a fixed point of ff (any point in Fix(f)Fix(f)). A generally harder problem is to compute specifically the LFP of ff or the GFP of ff. We consider mostly the oracle model, in which the function ff is given by a black-box oracle, and the complexity of the algorithm is measured in terms of the number of queries to the oracle. Alternatively, we can consider also an explicit model in which ff is given explicitly by a polynomial-time algorithm (a polynomial-size Boolean circuit), and then the complexity of the algorithm is measured in the ordinary Turing model. Note that the number of bits needed to represent a point in the domain is dlog⁡Nd\log N, so polynomial time here means polynomial in dd and n=log⁡Nn=\log N. The number NdN^{d} of points in the domain is exponential.

Tarski’s value iteration algorithm provides a simple way to compute the LFP of ff: Starting from the lowest point of the lattice, which here is the all-1 vector 11, apply repeatedly ff. This generates a monotonically increasing sequence of points 1≤f(1)≤f2(1)≤…1\leq f(1)\leq f^{2}(1)\leq\ldots until a fixed point is reached, which is the LFP of ff. In every step of the sequence, at least one coordinate is strictly increased, therefore a fixed point is reached in at most (N−1)d(N-1)d steps. In the worst case, the process may take that long, which is exponential in the bit size dlog⁡Nd\log N. Similarly, the GFP can be computed by applying repeatedly ff starting from the highest point of the lattice, i.e., from the all-NN point, until a fixed point is reached.

Another way to compute some fixed point of a monotone function ff (not necessarily the LFP or the GFP) is by a divide-and-conquer algorithm. In one dimension, we can use binary search: If the domain is the set L(l,h)={x∈Z∣l≤x≤h}L(l,h)=\{x\in Z|l\leq x\leq h\} of integers between the lowest point ll and the highest point hh, then compute the value of ff on the midpoint m=(l+h)/2m=(l+h)/2. If f(m)=mf(m)=m then mm is a fixed point; if f(m)<mf(m)<m then recurse on the lower half L(l,m)L(l,m), and if f(m)>mf(m)>m then recurse on the upper half L(m,h)L(m,h). The monotonicity of ff implies that ff maps the respective half interval into itself. Hence the algorithm correctly finds a fixed point in at most log⁡N\log N iterations, where NN is the number of points.

In the general dd-dimensional case, suppose that the domain is the set of integer points in the box defined by the lowest point ll and the highest point hh, i.e. L(l,h)={x∈Zd∣l≤x≤h}L(l,h)=\{x\in Z^{d}|l\leq x\leq h\}. Consider the set of points with dd-th coordinate equal to m=(l+h)/2m=(l+h)/2; their first d−1d-1 coordinates induce a (d−1)(d-1)-dimensional lattice L′(l,h)={x∈Zd−1∣li≤xi≤hi,i=1,…d−1}L^{\prime}(l,h)=\{x\in Z^{d-1}|l_{i}\leq x_{i}\leq h_{i},i=1,\ldots d-1\}. Define the function gg on L′(l,h)L^{\prime}(l,h) by letting g(x)g(x) consist of the first d−1d-1 components of f(x,m)f(x,m). It is easy to see that gg is a monotone function on L′(l,h)L^{\prime}(l,h). Recursively, compute a fixed point x∗x^{*} of gg. If fd(x∗,m)=mf_{d}(x^{*},m)=m, then (x∗,m)(x^{*},m) is a fixed point of ff (this holds in particular if l=hl=h). If fd(x∗,m)>mf_{d}(x^{*},m)>m, then recurse on L(f(x∗,m),h)L(f(x^{*},m),h). If fd(x∗,m)<mf_{d}(x^{*},m)<m, then recurse on L(l,f(x∗,m))L(l,f(x^{*},m)). In either case, monotonicity implies that if the algorithm recurses, then ff maps the smaller box into itself and thus has a fixed point in it. An easy induction shows that the complexity of this algorithm is O((log⁡N)d)O((\log N)^{d}), ().

Computing the least or the greatest fixed point is in general hard, even in one dimension, both in the oracle and in the explicit model.

Computing the LFP or the GFP of an explicitly given polynomial-time monotone function in one dimension is NP-hard. In the oracle model, the problem requires Ω(N)\Omega(N) queries for a domain of size NN.

We prove the claim for the LFP; the GFP is similar. Reduction from Satisfiability. Given a Boolean formula ϕ\phi in nn variables, let the domain D={0,1,…,2n}D=\{0,1,\ldots,2^{n}\}, and define the function ff as follows. For x≤2n−1x\leq 2^{n}-1, viewing xx as an nn-bit binary number, it corresponds to an assignment to the nn variables of ϕ\phi; let f(x)=xf(x)=x if the assignment xx satisfies ϕ\phi, and let f(x)=x+1f(x)=x+1 otherwise. Define f(2n)=2nf(2^{n})=2^{n}. Clearly ff is a monotone function and it can be computed in polynomial time. If ϕ\phi is not satisfiable then the LFP of ff is 2n2^{n}, while if ϕ\phi is satisfiable then the LFP is not 2n2^{n}.

For the oracle model, use the same domain DD and let ff map every x≤2n−1x\leq 2^{n}-1 to xx or x+1x+1, and f(2n)=2nf(2^{n})=2^{n}. The LFP is not 2n2^{n} iff there exists an x≤2n−1x\leq 2^{n}-1 such that f(x)=xf(x)=x, which in the oracle model requires trying all possible x≤2n−1x\leq 2^{n}-1. ∎

In the case of a continuous domain [1,N]d[1,N]^{d}, we may not be able to compute an exact fixed point, and thus we have to be content with approximation. Given an ϵ>0\epsilon>0, an ϵ\epsilon-approximate fixed point is a point xx such that ∣f(x)−x∣≤ϵ|f(x)-x|\leq\epsilon, where we use the L∞L_{\infty} (max) norm, i.e. ∣f(x)−x∣=max⁡{∣fi(x)−xi∣∣i=1,…,d}|f(x)-x|=\max\{|f_{i}(x)-x_{i}||i=1,\ldots,d\}. In this context, polynomial time means polynomial in log⁡N,d,\log N,d, and log⁡(1/ϵ)\log(1/\epsilon) (the number of bits of the approximation). An ϵ\epsilon-approximate fixed point need not be close to any actual fixed point of ff. A problem that is generally harder is to compute a point that approximates some actual fixed point, and an even harder task is to approximate specifically the LFP or the GFP of ff. Tarski’s value iteration algorithm, starting from the lowest point converges in the limit to the LFP (and if started from the highest point, it converges to the GFP), but there is no general bound on the number of iterations needed to get within ϵ\epsilon of the LFP (or the GFP). The algorithm reaches however an ϵ\epsilon-approximate fixed point within Nd/ϵNd/\epsilon iterations (note, this is exponential in log⁡N,log⁡(1/ϵ)\log N,\log(1/\epsilon)).

It is easy to see that the approximate fixed point problem for the continuous case reduces to the exact fixed point problem for the discrete case.

The problem of computing an ϵ\epsilon-approximate fixed point of a given monotone function on the continuous domain [1,N]d[1,N]^{d} reduces to the exact fixed point problem on a discrete domain [N/ϵ]d[N/\epsilon]^{d}.

Given the monotone function ff on the continuous domain D1=[1,N]dD_{1}=[1,N]^{d}, consider the discrete domain D2={x∈Zd∣k≤xi≤Nk,i=1,…,d}D_{2}=\{x\in Z^{d}|k\leq x_{i}\leq Nk,i=1,\ldots,d\}, where k=⌈1/ϵ⌉k=\lceil 1/\epsilon\rceil, and define the function gg on D2D_{2} as follows. For every x∈D2x\in D_{2}, let g(x)g(x) be obtained from kf(x/k)kf(x/k) by rounding each coordinate to the nearest integer, with ties broken (arbitrarily) in favor of the ceiling. Since ff is monotone, gg is also monotone. If x∗x^{*} is a fixed point of gg, then kf(x∗/k)kf(x^{*}/k) is within 1/2 of x∗x^{*} in every coordinate, and hence f(x∗/k)f(x^{*}/k) is within 1/2k<ϵ1/2k<\epsilon of x∗/kx^{*}/k. Thus x∗/kx^{*}/k is an ϵ\epsilon-approximate fixed point of ff. ∎

Computing a Tarski fixed point is in 𝖯𝖫𝖲𝖯𝖫𝖲\mathsf{PLS} ∩\cap 𝖯𝖯𝖠𝖣𝖯𝖯𝖠𝖣\mathsf{PPAD}{}

Recall that a general discrete total search problem (with polynomially bounded outputs), Π\Pi, has a set of valid input instances DΠ⊆{0,1}∗D_{\Pi}\subseteq\{0,1\}^{*}, and associates with each valid input instance I∈DΠI\in D_{\Pi}, a non-empty set OI⊆{0,1}pΠ(∣I∣){\mathcal{O}}_{I}\subseteq\{0,1\}^{p_{\Pi}(|I|)} of acceptable outputs, where pΠ(⋅)p_{\Pi}(\cdot) is some polynomial. (So the bit encoding length of every acceptable output is polynomially bounded in the bit encoding length of the input II.)

We are interested in the complexity of the following total search problem:

Input: A function f:[N]d→[N]df:[N]^{d}\rightarrow[N]^{d} with N=2nN=2^{n} for some n≥1n\geq 1, given by a boolean circuit, CfC_{f}, with (d⋅n)(d\cdot n) input gates and (d⋅n)(d\cdot n) output gates.

Note Tarski\mathtt{Tarski} is a total search problem: If ff is monotone, it will contain a fixed point in [N]d[N]^{d}, and otherwise it will contain such a witness pair of vectors that exhibit non-monotonicity. (If it is non-monotone it may of course have both witnesses for non-monotonicity and fixed points.)

Recall that a total search problem, Π\Pi, is in the complexity class PLS\mathsf{PLS} (Polynomial Local Search) if it satisfies all of the following conditions (see ):

A solution s∈SIs\in S_{I} is called a local optimum (local maximum) if for all s′∈NI(s)s^{\prime}\in{\mathcal{N}}_{I}(s), gI(s)≥gI(s′)g_{I}(s)\geq g_{I}(s^{\prime}). We let OI{\mathcal{O}}_{I} denote the set of all local optima for instance II. (Clearly OI{\mathcal{O}}_{I} is non-empty, because SIS_{I} is non-empty.)

There is a polynomial time algorithm, AΠA_{\Pi}, that given a string I∈{0,1}∗I\in\{0,1\}^{*}, decides whether II is a valid input instance I∈DΠI\in D_{\Pi}, and if so outputs some solution s0∈SIs_{0}\in S_{I}.

There is a polynomial time algorithm, BΠB_{\Pi}, that given valid instance I∈DΠI\in D_{\Pi} and a string s∈{0,1}p(∣I∣)s\in\{0,1\}^{p(|I|)}, decides whether s∈SIs\in S_{I}, and if so, outputs the payoff gI(s)g_{I}(s).

There is a polynomial time algorithm, HΠH_{\Pi}, that given valid instance I∈DΠI\in D_{\Pi} and s∈SIs\in S_{I}, decides whether ss is a local optimum, i.e., whether s∈OIs\in{\mathcal{O}}_{I}, and otherwise computes a strictly improving neighbor s′∈NI(s)s^{\prime}\in{\mathcal{N}}_{I}(s), such that gI(s′)>gI(s)g_{I}(s^{\prime})>g_{I}(s).

Each valid input instance If∈DTarski⊆{0,1}∗I_{f}\in D_{\mathtt{Tarski}}\subseteq\{0,1\}^{*} of Tarski\mathtt{Tarski} is an encoding of a function f:[N]d→[N]df:[N]^{d}\rightarrow[N]^{d} via a boolean circuit CfC_{f}. We can view the problem Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}{} as a polynomial local search problem, as follows:

There is a polynomial time algorithm ATarskiA_{\mathtt{Tarski}} that, given a string If∈{0,1}∗I_{f}\in\{0,1\}^{*} first determines whether this is a valid input instance, by checking that it suitably encodes a boolean circuit (straight-line program) CfC_{f} with (dlog⁡N)(d\log N) input gates and the same number of output gates, and thereby defines a function f:[N]d→[N]df:[N]^{d}\rightarrow[N]^{d}. If the input is a valid instance, then ATarskiA_{\mathtt{Tarski}} outputs a solution s0∈SIfs_{0}\in S_{I_{f}}, by just letting s0:=1∈[N]ds_{0}:={\mathbf{1}}\in[N]^{d} be the all 1 vector. Clearly, 1≤f(1){\mathbf{1}}\leq f({\mathbf{1}}), so indeed 1∈SIf′⊆SIf{\mathbf{1}}\in S^{\prime}_{I_{f}}\subseteq S_{I_{f}}.

There is a polynomial time algorithm BTarskiB_{\mathtt{Tarski}} that, given a valid instance IfI_{f} and given a string s∈{0,1}∗s\in\{0,1\}^{*}, first decides whether s∈SIfs\in S_{I_{f}}. It does so as follows: if ss is (a binary encoding of) x∈[N]dx\in[N]^{d}, then BTarskiB_{\mathtt{Tarski}} computes f(x)f(x) using the given boolean circuit CfC_{f} (encoded in instance IfI_{f}), and checking whether x≤f(x)x\leq f(x). If instead s=(x,y)∈[N]d×[N]ds=(x,y)\in[N]^{d}\times[N]^{d}, then it checks whether (x,y)(x,y) is a witness of non-monotonicity, by computing f(x)f(x) and f(y)f(y) using CfC_{f}, and checking that both x≤yx\leq y and f(x)≰f(y)f(x)\not\leq f(y) hold.

If s∈SIfs\in S_{I_{f}}, the algorithm can also easily output the value of the objective gIf(s)g_{I_{f}}(s). Namely, if s=x∈SIf′s=x\in S^{\prime}_{I_{f}}, then gIf(s):=∑i=1dxig_{I_{f}}(s):=\sum_{i=1}^{d}x_{i}, and if s=(x,y)∈SIf′′s=(x,y)\in S^{\prime\prime}_{I_{f}} then gIf(s):=dN+1g_{I_{f}}(s):=dN+1.

We have thus shown that Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}{} satisfies all the conditions of being in PLS\mathsf{PLS}{}. ∎

𝚃𝚊𝚛𝚜𝚔𝚒∈𝖯𝖯𝖠𝖣𝚃𝚊𝚛𝚜𝚔𝚒𝖯𝖯𝖠𝖣\mathtt{Tarski}{}\in\mathsf{PPAD}

Once we have established that Tarski∈PPPAD\mathtt{Tarski}\in P^{\mathsf{PPAD}}, the fact that Tarski∈PPAD\mathtt{Tarski}\in\mathsf{PPAD} will follow as a simple corollary, using a prior result of Buss and Johnson , who showed that PPAD\mathsf{PPAD} is closed under polynomial-time Turing reductions.

There are a number of equivalent ways to define the total search complexity class PPAD\mathsf{PPAD}. Rather than give the original definition (), we will use an equivalent characterization of PPAD\mathsf{PPAD} (a.k.a., linear\mathsf{linear}-FIXP\mathsf{FIXP}) from (see section 5 of ). Informally, according to this characterization, a discrete total search problem, Π\Pi, is in PPAD\mathsf{PPAD} if and only if it can be reduced in P-time to computing a Brouwer fixed point of an associated “polynomial piecewise-linear” continuous function that maps a non-empty convex polytope to itself. More formally, Π\Pi is in PPAD\mathsf{PPAD} if it satisfies all of the following conditions:

There is a polynomial time oracle algorithm, RΠ2R^{2}_{\Pi}, that “computes” the piecewise-linear function FIF_{I} in the following sense.

Note that in this sense RΠ2R^{2}_{\Pi} does indeed define the piecewise-linear function FI:W(I)→W(I)F_{I}:W(I)\rightarrow W(I). Specifically, for x∈W(I)x\in W(I), the sequence of (polynomially many) oracle queries made by RΠ2(I,Ox)R^{2}_{\Pi}(I,O_{x}) defines a system of linear inequalities (with rational, polynomially bounded, coefficients) satisfied by xx which define a “piece” or “cell” such that x∈Cx⊆W(I)x\in{\mathcal{C}}_{x}\subseteq W(I), and such that FIF_{I} is linear on Cx{\mathcal{C}}_{x}; specifically such that for any y∈Cxy\in{\mathcal{C}}_{x}, FI(y)=Cy+C′F_{I}(y)=Cy+C^{\prime}.

Suppose we are given an instance If∈DTarskiI_{f}\in D_{\mathtt{Tarski}} of Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}, corresponding to a function f:[N]d→[N]df:[N]^{d}\rightarrow[N]^{d} (given by a boolean circuit CfC_{f}).

Nevertheless, we will show that finding any such fixed point of f′f^{\prime} allows us to make progress (via a divide and conquer binary search), towards either finding a discrete fixed point of ff (if it is monotone), or finding witnesses for a violation of monotonicity of ff.

We now define f′f^{\prime} in detail. Consider the following simplicial decompositionKnown as Freudenthal’s simplicial division . of B(a,b)B(a,b). For each i∈[d]i\in[d], let ei∈{0,1}de^{i}\in\{0,1\}^{d} denote the standard unit vector with ’s in every coordinate except a 11 in the ii’th coordinate. For each integer vector y∈L(a,b−1)y\in L(a,b-{\mathbf{1}}), and for every permutation π=(π1,…,πd)\pi=(\pi_{1},\ldots,\pi_{d}) of [d][d], define the subsimplex Sy,πS^{y,\pi} as the convex hull of the following d+1d+1 (affinely independent) vertices y0,…,yd+1∈L(a,b)y^{0},\ldots,y^{d+1}\in L(a,b), given by y0=yy^{0}=y, and for i∈{1,…,d}i\in\{1,\ldots,d\}, yi=yi−1+eπiy^{i}=y^{i-1}+e^{\pi_{i}}.

The union of all d!d! simplices \{S^{y,\pi}\mid\pi\ \mbox{is a permutation of[d]}\} constitutes a simplicial subdivision of the d-cube B(y,y+1)B(y,y+{\mathbf{1}}), and the union of all such simplices, for all y∈L(a,b−1)y\in L(a,b-{\mathbf{1}}) constitutes a simplicial subdivision of B(a,b)B(a,b). Note the following important property of this simplicial subdivision, which we exploit: the vertices y0,y1,…,ydy^{0},y^{1},\ldots,y^{d} of each subsimplex Sy,πS^{y,\pi} are totally ordered with respect to coordinate-wise order: y0≤y1≤y2≤…≤ydy^{0}\leq y^{1}\leq y^{2}\leq\ldots\leq y^{d}.

Given this simplicial subdivision of B(a,b)B(a,b), we define f′:B(a,b)→B(a,b)f^{\prime}:B(a,b)\rightarrow B(a,b) so that it linearly interpolates ff inside each subsimplex Sy,πS^{y,\pi}. Specifically, for any point x∈Sy,πx\in S^{y,\pi}, there is a unique vector λ=(λ0,λ1,…,λd)∈d+1\lambda=(\lambda_{0},\lambda_{1},\ldots,\lambda_{d})\in^{d+1}, such that ∑j=0dλj=1\sum_{j=0}^{d}\lambda_{j}=1, and such that x=∑j=0dλjyjx=\sum_{j=0}^{d}\lambda_{j}y^{j}. We define f′(x):=∑j=0dλjf(yj)f^{\prime}(x):=\sum_{j=0}^{d}\lambda_{j}f(y^{j}). Note that f′f^{\prime} agrees with ff on integer points in L(a,b)L(a,b). Also if xx belongs to several x∈Sy,πx\in S^{y,\pi} (i.e. lies on some common faces of the subsimplices), then only the common vertices will have nonzero coefficients in any subsimplex, thus they all yield the same value for f′(x)f^{\prime}(x).

Suppose, on the other hand, that the computed fixed point x∗x^{*} of f′f^{\prime} is non-integer in some coordinate. It is still useful. Consider the cell C⊆Sy,πC\subseteq S^{y,\pi}, defined as the convex hull of the unique subset Y′={yj1,yj2,…,yjk}Y^{\prime}=\{y^{j_{1}},y^{j_{2}},\ldots,y^{j_{k}}\} of the vertices Y={y0,…,yd}Y=\{y^{0},\ldots,y^{d}\} of Sy,πS^{y,\pi}, such that CC contains x∗x^{*} in its strict interior. In other words, x∗=∑r=1kλjryjrx^{*}=\sum_{r=1}^{k}\lambda_{j_{r}}y^{j_{r}}, such that 0<λjr<10<\lambda_{j_{r}}<1 for all r∈{1,…,k}r\in\{1,\ldots,k\}. Let u=yjtu=y^{j_{t}} be the maximum vertex of CC, and let v=yjqv=y^{j_{q}} be the minimum vertex of CC (the vertices of CC are ordered since they are a subset of the vertices of Sy,πS^{y,\pi}).

Suppose that ff is monotone and f(u)i<uif(u)_{i}<u_{i} for some coordinate ii. Then f(u)i≤ui−1f(u)_{i}\leq u_{i}-1 because f(u)if(u)_{i} is an integer. Furthermore, for all vertices yjry^{j_{r}} of CC, since yjr≤u=yjty^{j_{r}}\leq u=y^{j_{t}}, we must also have fi(yjr)≤fi(u)≤ui−1≤yijrf_{i}(y^{j_{r}})\leq f_{i}(u)\leq u_{i}-1\leq y^{j_{r}}_{i} (where the last inequality holds because two vertices of CC differ in any given coordinate by at most 1). But we have ∑r=1kλjryijr=xi∗=f′(x∗)i=∑r=1kλjrf(yjr)i\sum_{r=1}^{k}\lambda_{j_{r}}y^{j_{r}}_{i}=x^{*}_{i}=f^{\prime}(x^{*})_{i}=\sum_{r=1}^{k}\lambda_{j_{r}}f(y^{j_{r}})_{i}, which is impossible, since yijr≥f(yjr)iy^{j_{r}}_{i}\geq f(y^{j_{r}})_{i} for every rr, and yijt>f(yjt)iy^{j_{t}}_{i}>f(y^{j_{t}})_{i}, and λjt>0\lambda_{j_{t}}>0. Thus, since x∗x^{*} is a fixed point of f′f^{\prime}, it can not be the case that ff is monotone and f(u)i<uif(u)_{i}<u_{i} for some coordinate ii. Therefore, if ff is monotone, then f(u)≥uf(u)\geq u (in all coordinates). For a completely analogous reason, if ff is monotone, we also have f(v)≤vf(v)\leq v.

Suppose, on the other hand we either find that f(u)≱uf(u)\not\geq u, or that f(v)≰vf(v)\not\leq v. Then necessarily, it must be the case that there are a pair of vertices yjb,yjey^{j_{b}},y^{j_{e}} of the cell CC containing x∗x^{*} in its interior, such that yjb≤yjey^{j_{b}}\leq y^{j_{e}} but f(yjb)≰f(yje)f(y^{j_{b}})\not\leq f(y^{j_{e}}). So, in this case, we examine all such pairs to find such a pair, we halt and output (yjb,yje)(y^{j_{b}},y^{j_{e}}) as a witness pair for the non-monotonicity of ff.

Assume on the other hand that f(u)≥uf(u)\geq u and f(v)≤vf(v)\leq v. Note that in that case, if ff is monotone, then it maps the sublattice L(u,b)L(u,b) to itself, and it also maps the disjoint sublattice L(a,v)L(a,v) to itself. Thus, if ff is monotone, ff must have an integer fixed point in both L(a,v)L(a,v) and L(u,b)L(u,b).

So, we can choose the smaller of these two sublattices, consider the function ff restricted to that sublattice, and continue recursively to find a fixed point in that sublattice (if ff is monotone) or a violation of monotonicity. If ff is not monotone, it is possible that it maps some points in the sublattice L(a,v)L(a,v) (or L(u,b)L(u,b)) to points outside. Therefore, in the recursive call for the sublattice, when we define the piecewise-linear function f′f^{\prime} on the corresponding box B(a,v)B(a,v) (or B(u,b)B(u,b)) we take the maximum with aa and minimum with vv (or uu and bb respectively), i.e., threshold it, so that it maps the box to itself, and hence it is a Brouwer function. When the PPAD\mathsf{PPAD}{} oracle gives us back a fixed point x∗x^{*} for this (possibly thresholded) function f′f^{\prime}, we find the vertices yjry^{j_{r}} of the cell CC that contains x∗x^{*} in its strict interior (i.e. the ones that have nonzero coefficients in the convex combination) and test if ff maps all of them within the current box. If this is not the case then we get a violation of monotonicity: Suppose wlog that the current box is B(a,v)B(a,v) (similarly if it is B(u,b)B(u,b)). If f(yjr)≱af(y^{j_{r}})\not\geq a then (a,yjr)(a,y^{j_{r}}) is a violating pair because f(a)≥af(a)\geq a; if f(yjr)≰vf(y^{j_{r}})\not\leq v then (yjr,v)(y^{j_{r}},v) is a violating pair because f(v)≤vf(v)\leq v. Thus, if f(yjr)f(y^{j_{r}}) lies outside the current box, then we return the discovered violating pair and terminate. Otherwise, the thresholding did not affect the f(yjr)f(y^{j_{r}}) and f′(x∗)f^{\prime}(x^{*}) and we proceed as explained above.

Every iteration decreases the total number of points in our current lattice by a factor of 22, from the number of points in the original lattice L(a,b)L(a,b). So after a polynomial number of iterations in (d+log⁡N)(d+\log N), we either find a fixed point of ff, or we find a witness pair of integer vectors that witness the non-monotonicity of ff. ∎

This follows immediately from Theorem 3.3, combined with a result due to Buss and Johnson (, Theorem 6.1), who showed that PPAD\mathsf{PPAD} is closed under polynomial-time Turing reductions. ∎

The 2-dimensional lower bound

Consider a monotone function defined on the N×NN\times N grid f:[N]2↦[N]2f:[N]^{2}\mapsto[N]^{2}. Let AA be any (randomized) black-box algorithm for finding a fixed point of the function by computing a sequence of queries of the form f(x,y)=?f(x,y)=?; AA can of course be adaptive in that any query can depend in arbitrarily complex ways on the answers to the previous queries. For example, the divide-and-conquer algorithm described in the introduction is a black box algorithm. The following result suggests that this algorithm is optimal for two dimensions.

Given black-box access to a monotone function f:[N]2→[N]2f:\left[N\right]^{2}\rightarrow\left[N\right]^{2}, finding a fixed point of ff requires Ω(log⁡2N)\Omega(\log^{2}N) queries (with high probability).

Below, we construct a hard distribution of such functions.

Given a monotone path from (1,1)\left(1,1\right) to (N,N)\left(N,N\right) on the N×NN\times N grid graph and a point (i∗,j∗)\left(i^{*},j^{*}\right) on the path, we construct ff as follows:

We let (i∗,j∗)\left(i^{*},j^{*}\right) be the unique fixed point of ff, i.e. f(i∗,j∗)≜(i∗,j∗)f\left(i^{*},j^{*}\right)\triangleq\left(i^{*},j^{*}\right).

At all other points on the path, ff is directed towards the fixed point. For a point (x,y)\left(x,y\right) on the path that is dominated by (i∗,j∗)\left(i^{*},j^{*}\right), we let f(x,y)f(x,y) be the next point on the path, i.e. f(x,y)=(x+1,y)f(x,y)=\left(x+1,y\right) or f(x,y)=(x,y+1)f(x,y)=\left(x,y+1\right). Similarly, for a point (x,y)(x,y) that is on the path and dominates (i∗,j∗)\left(i^{*},j^{*}\right), we let f(x,y)f(x,y) be the previous point on the path.

For all points outside the path, ff is directed towards the path. Observe that the path partitions [N]2\left[N\right]^{2} into three (possibly empty) subsets: below the path, the path, and above the path. For a point (x,y)\left(x,y\right) below the path, we set f(x,y)≜(x−1,y+1)f\left(x,y\right)\triangleq\left(x-1,y+1\right). Similarly, for a point (x,y)\left(x,y\right) above the path, f(x,y)≜(x+1,y−1)f\left(x,y\right)\triangleq\left(x+1,y-1\right).

An example of such a function f:2→2f:^{2}\rightarrow^{2} is given in Figure 1.

For any choice of path and point (i∗,j∗)\left(i^{*},j^{*}\right) on the path, ff constructed as above is monotone.

In our hard distribution, once we fix a path, we choose (i∗,j∗)\left(i^{*},j^{*}\right) uniformly at random among all points on the path.

Given oracle access to ff and the path, any (randomized) algorithm that finds a point (i′,j′)\left(i^{\prime},j^{\prime}\right) on the path that is within N\sqrt{N} (Manhattan distance) from (i∗,j∗)\left(i^{*},j^{*}\right) requires querying ff at Ω(log⁡N)\Omega\left(\log N\right) points on the path that are at least N\sqrt{N} apart.

Observe that once we fix the path, the values of ff outside the path do not reveal information about the location of (i∗,j∗)\left(i^{*},j^{*}\right). The lower bound now follows from the standard lower bound for binary search. ∎

Choosing the central path

Our goal now is to prove that it is hard to find many distant points on the path. To simplify the analysis, we will only consider the special case where all points (x,y)\left(x,y\right) on the path satisfy x−y∈[−N1/4,N1/4]x-y\in\left[-N^{1/4},N^{1/4}\right]. We partition the N×NN\times N grid into Θ(N)\Theta\left(\sqrt{N}\right) regions of the form Ra≜{(x,y)∣x+y∈[a,a+N)}R_{a}\triangleq\left\{\left(x,y\right)\mid x+y\in[a,a+\sqrt{N})\right\}. Notice that each region intersects the path at exactly N\sqrt{N} points. The path enters each regionFor the first and last region, the path is obviously forced to start at (1,1)\left(1,1\right) (respectively end at (N,N)\left(N,N\right)); but those two regions can only account for two of the Ω(log⁡N)\Omega\left(\log N\right) distant path points required by Claim 4.3, so we can safely ignore them. at a point (x,y)\left(x,y\right) for a value x−yx-y chosen uniformly at random among [−N1/4,N1/4]\left[-N^{1/4},N^{1/4}\right]. We will argue (Lemma 4.6 below) that in order to find a point on the path in any region RaR_{a}, the algorithm must query the function at Ω(log⁡N)\Omega\left(\log N\right) points in RaR_{a} or its neighboring regions.

Each region is further partitioned into Θ(N1/4)\Theta\left(N^{1/4}\right) sub-regions Sa≜{(x,y)∣x+y∈[a,a+2N1/4)}S_{a}\triangleq\left\{\left(x,y\right)\mid x+y\in[a,a+2N^{1/4})\right\}. For each region, we choose a special sub-region uniformly at random. In all non-special sub-regions, the path proceeds while maintaining x−yx-y fixed, up to ±1\pm 1. Inside the special sub-region, the value of x−yx-y for path points changes from the value chosen at random for the current region, to the value chosen at random for the next region.

Given a choice of random x−yx-y entry point for each region, and a random special sub-region for each region, we consider an arbitrary path that satisfies the description above. This completes the description of the construction.

Finding the special sub-region in region RaR_{a} requires Ω(log⁡N)\Omega\left(\log N\right) queries to points in RaR_{a}.

Let SaS_{a} and SbS_{b} be the special sub-regions of two consecutive regions. Let T≜{(x,y)∣x+y∈[a+2N1/4,b)}T\triangleq\left\{\left(x,y\right)\mid x+y\in[a+2N^{1/4},b)\right\} be the union of all the sub-regions between SaS_{a} and SbS_{b}. Observe that the value of x−yx-y remains fixed (up to ±1\pm 1) for all points in the intersection of the path with TT. Also, the construction of ff outside Sa∪T∪SbS_{a}\cup T\cup S_{b} does not depend at all on this value.

In order to find any point in the intersection of the path and TT, the algorithm must query either Ω(log⁡N)\Omega\left(\log N\right) points from TT, or at least one point from SaS_{a} or SbS_{b}.

By Claim 4.4, finding SaS_{a} or SbS_{b} requires at least Ω(log⁡N)\Omega\left(\log N\right) queries to the regions containing them. Therefore, the above two claims together imply:

In order to query a point in the intersection of the path and region RaR_{a}, any algorithm must query at least Ω(log⁡N)\Omega\left(\log N\right) points in RaR_{a} or its neighboring regions.

Therefore, in order to find Ω(log⁡N)\Omega\left(\log N\right) points on the path that are at least N\sqrt{N} apart, the algorithm must make a total of Ω(log⁡2N)\Omega\left(\log^{2}N\right) queries, completing the proof of Theorem 4.1. ∎

1 An alternative proof

Any deterministic black box algorithm for finding a Tarski fixed point in two dimensions needs Ω(log⁡2N)\Omega(\log^{2}N) queries.

This proof appears to be more promising to generalize to more dimensions: its gist is that any such algorithm must solve Ω(log⁡N)\Omega(\log N) independent one-dimensional problems.

We shall describe a simple strategy for the adversary that achieves this bound. The adversary’s strategy is to again commit to “herringbone” functions as in Figure 1: the function consists of a main path consisting of a monotonically increasing path from (1,1)(1,1) to a point x∗x^{*}, and a monotonically decreasing path from (N,N)(N,N) to x∗x^{*}, with each step along the path, except for x∗x^{*}, changing one dimension of the argument by one unit. For all points (x,y)(x,y) off the main path, f(x,y)f(x,y) is either (x−1,y+1)(x-1,y+1) or (x+1,y−1)(x+1,y-1), depending on whether (x,y)(x,y) is below or above the main path, respectively; thus, the graph of the function is again herringbone-like, consisting of the main path, plus 45o45^{\hbox{\rm o}} paths towards the main path (see Figure 1).

For the sake of exposition and geometric intuition, we shall use a simple notation based on the eight cardinal directionsWe will try to avoid confusion between the direction N (North), and the number NN. That is why we use boldface for the basic directions.: N, S, E, W, NW, SE, SW, NE. Thus, the answer (x−1,y+1)(x-1,y+1) to the query f(x,y)f(x,y) will be denoted NW. To summarize the adversary’s strategy, the answer to a query f(x,y)f(x,y) is either SE or NW, thus declaring that (x,y)(x,y) is not on the path, unless both answers would contradict monotonicity, in which case the adversary must choose one of the principal directions, N, S, E, W. A query of the latter type is termed a decisive query. Note that the answer to any non-decisive query f(x,y)f(x,y) effectively “removes from consideration” a rectangular area of the grid — if f(x,y)=NWf(x,y)=NW, the block {(x′,y′):x′≥x,y′≤y}\{(x^{\prime},y^{\prime}):x^{\prime}\geq x,y^{\prime}\leq y\}, that is the whole block to the SE of (x,y)(x,y), is excluded for further consideration in the sense that the main path can no longer intersect it, and all points (x′,y′)(x^{\prime},y^{\prime}) in this block must have f(x′,y′)=NWf(x^{\prime},y^{\prime})=NW.Strictly speaking point on the block’s boundary do not have this restriction, but let us assume that they do, as this simplification favors the algorithm. At any time, the union of these forbidden rectangles consist of an upper left region that contains all points that are above and/or to the left of the query points (x,y)(x,y) that point SE (i.e. such that f(x,y)=SEf(x,y)=SE) and a lower right region that contains all points that are below or to the right of query points that point NW. The two forbidden regions are bounded by monotone staircase curves, and the main path must lie strictly between these two curves.

A query at point q=(x,y)q=(x,y) is decisive precisely when both points (x−1,y+1)(x-1,y+1) and (x+1,y−1)(x+1,y-1) to the NW and SE of qq belong to the forbidden area, the first one to (the boundary of) the upper left region and the second one to the lower right region. Thus, the main path must pass through the query point qq and now the adversary must decide whether the fixed point x∗x^{*} is above or below (x,y)(x,y).

How is this decision, as well as the decisions off the path (the choice between NW and SE) made? At any query, the algorithm has effectively determined that the part of the main path of current interest (certain to include the fixed point) is one of the possible monotonically increasing paths from some point (x‾,y‾)(\underline{x},\underline{y}) (the SW-most part of the domain), either the origin or a past decisive query, to some point (xˉ,yˉ)>(x‾,y‾)(\bar{x},\bar{y})>(\underline{x},\underline{y}) (the NE-most point of the domain) that avoids all blocks removed by past non-decisive queries. We call this region the current domain. During a decisive query qq, the algorithm has to choose: which of the two subdomains of the current domain, the one to the SW or the one to the NE, will be the new domain? The answer is whichever subdomain has the largest number of potential main paths. Since there is at least one potential main path remaining, at least one of the directions S{\bf S}, W{\bf W} must be available at qq (i.e., the point below or to the left of q=(x,y)q=(x,y) is not forbidden - it is possible that both are available), and similarly at least one of the directions N{\bf N}, E{\bf E} must be available at qq. The adversary compares the number of feasible monotone paths in the lower and upper subdomain (i.e. the number of feasible monotone paths between (x‾,y‾)(\underline{x},\underline{y}) and qq, to the number between qq and (xˉ,yˉ)(\bar{x},\bar{y})), continues in the subdomain with the largest number of paths, and if both choices for direction are available in this subdomain, then it chooses again the direction with the larger number of paths.

During any non-decisive query, the same criterion is used: The adversary will choose the answer among NW and SE that will result in a new domain (the previous domain with one block removed) with the largest number of paths that avoid all blocks, among the two possible choices. But there is an exception: If the domain is becoming very narrow — that is, if the NW or the SE forbidden region is very close to the query point qq - then a different rule is used. Specifically, if the NW-SE line through the query point qq hits the boundary of the forbidden region on either side within distance ≤w/2=Nα/2\leq w/2=N^{\alpha}/2, where α<1\alpha<1 (for concreteness, assume for the rest of the proof that α=1/2\alpha=1/2 and we measure for simplicity the length of diagonal paths in the L∞L_{\infty} metric), then the adversary chooses the direction NW or SE from qq that is furthest from the forbidden region (breaking ties arbitrarily). We call such queries short queries.

This completes the description of the adversary’s strategy. The potential function that will inform our lower bound is the logarithm of the number of main paths is the current domain. That is, for each time tt, we define LtL_{t} as the logarithm of the number of monotonically increasing paths in the domain at time tt (that is to say, just before the tt-th query). In the beginning, L1≥NL_{1}\geq N — actually, it is 2N−12log⁡N+o(1)2N-{1\over 2}\log N+o(1), since the number of paths is (2NN){2N}\choose{N}. When the algorithm concludes, Lt=0L_{t}=0 (since there is only one path left, the one containing the fixed point). If the tt-th query is a decisive query, then Lt+1≥Lt2−1L_{t+1}\geq{L_{t}\over 2}-1, since the number of main paths before query tt was precisely the product of the number of paths in the upper and lower subdomain, the adversary will choose to continue in the subdomain with the largest of the two (thus, with at least the square root of the number of paths), and if there are two available choices of direction in the subdomain, it chooses the direction with the larger number of paths.

If the tt-th query qq is a non-decisive and non-short query, then all feasible paths, except for those that go through the query point qq, belong obviously to either the feasible domain that results if f(q)=NWf(q)=NW or the domain that results if f(q)=SEf(q)=SE. Since qq is not a short query, the number of feasible paths that go through qq is a small fraction of the total number of feasible paths. Since the adversary chooses the direction among NW, SE with the larger number of paths, it follows that this number is approximately at least one half of the paths, hence certainly Lt+1≥Lt−2L_{t+1}\geq L_{t}-2.

The following lemma describes what happens at short queries:

If tt is a short query, then Lt+1≥Lt−Nαlog⁡NL_{t+1}\geq L_{t}-N^{\alpha}\log N.

Consider a short query qq and the NW to SE line through it, which intersects the boundary of the upper left forbidden region at aa and the boundary of the lower right region at bb. Suppose wlog that the adversary in this case chose f(q)=NWf(q)=NW, that is, ∣qa∣≥∣qb∣|qa|\geq|qb|, where ∣qa∣,∣qb∣|qa|,|qb| is the length of the segments qa,qbqa,qb (in L∞L_{\infty} metric). Since qq is a short query, d=∣qb∣≤w/2d=|qb|\leq w/2. Let ss be the minimum point of the current domain, and uu the maximum. For a point pp of the segment abab, we let npn_{p} denote the number of monotone feasible paths from ss to uu that go through pp. Let QQ be the number of paths that go through a point in the qaqa segment, and Q′Q^{\prime} the number of paths that go through a point in the qbqb segment.

Consider a point p′=(xp′,yp′)∈qbp^{\prime}=(x_{p^{\prime}},y_{p^{\prime}})\in qb and the point p=(xp,yp)=(xp′−d,yp′+d)p=(x_{p},y_{p})=(x_{p^{\prime}}-d,y_{p^{\prime}}+d) that is NW of p′p^{\prime} at distance dd. The point pp is in qaqa since d=∣qb∣≤∣qa∣d=|qb|\leq|qa|. Map every s−us-u path π′\pi^{\prime} through p′p^{\prime} to the path π\pi through pp, which agrees with π′\pi^{\prime} until it reaches x−x-coordinate xpx_{p} for the first time, then π\pi moves up vertically to pp, then horizontally until it meets again π′\pi^{\prime}, and then follows π′\pi^{\prime} until the end (see Figure 2).

Let z1z_{1} be the first point of π\pi with x−x-coordinate xpx_{p}, and let z2z_{2} be the last point of π\pi with yy-coordinate ypy_{p}. How many paths π′\pi^{\prime} through p′p^{\prime} get mapped to the same path π\pi through pp? All these paths π′\pi^{\prime} differ only in their portion between z1z_{1} and z2z_{2}. The number of monotone paths from z1z_{1} to p′p^{\prime} is at most (Nd)N\choose d, because such a path amounts to choosing dd E moves out of at most NN steps (and some of these paths may in fact not be feasible), and similarly the number of monotone paths from p′p^{\prime} to z2z_{2} is at most (Nd)N\choose d. Therefore, np′≤(Nd)2⋅npn_{p^{\prime}}\leq{N\choose d}^{2}\cdot n_{p}, for every p′∈qbp^{\prime}\in qb, and consequently Q′≤(Nd)2⋅QQ^{\prime}\leq{N\choose d}^{2}\cdot Q. We have to account also for the s−us-u paths through the query point qq. If ∣qa∣>∣qb∣|qa|>|qb|, then we can map them to the paths through the point at distance dd NW of qq, but even if ∣qa∣=∣qb∣|qa|=|qb|, note similarly that the number of paths through qq is at most N2N^{2} times the number of paths through the point immediately NW of it. In any case, since d≤w/2d\leq w/2, the total number of paths before the tt-th query is 2Lt≤2(Nw/2)2⋅Q<Nw⋅Q=Nw⋅2Lt+12^{L_{t}}\leq 2{N\choose{w/2}}^{2}\cdot Q<N^{w}\cdot Q=N^{w}\cdot 2^{L_{t+1}}. The lemma follows. ∎

The rest of the lower bound argument proceeds as follows: We shall show that there are at least Θ(log⁡N)\Theta(\log N) decisive queries such that we can “charge” to each of them Θ(log⁡N)\Theta(\log N) other queries — naturally, a query should be charged to only one decisive query, or at most a constant number of them. The theorem then follows immediately. The first part, the existence of Θ(log⁡N)\Theta(\log N) decisive queries, is already obvious; the Θ(log⁡N)\Theta(\log N) queries that can be charged to each (without much overcharging) will take a little more care to establish. We show first that there is a set of Ω(log⁡N)\Omega(\log N) decisive queries that are ww far from each other in both coordinates.

If the total number of queries is no more than log2Nlog^{2}N, then there is a set SS of K=Ω(log⁡N)K=\Omega(\log N) decisive queries {q1=(x1,y1),…,qK=(xK,yK)}\{q_{1}=(x_{1},y_{1}),\ldots,q_{K}=(x_{K},y_{K})\} such that, for any 1≤i≠j≤K1\leq i\neq j\leq K we have that ∣xi−xj∣,∣yi−yj∣>w|x_{i}-x_{j}|,|y_{i}-y_{j}|>w.

Any decisive query qt=(x,y)q_{t}=(x,y) takes place within a domain DtD_{t} with a SW-most point (x‾,y‾)(\underline{x},\underline{y}) and a NE-most point (xˉ,yˉ)(\bar{x},\bar{y}). We claim that, if xx is within ww of x‾,xˉ\underline{x},\bar{x}, or if yy is within ww of y‾,yˉ\underline{y},\bar{y}, then this query decreases LtL_{t} by at most wlog⁡Nw\log N. In proof, if xx is within ww of xˉ\bar{x} the number of paths between (x,y)(x,y) and (xˉ,yˉ)(\bar{x},\bar{y}) is at most (Nw)≤Nw{N\choose w}\leq N^{w}, and a similar argument holds for the other directions. Let us call such decisive queries ineffective, and otherwise they are called effective.

In summary, we have a potential function that starts at the value NN, and then is decreased in at most log⁡2N\log^{2}N steps either (1) by a factor of no more than two, minus additive 1 (decisive queries that are effective), or (2) by an additive term of at most Nαlog⁡NN^{\alpha}\log N (non-decisive, or ineffective decisive queries). It follows from arithmetic that there must be at least log⁡(N1−αlog⁡3N)\log\left({N^{1-\alpha}\over{\log^{3}N}}\right) queries of type (1).

Hence there is a set SS of K=Ω(log⁡N)K=\Omega(\log N) decisive queries that are effective. At the time each of these queries was issued, it was farther than ww from the SW and NE corners of its domain, in both the xx and the yy direction, and thus also farther than ww from any other previous queries — and this includes the previous decisive queries in SS. Hence these queries are all farther than ww away from each other, as claimed in the lemma. ∎

We show now how to assign Ω(log⁡n)\Omega(\log n) non-decisive queries to each ‘effective’ query qq in the set SS of the previous lemma. These are essentially the trace of the binary search that helped the algorithm corner the adversary into qq. We will refer in the following to the two boundary half-lines of the forbidden block generated by a non-decisive query as its walls. Consider a decisive effective query q=(x,y)q=(x,y) at time tt.

For every decisive effective query point qq there are Ω(log⁡N)\Omega(\log N) walls, generated by non-decisive queries, that intersect the NW-SE line through qq within a distance w/2w/2 from qq.

Since the query point q=(x,y)q=(x,y) is decisive, the points p1=(x−1,y+1)p_{1}=(x-1,y+1), p2=(x+1,y−1)p_{2}=(x+1,y-1) that are at distance 1 NW and SE from qq belong to the forbidden region, hence there exist two walls within a distance of 1 from qq on the NW-SE line, on either side of qq, corresponding to two queries q1=(x1,y1)q_{1}=(x_{1},y_{1}) and q2=(x2,y2)q_{2}=(x_{2},y_{2}), at times t1,t2t_{1},t_{2}. Since qq is effective, the queries q1,q2q_{1},q_{2} are non-decisive. We will use induction on k=2,…,⌊log⁡(w/2)⌋k=2,\ldots,\lfloor\log(w/2)\rfloor, to show that there is a set SkS_{k} of kk walls, generated by non-decisive queries, that intersect the NW-SE line through qq on both sides, within an interval that includes the point qq and has length δk≤2k\delta_{k}\leq 2^{k} (in the L∞L_{\infty} metric). This claim for k=⌊log⁡(w/2)⌋k=\lfloor\log(w/2)\rfloor implies immediately the lemma. For the basis, k=2k=2, we let S2S_{2} contain the walls at p1p_{1} and p2p_{2}.

For the induction step, consider the set SkS_{k} of walls. Let tlt_{l} be the earliest time that generated a wall of SkS_{k} that intersects the NW-SE line through qq left of qq (i.e. NW of qq), let plp_{l} be the intersection point and qlq_{l} the query point that generated the wall. Similarly, let trt_{r} be the earliest time that generated a wall of SkS_{k} that intersects the NW-SE line through qq right of qq (i.e. SE of qq), let prp_{r} be the intersection point and qrq_{r} the query point that generated the wall.

Suppose without loss of generality that tl>trt_{l}>t_{r}. Why did the adversary choose SE in response to query qlq_{l} at time tlt_{l}? Since tl>trt_{l}>t_{r}, the walls of qrq_{r} existed at time tlt_{l}. The wall through plp_{l} is either vertical, in which case qlq_{l} is below plp_{l}, or the wall is horizontal, in which case qlq_{l} is to the right of plp_{l} (see Figure 3). In either case, it is easy to see that the line from qlq_{l} in the SE direction hits a wall of the query point qrq_{r} within distance at most the length ∣plpr∣|p_{l}p_{r}| of the segment (pl,pr)(p_{l},p_{r}), thus at most 2k2^{k}; Fig. 3 shows the geometry when the wall at prp_{r} is vertical (the case of a horizontal wall at prp_{r} is symmetric).

Since the line from qlq_{l} in the SE direction hits a wall within 2k≤w/22^{k}\leq w/2, qq is a short query. Since the adversary chooses SE at qlq_{l}, the line from qlq_{l} in the NW direction must hit also within distance at most 2k2^{k} another wall, generated by a query point qk+1q_{k+1} at an earlier time tk+1<tlt_{k+1}<t_{l}. Since qlq_{l} is below or to the right of plp_{l}, the NW-SE line through qq hits a wall of qk+1q_{k+1} at a point pk+1p_{k+1} that is at most 2k2^{k} beyond plp_{l}. Adding this wall to SkS_{k} yields the set Sk+1S_{k+1} that satisfies the induction hypothesis. ∎

We can now complete the proof of Theorem 4.7. By Lemma 4.10, to every effective decisive query qq we can assign Ω(log⁡N)\Omega(\log N) non-decisive queries that generate walls within w/2w/2 of qq, hence their x−x- or y−y-coordinate is within w/2w/2 of that of qq. Since the Ω(log⁡N)\Omega(\log N) effective queries of the set SS of Lemma 4.9 are more than ww far from each other in both coordinates, a non-decisive query can be close to at most one query of SS in xx-coordinate and at most one in yy-coordinate. Therefore, there are Ω(log⁡2N)\Omega(\log^{2}N) distinct non-decisive queries. ∎

Supermodular Games

A supermodular game is a game in which the set SiS_{i} of strategies of each player ii is a complete lattice, and the utility (payoff) functions uiu_{i} satisfy certain conditions. Let kk be the number of players and let S=Πi=1kSiS=\Pi_{i=1}^{k}S_{i} be the set of strategy profiles. As usual, we use sis_{i} to denote a strategy for player ii and s−is_{-i} to denote a tuple of strategies for the other players. The conditions on the utility functions uiu_{i} are the following: C1. ui(si,s−i)u_{i}(s_{i},s_{-i}) is upper semicontinuous in sis_{i} for fixed s−is_{-i}, and it is continuous in s−is_{-i} for each fixed sis_{i}, and has a finite upper bound. C2. ui(si,s−i)u_{i}(s_{i},s_{-i}) is supermodular in sis_{i} for fixed s−is_{-i}. C3. ui(si,s−i)u_{i}(s_{i},s_{-i}) has increasing differences in sis_{i} and s−is_{-i}.

We will consider here games where each SiS_{i} is a discrete (or continuous) finite box in did_{i} dimensions of size NN in each coordinate. We let d=∑i=1kdid=\sum_{i=1}^{k}d_{i} be the total number of coordinates. In the discrete case, condition C1 is trivial. Condition C2 is trivial if di=1d_{i}=1 (all functions in one dimension are supermodular), but nontrivial for 2 or more dimensions. C3 is nontrivial.

Supermodular games (and GSC) have pure Nash equilibria. Furthermore, the pure Nash equilibria form a complete lattice , thus there is a highest and a lowest equilibrium. Another important property is that the best response correspondence βi(s−i)\beta_{i}(s_{-i}) for each player ii has the property that (1) both sup⁡βi(s−i)\sup\beta_{i}(s_{-i}) and inf⁡βi(s−i)\inf\beta_{i}(s_{-i}) are in βi(s−i)\beta_{i}(s_{-i}), and (2) both functions sup⁡βi(⋅)\sup\beta_{i}(\cdot) and inf⁡βi(⋅)\inf\beta_{i}(\cdot) are monotone functions . The function βˉ(s)=(sup⁡β1(s−1),…,sup⁡βk(s−k))\bar{\beta}(s)=(\sup\beta_{1}(s_{-1}),\ldots,\sup\beta_{k}(s_{-k})) of the supremum best responses is a monotone function from SS to itself, and its greatest fixed point is the highest Nash equilibrium of the game. The function β‾(s)=(inf⁡β1(s−1),…,inf⁡βk(s−k))\underline{\beta}(s)=(\inf\beta_{1}(s_{-1}),\ldots,\inf\beta_{k}(s_{-k})) of the infimum best responses is also a monotone function, and its least fixed point is the lowest Nash equilibrium of the game.

(A simplified Diamond search model .) There are kk players (businesses). Each player i∈[k]i\in[k] can exert some amount of “effort”, si∈[0,mi]s_{i}\in[0,m_{i}], where mi>0m_{i}>0, to find a business partner. So, the strategy space SiS_{i} of player ii is the closed bounded interval [0,mi][0,m_{i}]. Any player ii incurs a cost Ci(si)C_{i}(s_{i}) for exerting effort sis_{i}, where we assume Ci(⋅)C_{i}(\cdot) is some arbitrary continuous function (we do not necessarily assume that Ci(si)C_{i}(s_{i}) is increasing in sis_{i}; this is not needed). The payoff to player ii depends also on how much effort others are putting into finding a business partner. Specifically, for each player ii, we assume that for some αi>0\alpha_{i}>0 the utility function ui(s1,…,sk)u_{i}(s_{1},\ldots,s_{k}) for player ii is given by:

Let us check that this is a supermodular game. Clearly the strategy space Si=[0,mi]S_{i}=[0,m_{i}] of each player (a closed interval) is a complete lattice. C1. condition C1 certainly holds, since in fact ui(si,s−i)u_{i}(s_{i},s_{-i}) is continuous in both sis_{i} and s−is_{-i}, and has a finite upper bound (because the strategy spaces of all players are bounded intervals). C2. condition C2 holds vacuously, because for fixed s−i′s^{\prime}_{-i}, the function f(si):=ui(si,s−i′)f(s_{i}):=u_{i}(s_{i},s^{\prime}_{-i}) is a function in a single real-valued parameter, sis_{i}, and any such function is supermodular, because for all si,si′∈Sis_{i},s^{\prime}_{i}\in S_{i}, f(si)+f(si′)=f(min⁡{si,si′})+f(max⁡{si,si′})=f(si∧si′)+f(si∨si′)f(s_{i})+f(s^{\prime}_{i})=f(\min\{s_{i},s^{\prime}_{i}\})+f(\max\{s_{i},s^{\prime}_{i}\})=f(s_{i}\land s^{\prime}_{i})+f(s_{i}\lor s^{\prime}_{i}). C3. To see that condition C3 holds, i.e., that the payoff functions ui(si,s−i)u_{i}(s_{i},s_{-i}) have increasing differences in sis_{i} and s−is_{-i}, suppose that si′≥sis^{\prime}_{i}\geq s_{i} and s−i′≥s−is^{\prime}_{-i}\geq s_{-i} (coordinate-wise inequality). Then note that we have:

2 Complexity of equilibrium computation in supermodular games

Given a supermodular game, the relevant problems include: (a) find a Nash equilibrium (anyone)Whenever we speak of finding a Nash Equilibrium (NE) for a supermodular game, we mean a pure NE, as we know that these exists., and (b) find the highest or the lowest equilibrium. In the case of continuous domains, we again have to relax to an approximate solution. We assume that we have access to a best response function, e.g. βˉ(⋅)\bar{\beta}(\cdot) and/or β‾(⋅)\underline{\beta}(\cdot), as an oracle or as a polynomial-time function. The monotonicity of these functions implies then easily the following:

1. The problem of computing a Nash equilibrium of a kk-player supermodular game over a discrete finite strategy space Πi=1k[N]di\Pi_{i=1}^{k}[N]^{d_{i}} reduces to the problem of computing a fixed point of a monotone function over [N]d[N]^{d} where d=∑i=1kdid=\sum_{i=1}^{k}d_{i}. Computing the highest (or lowest) Nash equilibrium reduces to computing the greatest (or lowest) fixed point of a monotone function.

2. For games with continuous box strategy spaces, Πi=1k[1,N]id\Pi_{i=1}^{k}[1,N]^{d}_{i}, and Lipschitz continuous utility functions with Lipschitz constant KK, the problem of computing an ϵ\epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium reduces to exact fixed point computation point for a monotone function with a discrete finite domain [NK/ϵ]d[NK/\epsilon]^{d}.

1. Follows from the monotonicity of βˉ(⋅)\bar{\beta}(\cdot) and β‾(⋅)\underline{\beta}(\cdot). If ss is fixed point of βˉ(⋅)\bar{\beta}(\cdot), then si=sup⁡βi(s−i)s_{i}=\sup\beta_{i}(s_{-i}) is a best response to s−is_{-i} for all ii (since sup⁡βi(s−i)∈βi(s−i)\sup\beta_{i}(s_{-i})\in\beta_{i}(s_{-i})), therefore ss is a Nash equilibrium of the game. The GFP of βˉ(⋅)\bar{\beta}(\cdot) is the highest Nash equilibrium. Similarly, every fixed point of β‾(⋅)\underline{\beta}(\cdot) is an equilibrium of the game, and the LFP of β‾(⋅)\underline{\beta}(\cdot) is the lowest equilibrium.

2. Suppose that the utility functions are Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant KK. To compute an ϵ\epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium of the game, it suffices to find a ϵ/K\epsilon/K-approximate fixed point of the function βˉ(⋅)\bar{\beta}(\cdot). For, if ss is such an approximate fixed point and s′=βˉ(s)s^{\prime}=\bar{\beta}(s), then ∣s′−s∣≤ϵ/K|s^{\prime}-s|\leq\epsilon/K in every coordinate. Hence ∣ui(si,s−i)−ui(si′,s−i)∣≤ϵ|u_{i}(s_{i},s_{-i})-u_{i}(s^{\prime}_{i},s_{-i})|\leq\epsilon, and si′s^{\prime}_{i} is a best response to s−is_{-i}, hence ss is an ϵ\epsilon-approximate equilibrium. Computing an ϵ/K\epsilon/K-approximate fixed point of the function βˉ(⋅)\bar{\beta}(\cdot) on the continuous domain, reduces by Proposition 2.2 to the exact fixed point problem for the discrete domain [NK/ϵ]d[NK/\epsilon]^{d}. ∎

Not every monotone function can be the (sup or inf) best response function of a game. In particular, a best response function has the property that the output values for the components corresponding to a player depend only on the input values for the other components corresponding to the other players. Thus, for example, for two one-dimensional players, if the function f(x,y)f(x,y) is the best response function of a game, it must satisfy f1(x,y)=f1(x′,y)f_{1}(x,y)=f_{1}(x^{\prime},y) for all x,x′,yx,x^{\prime},y, and f2(x,y)=f2(x,y′)f_{2}(x,y)=f_{2}(x,y^{\prime}) for all x,y,y′x,y,y^{\prime}. This property helps somewhat in improving the time needed to find a fixed point, and thus an equilibrium of the game, as noted below. For example, in the case of two one-dimensional players, an equilibrium can be computed in O(log⁡N)O(\log N) time, instead of the Ω(log⁡2N)\Omega(\log^{2}N) time needed to find a fixed point of a general monotone function in two dimensions.

Given a supermodular game with two players with discrete strategy spaces [N]di[N]^{d_{i}}, i=1,2i=1,2 with access to the sup (or inf) best response function βˉ(⋅)\bar{\beta}(\cdot) (or β‾(⋅)\underline{\beta}(\cdot)), we can compute an equilibrium in time O((log⁡N)min⁡(d1,d2))O((\log N)^{\min(d_{1},d_{2})}). More generally, for kk players with dimensions d1,…,dkd_{1},\ldots,d_{k}, an equilibrium can be computed in time O((log⁡N)d′)O((\log N)^{d^{\prime}}), where d′=∑idi−max⁡idid^{\prime}=\sum_{i}d_{i}-\max_{i}d_{i}.

Suppose that we have access to the sup best response βˉ(⋅)\bar{\beta}(\cdot). Assume without loss of generality that the first player has the maximum dimension, d1=max⁡idid_{1}=\max_{i}d_{i}. We apply the divide-and-conquer algorithm, but take advantage of the property of the monotone function βˉ\bar{\beta} that the first d1d_{1} components of βˉ(x)\bar{\beta}(x) do not depend on the first d1d_{1} coordinates of xx. As a consequence, for any fixed assignment to the other coordinates, i.e. choice of a strategy profile s−1s_{-1} for all the players except the first player, the induced function on the first d1d_{1} coordinates maps every point to the best response βˉ1(s−1)\bar{\beta}_{1}(s_{-1}) of player 1. Thus the fixed point of the induced function is simply βˉ1(s−1)\bar{\beta}_{1}(s_{-1}), it can be computed with one call to βˉ\bar{\beta}, and there is no need to recurse on the first d1d_{1} coordinates. It follows that the algorithm takes time at most O((log⁡N)d′)O((\log N)^{d^{\prime}}), where d′=∑idi−max⁡idid^{\prime}=\sum_{i}d_{i}-\max_{i}d_{i}. ∎

Conversely, we can reduce the fixed point computation problem for an arbitrary monotone function to the equilibrium computation problem for a supermodular game with two players.

1. Given a monotone function ff on [N]d[N]^{d} (resp. [1,N]d[1,N]^{d}) we can construct a supermodular game GG with two players, each with strategy space [N]d[N]^{d} (resp. [1,N]d[1,N]^{d}), so that the equilibria of GG correspond to the fixed points of ff.

2. More generally, the fixed point problem for a monotone function ff in dd dimensions can be reduced to the equilibrium problem for a supermodular game with any number k≥2k\geq 2 of players with any dimensions d1,…,dkd_{1},\ldots,d_{k}, provided that ∑idi≥2d\sum_{i}d_{i}\geq 2d and ∑idi−max⁡idi≥d\sum_{i}d_{i}-\max_{i}d_{i}\geq d.

1. We will define the utility functions uiu_{i} so that the best responses βi\beta_{i} of both players are functions (i.e. are unique). For player 1, the best response will be β1(y)=y\beta_{1}(y)=y, for all y∈[N]dy\in[N]^{d}, and for player 2, the best response will be β2(x)=f(x)\beta_{2}(x)=f(x), for all x∈[N]dx\in[N]^{d}. If xx is a fixed point of ff, then (x,x)(x,x) is an equilibrium of the game, since β(x,x)=(x,f(x))=(x,x)\beta(x,x)=(x,f(x))=(x,x). Conversely, if (x,y)(x,y) is an equilibrium of the game, then β(x,y)=(x,y)\beta(x,y)=(x,y), therefore x=yx=y and y=f(x)y=f(x), hence x=f(x)x=f(x). Thus, the set of equilibria of GG is {(x,x)∣x∈Fix(f)}\{(x,x)|x\in Fix(f)\}.

The utility function for player 1 is set to u1(x,y)=−(x−y)2=−∑j=1d(xj−yj)2u_{1}(x,y)=-(x-y)^{2}=-\sum_{j=1}^{d}(x_{j}-y_{j})^{2}. The utility function for player 2 is u2(x,y)=−(f(x)−y)2=−∑j=1d(fj(x)−yj)2u_{2}(x,y)=-(f(x)-y)^{2}=-\sum_{j=1}^{d}(f_{j}(x)-y_{j})^{2}. Obviously, the best response functions are as stated above, β1(y)=y\beta_{1}(y)=y and β2(x)=f(x)\beta_{2}(x)=f(x).

The utility functions u1,u2u_{1},u_{2} satisfy condition C2 with equality. For example, to check u2u_{2} (u1u_{1} is similar), fix a xx and consider two values y,y′y,y^{\prime}. For every j=1,…,dj=1,\ldots,d, we have −(fj(x)−yj)2−(fj(x)−yj′)2=−(fj(x)−max(yj,yj′))2−(fj(x)−min(yj,yj′))2-(f_{j}(x)-y_{j})^{2}-(f_{j}(x)-y^{\prime}_{j})^{2}=-(f_{j}(x)-max(y_{j},y^{\prime}_{j}))^{2}-(f_{j}(x)-min(y_{j},y^{\prime}_{j}))^{2}. Summing over all jj yields: −(f(x)−y)2−(f(x)−y′)2=−(f(x)−max(y,y′))2−(fj(x)−min(y,y′))2-(f(x)-y)^{2}-(f(x)-y^{\prime})^{2}=-(f(x)-max(y,y^{\prime}))^{2}-(f_{j}(x)-min(y,y^{\prime}))^{2}.

To verify condition C3 for u2u_{2}, consider any x′≥xx^{\prime}\geq x and y′≥yy^{\prime}\geq y. We have u2(x′,y′)−u2(x,y′)−(u2(x′,y)−u2(x,y))u_{2}(x^{\prime},y^{\prime})-u_{2}(x,y^{\prime})-(u_{2}(x^{\prime},y)-u_{2}(x,y)) =−∑j=1d(fj(x′)−yj′)2+∑j=1d(fj(x)−yj′)2+∑j=1d(fj(x′)−yj)2−∑j=1d(fj(x)−yj)2=-\sum_{j=1}^{d}(f_{j}(x^{\prime})-y^{\prime}_{j})^{2}+\sum_{j=1}^{d}(f_{j}(x)-y^{\prime}_{j})^{2}+\sum_{j=1}^{d}(f_{j}(x^{\prime})-y_{j})^{2}-\sum_{j=1}^{d}(f_{j}(x)-y_{j})^{2} =∑j=1d2(yj′−yj)(fj(x′)−fj(x))≥0=\sum_{j=1}^{d}2(y^{\prime}_{j}-y_{j})(f_{j}(x^{\prime})-f_{j}(x))\geq 0, where the last inequality holds because y′≥yy^{\prime}\geq y and f(x′)≥f(x)f(x^{\prime})\geq f(x) since x′≥xx^{\prime}\geq x and ff is monotone. Similarly, condition C3 can be verified for u1u_{1}.

2. Order the players in increasing order of their dimension, let TT be the ordering of all the ∑i=1kdi\sum_{i=1}^{k}d_{i} coordinates consisting first of the set Co(1)Co(1) of coordinates of player 1 (in any order), then the set Co(2)Co(2) of coordinates of player 2, and so forth. Number the coordinates in the order TT from 1 to ∑i=1kdi\sum_{i=1}^{k}d_{i}, and label them cyclically with the labels 1,…,d1,\ldots,d.

We define the (unique) best response function β\beta as follows. For every coordinate j≤dj\leq d (in the ordering TT), we set βj(x)=fj(x′)\beta_{j}(x)=f_{j}(x^{\prime}), where x′x^{\prime} is a subvector of xx with dd coordinates that have distinct labels 1,…,d1,\ldots,d and which belong to different players than coordinate jj. The subvector x′x^{\prime} is defined as follows. Suppose that coordinate jj belongs to player rr (j∈Co(r)j\in Co(r)), and let t=∑i=1r−1dit=\sum_{i=1}^{r-1}d_{i}. If dr≤dd_{r}\leq d, then x′x^{\prime} is the subvector of xx that consists of the first tt coordinates (in the order TT) and the coordinates t+1+d,…,2dt+1+d,\ldots,2d; note that all these coordinates do not belong to player rr. If dr>dd_{r}>d, then r<kr<k (since ∑idi−max⁡idi≥d\sum_{i}d_{i}-\max_{i}d_{i}\geq d). In this case, let x′x^{\prime} be the subvector of xx consisting of the last dd coordinates (in TT); all of these belong to player k≠rk\neq r. For coordinates j>dj>d, we set βj(x)=xj′\beta_{j}(x)=x_{j^{\prime}}, where j′∈[d]j^{\prime}\in[d] is equal to jmod  dj\mod d, unless j′j^{\prime} belongs to the same player rr as jj, in which case dr>dd_{r}>d, hence r≠kr\neq k; in this case we set βj(x)=xj"\beta_{j}(x)=x_{j"} for some (any) coordinate j"j" of the last player kk that is labeled j′j^{\prime}.

We define the utility functions of the players so that they yield the above best response function β\beta. Namely, we define the utility function of player ii to be ui(x)=−∑j∈Co(i)(xj−βj(x))2u_{i}(x)=-\sum_{j\in Co(i)}(x_{j}-\beta_{j}(x))^{2}. It can be verified as in part 1 that the utility functions satisfy conditions C2 and C3. It can be easily seen also that at any equilibrium of the game, all coordinates with the same label must have the same value, and the corresponding dd-vector xx is a fixed point of ff. Conversely, for any fixed point xx of ff, the corresponding strategy profile of the game is an equilibrium. ∎

Since the 2-dimensional monotone fixed point problem requires Ω(log⁡2N)\Omega(\log^{2}N) queries by Theorem 4.1, it follows that the equilibrium problem for two 2-dimensional players also requires Ω(log⁡2N)\Omega(\log^{2}N) queries, which is tight because it can be also solved in O(log⁡2N)O(\log^{2}N) time by Theorem 5.3. Similarly, for higher dimensions dd, if the monotone fixed point problem requires Ω(log⁡dN)\Omega(\log^{d}N) queries then the equilibrium problem for two d-dimensional players is also Θ(log⁡dN)\Theta(\log^{d}N).

The same reduction from monotone functions to supermodular games of Theorem 5.4, combined with Proposition 2.1 implies the hardness of computing the highest and lowest equilibrium.

It is NP-hard to compute the highest and lowest equilibrium of a supermodular game with two 1-dimensional players with explicitly given polynomial-time best response (and utility) functions.

Condon’s and Shapley’s stochastic games reduce to 𝚃𝚊𝚛𝚜𝚔𝚒𝚃𝚊𝚛𝚜𝚔𝚒\mathtt{Tarski}

In this section we show that computing the exact (rational) value of Condon’s simple stochastic games (), as well as computing the (irrational) value of Shapley’s more general (stopping/discounted) stochastic games to within a given desired error ϵ>0\epsilon>0 (given in binary), are both polynomial time reducible to Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}{}.

Recall that a simple stochastic gameThe definition we give here for SSGs is slightly more general than Condon’s original definition in . Specifically, Condon allows edge probabilities of 1/21/2 only, and also assumed that the game is a “stopping game”, meaning it halts with probability 1, regardless of the strategies of the two players. It is well known that our more general definition does not alter the difficulty of computing the game value and optimal strategies: solving general SSGs can be reduced in P-time to solving SSGs in Condon’s more restricted form. (SSG) is a 2-player zero-sum game, played on the vertices of an edge-labeled directed graph, specified by G=(V,V0,V1,V2,δ)G=(V,V_{0},V_{1},V_{2},\delta), whose vertices V={v1,…,vn}V=\{v_{1},\ldots,v_{n}\} include two special sink vertices, a 0{\mathbf{0}}-sink, vn−1v_{n-1}, and a 1\mathbf{1}-sink, vnv_{n}, and where the rest of the vertices V∖{vn−1,vn}={v1,…,vn−2}V\setminus\{v_{n-1},v_{n}\}=\{v_{1},\ldots,v_{n-2}\} are partitioned into three disjoint sets V0V_{0} (random), V1V_{1} (max), and V2V_{2} (min). The labeled directed edge relation is δ⊆(V∖{vn−1,vn})×((0,1]∪⊥)×V\delta\subseteq(V\setminus\{v_{n-1},v_{n}\})\times((0,1]\cup\bot)\times V. For each “random” node u∈V0u\in V_{0}, every outgoing edge (u,pu,v,v)∈δ(u,p_{u,v},v)\in\delta is labeled by a positive probability pu,v∈(0,1]p_{u,v}\in(0,1], such that these probabilities sum to 11, i.e., ∑{v∈V∣(u,pu,v,v)∈δ}pu,v=1\sum_{\{v\in V\mid(u,p_{u,v},v)\in\delta\}}p_{u,v}=1. We assume, for computational purposes, that the probabilities pu,vp_{u,v} are rational numbers (given as part of the input, with numerator and denominator given in binary). The outgoing edges from “max” (V1V_{1}) and “min” (V2V_{2}) nodes have an empty label, “⊥\bot”. We assume each vertex u∈V∖{vn−1,vn}u\in V\setminus\{v_{n-1},v_{n}\} has at least one outgoing edge. Thus in particular, for any node u∈V1∪V2u\in V_{1}\cup V_{2} there exists an outgoing edge (u,⊥,v)∈δ(u,\bot,v)\in\delta for some v∈Vv\in V. Finally, there is a designated start vertex s∈Vs\in V.

A play of the game transpires as follows: a token is initially placed on ss, the start node. Thereafter, during each “turn”, when the token is currently on a node u∈Vu\in V, unless uu is already a sink node (in which case the game halts), the token is moved across an outgoing edge of uu to the next node by whoever “controls” uu. For a random node u∈V0u\in V_{0}, which is controlled by “nature”, the outgoing edge is chosen randomly according to the probabilities (pu,v)v∈V(p_{u,v})_{v\in V}. For u∈V1u\in V_{1}, the outgoing edge is chosen by player 1, the max⁡\max player, who aims to maximize the probability that the token will eventually reach the 1\mathbf{1}-sink. For u∈V2u\in V_{2}, the outgoing edge is chosen by player 2, the min⁡\min player, who aims to minimize the probability that the token will eventually reach the 1\mathbf{1}-sink. The game halts if the token ever reaches either of the two sink nodes.

For every possible start node s=vi∈Vs=v_{i}\in V, this zero-sum game has a well defined value, qi∗∈q^{*}_{i}\in. This is, by definition, a probability such that player 1, the max player (and, respectively, player 2, the min player) has a strategy to “force” reaching the 11-sink with probability at least (respectively, at most) qi∗q^{*}_{i}, irrespective of what the other player’s strategy is. In other words, these games are determined. Moreover qi∗q^{*}_{i} is a rational value whose encoding size, with numerator and denominator in binary, is polynomial in the bit encoding size of the SSG (). Furthermore, both players have deterministic, memoryless (a.k.a., pure, positional) optimal strategies in the game (which do not depend on the specific start node ss), in which for each vertex u∈V1u\in V_{1} (or u∈V2u\in V_{2}) the max player (respectively the min player) chooses the same specific outgoing edge every time the token visits vertex uu, regardless of the prior history of play prior to that visit to uu.

Given an SSG, the goal is to compute the value of the game (starting at each vertex). Condon () already showed that the problem of deciding whether the value is >1/2>1/2 is in NP ∩\cap co-NP, and it is a long-standing open problem whether this is in P-time. Moreover, the search problem of computing the value for an SSG is known to be in both PLS\mathsf{PLS}{} and PPAD\mathsf{PPAD}{} (see, e.g., and ).

The following total search problem is polynomial-time reducible to Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}{}: Given an instance GG of Condon’s simple stochastic game, and given a start vertex s=vi∈Vs=v_{i}\in V, computing the exact (rational) value qi∗q^{*}_{i} of the game.

Let x=(x1,…,xn)x=(x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}) be an nn-vector of variables. The nn-vector q∗q^{*} of values, qi∗q^{*}_{i}, of the SSG starting at each vertex viv_{i}, is given by the least fixed point (LFP) solution of the following monotone min-max-linear system of nn equations in nn unknowns:

We denote this system of equations by x=F(x)x=F(x). Note that F(x)F(x) defines a monotone map F:n→nF:^{n}\rightarrow^{n} mapping the complete lattice n^{n} (under coordinate-wise order) to itself. Thus by Tarski’s theorem it has a least (as well as greatest) fixed point. It is well known that the least fixed point (LFP) is q∗q^{*}.This is not stated explicitly in , who assumes for simplicity that the SSGs are stopping games, and thus whose equations have a unique fixed point; but it follows easily from well known facts. See, e.g., for a generalization of this fact to a much richer class of (infinite-state) stochastic games.

Consider now the “β\beta-discounted” (or “β\beta-stopping”) version of these equations, x=(1−β)F(x)x=(1-\beta)F(x). where each equation now has the form xi=(1−β)Fi(x)x_{i}=(1-\beta)F_{i}(x), for a given discount value β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1). We can also view these equations as corresponding to a modified β\beta-stopping version, GβG^{\beta}, of the original SSG, GG, where at each vertex there is a direct probability β\beta of immediately transitioning to the 0\mathbf{0}-sink; and with the remaining probability, (1−β)(1-\beta), there remain exactly the same possibilities as before in GG.)

Letting Fβ(x):=(1−β)F(x)F^{\beta}(x):=(1-\beta)F(x), note that Fβ:n→nF^{\beta}:^{n}\rightarrow^{n} defines both a monotone map and a contraction map with respect to the l∞l_{\infty} norm. Specifically, for x,y∈nx,y\in^{n}, ∥Fβ(x)−Fβ(y)∥∞≤(1−β)∥x−y∥∞\|F^{\beta}(x)-F^{\beta}(y)\|_{\infty}\leq(1-\beta)\|x-y\|_{\infty}. Hence, by Banach’s fixed point theorem, x=Fβ(x)x=F^{\beta}(x) has a unique fixed point solution, qβ∈nq^{\beta}\in^{n} (which is also both the least and greatest fixed point of x=Fβ(x)x=F^{\beta}(x) in n^{n}). The vector qβq^{\beta} corresponds to the game values of the β\beta-stopping game GβG^{\beta}, starting at each vertex.

Let ∣G∣|G| denote the bit encoding size of the given SSG, GG. There is a fixed polynomial, h()h() such that for any SSG, GG, the denominator of the rational values qi∗q^{*}_{i} is at most 2h(∣G∣)2^{h(|G|)}. If we apply this to the already β\beta-discounted SSG, GβG^{\beta}, then this says that the denominators of the values qiβq^{\beta}_{i} are at most 2h(∣G∣+log⁡(1/β))2^{h(|G|+\log(1/\beta))}.

Moreover, for any SSG GG, there is also a fixed polynomial, r(x)r(x), such that given a rational vector q′∈nq^{\prime}\in^{n}, such that ∥q∗−q′∥∞<2−r(∣G∣)\|q^{*}-q^{\prime}\|_{\infty}<2^{-r(|G|)}, the closest rational number to qi′q^{\prime}_{i} with denominator at most 2h(∣G∣)2^{h(|G|)} is qi∗q^{*}_{i}.

It is also known (see, e.g., Lemma 8 in )Again, although Condon’s lemma is phrased assuming GG is a stopping game where edge probabilities are always 1/21/2, essentially the same proof with minor modification can be used to establish the analogous results in the more general setting of non-stopping SSGs with arbitrary rational edge probabilities. that there is some fixed polynomial t(⋅)t(\cdot), such that if β=ϵ2−t(∣G∣)\beta=\epsilon 2^{-t(|G|)}, for any ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1), then ∥q∗−qβ∥∞<ϵ/2\|q^{*}-q^{\beta}\|_{\infty}<\epsilon/2.

Thus if we let ϵ=2−r(∣G∣)\epsilon=2^{-r(|G|)}, and β=ϵ2−t(∣G∣)\beta=\epsilon 2^{-t(|G|)}, then not only do we have ∥q∗−qβ∥∞<2−r(∣G∣)\|q^{*}-q^{\beta}\|_{\infty}<2^{-r(|G|)}, but we also have that, for all i∈[n]i\in[n], the closest rational number to qiβq^{\beta}_{i} with denominator at most 2h(∣G∣)2^{h(|G|)} is qi∗q^{*}_{i}.

Next we note that for β=2−w(∣G∣)\beta=2^{-w(|G|)}, where w(x):=r(x)+t(x)w(x):=r(x)+t(x) is a polynomial, the map Fβ:n→nF^{\beta}:^{n}\rightarrow^{n} defines a polynomially contracting function, as defined in , because for all x,y∈nx,y\in^{n}, ∥Fβ(x)−Fβ(y)∥∞<(1−β)∥x−y∥∞\|F^{\beta}(x)-F^{\beta}(y)\|_{\infty}<(1-\beta)\|x-y\|_{\infty}. In other words, the Lipschitz constant for the contraction map has the form (1−12poly(∣I∣))(1-\frac{1}{2^{poly(|I|)}}), where ∣I∣|I| denotes the bit encoding size of the input II that describes the map. Hence, it follows from Proposition 2.2, part (3.) of that in order to compute some q′∈nq^{\prime}\in^{n} such that ∥qβ−q′∥∞<ϵ/2\|q^{\beta}-q^{\prime}\|_{\infty}<\epsilon/2, for some desired ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1), it suffices to compute some q′∈nq^{\prime}\in^{n} such that ∥Fβ(q′)−q′∥∞<(ϵ/2)β\|F^{\beta}(q^{\prime})-q^{\prime}\|_{\infty}<(\epsilon/2)\beta.

Combining the above facts together it follows that, given an SSG, GG, computing its vector of values q∗q^{*} is P-time reducible to computing a vector q′∈nq^{\prime}\in^{n} such that ∥Fβ(q′)−q′∣<12z(∣G∣)\|F^{\beta}(q^{\prime})-q^{\prime}|<\frac{1}{2^{z(|G|)}}, where β=2−w(∣G∣)\beta=2^{-w(|G|)}, and where z(x):=w(x)+r(x)=t(x)+2⋅r(x)z(x):=w(x)+r(x)=t(x)+2\cdot r(x), is a fixed polynomial.

We next show that, given GG, the problem of computing such a vector q′∈nq^{\prime}\in^{n} is reducible to Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}. Note, firstly, that for β=2−w(∣G∣)\beta=2^{-w(|G|)}, Fβ(x)F^{\beta}(x) is polynomial-time computable, given the rational vector y∈ny\in^{n}, and given the underlying SSG GG.

We now define a discrete monotone function H:[M]n→[M]nH:[M]^{n}\rightarrow[M]^{n}, such that H()H() is a discretization of the monotone contraction map Fβ()F^{\beta}(), where β=2−w(∣G∣)\beta=2^{-w(|G|)}, such that any fixed point of HH directly yields (via rescaling) a vector q′∈nq^{\prime}\in^{n} such that ∥Fβ(q′)−q′∣<2−z(∣G∣)\|F^{\beta}(q^{\prime})-q^{\prime}|<2^{-z(|G|)}.

The map H()H() is defined as follows. We let M=22⋅z(∣G∣)M=2^{2\cdot z(|G|)}. For v∈[M]nv\in[M]^{n}, we let H(v)i=⌊M⋅Fβ(v/M)i⌋H(v)_{i}=\lfloor M\cdot F^{\beta}(v/M)_{i}\rfloor, for all i∈[n]i\in[n]. Clearly, H:[M]n→[M]nH:[M]^{n}\rightarrow[M]^{n} defines a monotone map which is polynomial-time computable, given the input vector v∈[M]nv\in[M]^{n} and given the SSG, GG. Moreover, if we find some fixed point v∗∈[M]nv^{*}\in[M]^{n} such that v∗=H(v∗)v^{*}=H(v^{*}), then ∥Fβ(v∗/M)−v∗/M∥∞<2−z(∣G∣)\|F^{\beta}(v^{*}/M)-v^{*}/M\|_{\infty}<2^{-z(|G|)}. Hence, a fixed point v∗v^{*} of HH immediately yields a vector q′∈nq^{\prime}\in^{n} such that ∥Fβ(q′)−q′∥∞<2−z(∣G∣)\|F^{\beta}(q^{\prime})-q^{\prime}\|_{\infty}<2^{-z(|G|)}, given which we know we can compute q∗q^{*} in P-time. We have therefore shown that the problem of computing the vector q∗∈nq^{*}\in^{n} of values for a given SSG, GG, is P-time reducible to Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}{}. ∎

2 Shapley’s stochastic games reduce to 𝚃𝚊𝚛𝚜𝚔𝚒𝚃𝚊𝚛𝚜𝚔𝚒\mathtt{Tarski}

We now consider the original stochastic games introduced by Shapley in , which are more general than Condon’s games, and show that approximating the value of such a game (which is in general irrational, even when the input data associated with the game consists of rational numbers), to within any given desired accuracy, ϵ>0\epsilon>0 (given in binary as part of the input), is polynomial time reducible to Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}.

A play of Shapley’s game transpires as follows: a token is initially placed on ss, the start node. Thereafter, during each “round” of play, if the token is currently on some node vi∈Vv_{i}\in V, both players simultaneously and independently choose respective actions j∈[mi]j\in[m_{i}] and k∈[ni]k\in[n_{i}], and player 1 then receives the corresponding reward Aj,kiA^{i}_{j,k} from player 2; thereafter, for each r∈[n]r\in[n] with probability Pj,ki(r)P^{i}_{j,k}(r) the token is moved from node viv_{i} to node vrv_{r}, and with the remaining positive probability qj,ki=1−∑r=1nPj,ki(r)>0q^{i}_{j,k}=1-\sum_{r=1}^{n}P^{i}_{j,k}(r)>0, the game “halts”. Let q=min⁡{qj,ki∣i,j,k}>0q=\min\{q^{i}_{j,k}\mid i,j,k\}>0 be the minimum such halting probability at any state, and under any pair of actions. Since qq is positive, i.e., since there is positive probability ≥q>0\geq q>0 of halting after each round, a play of the game eventually halts with probability 1. The goal of player 1 (player 2) is to maximize (minimize, respectively) the expected total reward that player 1 receives from player 2 during the entire play. A strategy for each player specifies, based in principle on the entire history of play thusfar, a probability distribution on the actions available at the current token location. Given strategies σ1\sigma_{1} and σ2\sigma_{2} for player 1 and 2, respectively, let ri(σ1,σ2)r_{i}(\sigma_{1},\sigma_{2}) denote the expected total payoff to player 1, starting at node s=vi∈Vs=v_{i}\in V. Shapley showed that these games have a value, meaning that sup⁡σ1inf⁡σ2ri(σ1,σ2)=inf⁡σ2sup⁡σ1ri(σ1,σ2)\sup_{\sigma_{1}}\inf_{\sigma_{2}}r_{i}(\sigma_{1},\sigma_{2})=\inf_{\sigma_{2}}\sup_{\sigma_{1}}r_{i}(\sigma_{1},\sigma_{2}). In fact, Shapley showed that both players have optimal stationary (but randomized) strategies in such games, i.e., optimal strategies that only depend on the current node where the token is located, not the prior history of play, but where players can randomize on their choice of actions at each node.

Let ri∗=sup⁡σ1inf⁡σ2ri(σ1,σ2)r^{*}_{i}=\sup_{\sigma_{1}}\inf_{\sigma_{2}}r_{i}(\sigma_{1},\sigma_{2}) denote the game value starting at vertex s=vi∈Vs=v_{i}\in V. Note that we could also define ri∗r^{*}_{i} as ri∗=max⁡σ1min⁡σ2ri(σ1,σ2)r^{*}_{i}=\max_{\sigma_{1}}\min_{\sigma_{2}}r_{i}(\sigma_{1},\sigma_{2}), due to the existence of optimal strategies.

Denote this system of equations by x=F(x)x=F(x). If we let M=maxi,j,k∣Aj,ki∣M=max_{i,j,k}|A^{i}_{j,k}| denote the maximum absolute value reward, then it is easy to observe that F(x)F(x) defines a map

from [−Mq,Mq]n\left[\frac{-M}{q},\frac{M}{q}\right]^{n} to itself, and moreover, as Shapley observed, F(x)F(x) is a contraction map with respect to the l∞l_{\infty} norm. Specifically, for any x,y∈[−Mq,Mq]nx,y\in\left[\frac{-M}{q},\frac{M}{q}\right]^{n}, ∥F(x)−F(y)∥∞≤(1−q)∥x−y∥∞\|F(x)-F(y)\|_{\infty}\leq(1-q)\|x-y\|_{\infty}. In other words, the Lipschitz constant of the contraction map is (1−q)(1-q). (Hence, F(x)F(x) is a polynomially contracting function, as defined in .)

Thus, just as in the case of the functions Fβ(x)F^{\beta}(x) that arose for showing that computing the value of Condon’s stochastic games reduces to Tarski, it follows from the from (Proposition 2.2, part (3.)), that in order to compute a vector r′∈[−Mq,Mq]nr^{\prime}\in\left[\frac{-M}{q},\frac{M}{q}\right]^{n}, such that ∥r∗−r′∥∞<ϵ\|r^{*}-r^{\prime}\|_{\infty}<\epsilon, it suffices to compute r′r^{\prime} such that ∥F(r′)−r′∥∞<ϵ⋅q\|F(r^{\prime})-r^{\prime}\|_{\infty}<\epsilon\cdot q.

Hence, again as in the proof for Condon’s game, this allows us to “discretize” the monotone function F()F(), to turn the problem of computing such a vector r′r^{\prime} into an instance of Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}{}. Specifically, for a positive integer KK, let ⟨K⟩={−K,−K+1,…,1,0,1,…,K−1,K}\langle K\rangle=\{-K,-K+1,\ldots,1,0,1,\ldots,K-1,K\}. We construct a discrete monotone map, H′:⟨M′⟩n→⟨M′⟩nH^{\prime}:\langle M^{\prime}\rangle^{n}\rightarrow\langle M^{\prime}\rangle^{n}, where M′=4M/(ϵ⋅q)M^{\prime}=4M/(\epsilon\cdot q). For v∈⟨M′⟩nv\in\langle M^{\prime}\rangle^{n}, we let H′(v)i=⌊M′⋅F(v/M′)i⌋H^{\prime}(v)_{i}=\lfloor M^{\prime}\cdot F(v/M^{\prime})_{i}\rfloor, for all i∈[n]i\in[n]. H′H^{\prime} defines a monotone map which is polynomial-time computable, given the input vector v∈⟨M′⟩nv\in\langle M^{\prime}\rangle^{n}, given the instance GG of Shapley’s stochastic game, and given the desired error ϵ>0\epsilon>0 (in binary). Moreover (again, as in the case for Condon’s game), if we find a fixed point v∗∈⟨M′⟩nv^{*}\in\langle M^{\prime}\rangle^{n} such that v∗=H′(v∗)v^{*}=H^{\prime}(v^{*}), then ∥F(v∗/M′)−v∗/M′∥∞≤ϵ⋅q\|F(v^{*}/M^{\prime})-v^{*}/M^{\prime}\|_{\infty}\leq\epsilon\cdot q, and hence ∥r∗−v∗/M′∥∞<ϵ\|r^{*}-v^{*}/M^{\prime}\|_{\infty}<\epsilon.

Hence we have shown that approximating the value vector r∗r^{*}, for a given instance GG of Shapley’s stochastic game, within a given desired additive error ϵ>0\epsilon>0 (given in binary), is polynomial-time reducible to Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}. ∎

Conclusions

We have studied the complexity of computing a Tarski fixed point for a monotone function over a finite discrete Euclidean grid, and we have shown that this problem essentially captures the complexity of computing a (ϵ\epsilon-approximate) pure Nash equilibrium of a supermodular game. We have also shown that computing the value of Condon’s and Shapley’s stochastic games reduces to this Tarski\mathtt{Tarski} fixed point problem, where the monotone function is given succinctly (by a boolean circuit).

We have provided several upper bounds for the Tarski\mathtt{Tarski} problem, showing that it is contained in both PLS\mathsf{PLS}{} and PPAD\mathsf{PPAD}. On the other hand, in the oracle model, for 2-dimensional monotone functions f:[N]2→[N]2f:[N]^{2}\rightarrow[N]^{2}, we have shown a Ω(log⁡2N)\Omega(\log^{2}N) lower bound for the (expected) number of (randomized) queries required to find a Tarski fixed point, which matches the O(log⁡dN)O(\log^{d}N) upper bound for d=2d=2.

A key question left open by our work is to improve the lower bounds in the oracle model to higher dimensions. It is tempting to conjecture that for any dimension d<log⁡Nd<\log N, a lower bound close to Ω(log⁡dN)\Omega(\log^{d}N) holds. On the other hand, we know that this cannot hold for arbitrary dd and NN, because we also have the dNdN upper bound (which is better than log⁡dN\log^{d}N when d=ω(log⁡N)d=\omega(\log N)).

Another interesting open question is the relationship between the Tarski\mathtt{Tarski} problem and the total search complexity class CLS\mathsf{CLS}{} , as well as the closely related recently defined class EOPL\mathsf{EOPL} (which stands for “End of Potential Line” ). EOPL\mathsf{EOPL}{} is contained in CLS\mathsf{CLS}{}, which is contained in both PLS\mathsf{PLS} and PPAD\mathsf{PPAD}. Is Tarski\mathtt{Tarski} in CLS\mathsf{CLS} (or in EOPL\mathsf{EOPL}{})? That would be remarkable, as the proof that it is in PPAD\mathsf{PPAD} is currently quite indirect. Conversely, can Tarski\mathtt{Tarski} be proved to be CLS\mathsf{CLS}{}-hard (EOPL\mathsf{EOPL}{}-hard)? (Recall from the previous section that some key problems in CLS\mathsf{CLS}{} related to stochastic games do reduce to Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}.)

Another question worth considering is the complexity of the unique\mathtt{unique}{}-Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}{} problem, where the monotone function is further assumed (promised) to have a unique fixed point. Is unique\mathtt{unique}-Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}{} easier than Tarski\mathtt{Tarski}{}? Note that our Ω(log⁡2N)\Omega(\log^{2}N) lower bound in the oracle model, in dimension d=2d=2, applies on the family of “herringbone” functions which do have a unique fixed point.

Thanks to Alexandros Hollender for pointing us to .

References