The Communication Complexity of Local Search

Yakov Babichenko, Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan

Introduction

In the context of computational complexity, local search problems are captured by the complexity class PLS [Johnson et al., 1988] which is a subset of the well studied class TFNP (defined in [Megiddo and Papadimitriou, 1991] and studied, e.g., in [Papadimitriou et al., 1990, Beame et al., 1998, Daskalakis et al., 2009, Hubácek et al., 2017]): search problems for which a witness always exists (“total search problems”) and can by efficiently verified (“in NP”). The problem has also been widely studied in the model of query complexity where the cost of an algorithm is the number of black-box queries to the objective function ff, from the pioneering work of [Aldous, 1983] on the Boolean hypercube, to a rather complete characterization of not only the deterministic query complexity but also the randomized and even quantum complexities on any graph [Santha and Szegedy, 2004, Aaronson, 2006, Sun and Yao, 2009].

Definition: For a fixed, commonly known graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E), the \textscSumLS(G)\textsc{SumLS}(G) communication problem is the following: Alice holds a function fA:V→{1,...,W}f_{A}:V\rightarrow\{1,...,W\}, Bob holds a function fB:V→{1,...,W}f_{B}:V\rightarrow\{1,...,W\}, and their goal is to find a vertex v∗∈Vv^{*}\in V such that fA(v∗)+fB(v∗)≥fA(u)+fB(u)f_{A}(v^{*})+f_{B}(v^{*})\geq f_{A}(u)+f_{B}(u) for all u∈Vu\in V with (v∗,u)∈E(v^{*},u)\in E.

Determining the communication complexity of SumLS on certain families of graphs is easy. For example, a simple reduction from disjointness shows that the communication complexity of SumLS on the clique with nn vertices is Ω(n)\Omega(n). Our main theorem proves optimal lower bounds for several important families of graphs, all have small degree. The technical challenge is that the non-deterministic communication complexity of the problem on small degree graphs is clearly low: to verify that v∗v^{*} is a local optimum, Alice and Bob need only communicate the values f(u)f(u) and g(u)g(u) for the small number of v∗v^{*}’s neighbours in the graph (note that the degree of all graphs that we consider is indeed small: log⁡N\log N or even constant). There are only a few results in the communication complexity literature that manage to prove good lower bounds for total problems where verification is easy, most notably for Karchmer-Wigderson games [Karchmer and Wigderson, 1990, Karchmer et al., 1995, Raz and McKenzie, 1997] and for PPAD-like communication problems [Babichenko and Rubinstein, 2016, Göös and Rubinstein, 2018].

The communication complexity of local search on the nn-dimensional hypercube with N=2nN=2^{n} vertices is Ω(N)\Omega(\sqrt{N}).

The communication complexity of local search on a constant-dimension grid with NN vertices is Ω(N)\Omega(\sqrt{N}).

The communication complexity of local search on a specific family of constant degree graphs with NN vertices is Ω(N)\Omega(\sqrt{N}).

The communication complexity of local search on the odd graph with NN vertices is Ω(N)\Omega(\sqrt{N}).

We note that all our bounds hold for randomized communication complexity. Interestingly, the first three bounds are optimal: first, since for these families of graphs an algorithm by Aldous finds a local optimum with O(N)O(\sqrt{N}) queries in expectation, which clearly implies an analogous communication algorithm with the same efficiency.

Our proof starts from considering the communication variant of a pebbling game Göös and Pitassi . D=(V,E)D=(V,E) is a known directed acyclic graph. The input is a boolean assignment for the vertices b:V→{0,1}b:V\rightarrow\{0,1\} such that every source is true (b(v)=1b(v)=1) and every sink is false (b(v)=0b(v)=0). The output is a false vertex whose all predecessors are true (i.e., v∈Vv\in V such that b(v)=0b(v)=0 and b(u)=1b(u)=1 for all u∈Vu\in V, (u,v)∈E(u,v)\in E). [Göös and Pitassi, 2014] consider the communication variant of the game which is obtained by distributing the information b(v)∈{0,1}b(v)\in\{0,1\} of every vertex by a constant size index-gadget {0,1}3×→{0,1}\{0,1\}^{3}\times\rightarrow\{0,1\}. They show that for some constant-degree graph DD with NN vertices the communication complexity of the problem is Θ(N)\Theta(\sqrt{N}), which is optimal.

Our proof is composed of three steps. The first step shows how to reduce the pebbling game to a variant of local search on a graph GG (VetoLS) where Alice holds the function ff and Bob holds a set of valid vertices. The goal is to find a local maximum in the subgraph that is composed of the valid vertices.

The second step is the most technically challenging one. We first define a notion of embedding one graph to the other, and show that if a graph GG can be embedded into HH then the communication of \textscVetoLS(H)\textsc{VetoLS}(H) is at least that of \textscVetoLS(H)\textsc{VetoLS}(H). We then show that the graph GG obtained in the previous step can be embedded into each of the families considered in the theorem. This embedding is quite delicate and uses specifics properties of the graph GG, since the number of vertices of GG and HH must be almost the same, in order to obtain an optimal bound of Ω(N)\Omega(\sqrt{N}) for \textscVetoLS(H)\textsc{VetoLS}(H), where NN is the number of vertices of HH.

Finally, in the third step we show that the communication complexity of VetoLS on any graph is at least that of local search, thus establishing the theorem.

The constants that are obtained in our theorem are quite big (the dimension of the grid has to be at least 119119, and the degree of the constant degree graph is 3636). Thus, we also provide an alternative proof that obtains better constants, at the cost of a worse communication bound. Specifically, we show that there exists a specific family of 44-degree graphs for which the communication complexity of local search is Ω(Nc)\Omega(N^{c}) for some constant c>0c>0. We also show a lower bound of the form Ω(Nc)\Omega(N^{c}) for the three dimensional grid N×N×2N\times N\times 2. The alternative proof uses the more recent and more generic “simulation” lemmas that “lift” lower bounds from the query complexity setting to the communication complexity setting [Göös et al., 2017, 2015, Raz and McKenzie, 1997], instead of the “simulation” lemma of [Göös and Pitassi, 2014] that was developed for specific settings like the pebbling game. The main technical difficulty that we overcome is that the “combination gadgets” used in these lemmas (specifically the index function) are very different from the simple sum that we desire.

We now describe two applications of our basic lower bound. In both applications we study communication variants of problems that are known to be PLS complete, have low non-deterministic complexity and, as we show, high communication complexity.

The communication requirements for reaching various types of equilibria in different types of games have received a significant amount of recent interest (Babichenko and Rubinstein , Göös and Rubinstein ) as they essentially capture the convergence time of arbitrary dynamics in scenarios where each player only knows his own utilities (“uncoupled dynamics” [Hart and Mas-Colell, 2003, Hart and Mansour, 2010]) and must “learn” information about the others. Of particular importance here is the class of potential games [Monderer and Shapley, 1996].

The class of exact potential games includes, in particular, all congestion games. A key property of potential games (exact or ordinal) is that every sequence of better responses converges to an equilibrium and therefore every potential game always has a pure Nash equilibrium.

[Hart and Mansour, 2010] study the communication complexity of pure Nash equilibrium in ordinal potential games. They consider nn-player games where each player has four actions and show (by a reduction from disjointness) that exponential communication is required to distinguish between the case where the game is an ordinal potential game (and thus has a Nash equilibrium) and the case where the game is not a potential game and does not admit any Nash equilibrium. This immediately implies that finding an equilibrium in games that are guaranteed to have one takes exp(n)exp(n) bits of communication.

Does finding an equilibrium become any easier for exact potential games? In [Nisan, 2009b] it was shown that exponentially many queries are needed to find an equilibrium, but maybe in the communication model the problem becomes much easier. The technical challenge is again that the non-deterministic communication complexity of the problem is low, i.e, verifying that a certain profile is a Nash equilibrium does not require much communication (each player only has to make sure that he plays his best response). Nevertheless, we provide a ray of hope and show that in contrast to ordinal potential games, there is a randomized protocol that uses only polylog(∣A∣)\textsf{polylog}(|A|) (when ∣A∣=∣A1∣⋅...⋅∣An∣|A|=|A_{1}|\cdot...\cdot|A_{n}| is the game size) bits of communication and determines whether the game is an exact potential game or not.

We then show that although it is easy to recognize whether a game is an exact potential game or not, finding an equilibrium requires polynomial (in the size of the game) communication (and in particular exponential in the number of players). These results provide a negative answer to an open question posed in [Nisan, 2009a].

For some constant c>0c>0, the following problem requires at least NcN^{c} communication (even randomized): Alice gets an N×NN\times N matrix uAu_{A} and Bob gets an N×NN\times N matrix uBu_{B}, they are promised that the game defined by these matrices is an (exact) potential game and they must output a pure Nash equilibrium of the game.

For some constant c>0c>0, the following problem requires at least 2cn2^{cn} communication (even randomized): Alice gets the utility functions of the first nn players in a 2n2n-player 22-action game. Bob gets the utility functions of the last nn players. They are promised that the game defined by these matrices is an (exact) potential game and they must output a pure Nash equilibrium of the game.

Our proofs are via reductions from local search on (certain) degree 4 graphs in the two-player NN-action case, and from local search on the hypercube in the 2n2n-player 2-action case. While the relation between equilibria of potential games and local maxima is well known and very simple, the reduction is actually quite subtle. First the neighbourhood structures do not naturally match (in the two-player case), but more crucially the input to the players here is very limited: only very specifically related matrices uAu_{A} and uBu_{B} give an (exact) potential game, while the lower bounds for local search were for arbitrary inputs.

We also show that the search for a pure Nash equilibrium in exact potential games can be formulated as a total search problem: Either find a pure Nash equilibrium (that is guaranteed to exist in exact potential games) or provide a succinct evidence that the game is not an exact potential game. Interestingly such a succinct evidence of violation of exact potential property is guaranteed to exist by [Monderer and Shapley, 1996]. As an immediate corollary from our results we deduce hardness of this total search problem.

2 Local Optima in Combinatorial Auctions

Our second application concerns attempts to weaken the global optimality constraints in market allocations. Consider a combinatorial auction of mm indivisible items among nn players, each with his own valuation function viv_{i} that gives a real value to every subset of the items. The usual goal of optimizing social welfare aims to globally maximize ∑ivi(Si)\sum_{i}v_{i}(S_{i}) over all allocations (S1,...,Sn)(S_{1},...,S_{n}) of the items.

A corresponding notion of equilibrium is the Walrasian equilibrium, which includes also a vector of prices p1,...,pmp_{1},...,p_{m} such that every player receives his globally-optimal set of items at these prices. While these notions provide very strong guarantees, they are usually “too good to be true”: Walreasian equilibria only rarely exist and optimizing social welfare is usually infeasible, in essentially any sense of the word, and in particular in the sense of requiring exponential communication [Nisan and Segal, 2006].

Several papers have tried to relax the notion of a Walrasian equilibrium or similarly view the allocation problem as a game and analyze the equilibria in this game. In particular, in the model of simultaneous second price auctions [Christodoulou et al., 2008] it is easy to see that when the valuations are submodular every allocation that is locally optimal can be part of an equilibrium in the game, and the same goes for the endowed equilibrium of [Babaioff et al., 2018]. Recall that a locally optimal allocation in a combinatorial auction is an allocation of the items (S1,…,Sn)(S_{1},\ldots,S_{n}) such that transferring any single item j∈Sij\in S_{i} to some other player i′i^{\prime} does not improve the welfare.

Since local optima play a central role in various relaxed notions of equilibria, an obvious question is whether they are easy to find. In [Babaioff et al., 2018] it is shown that for some succinctly represented submodular valuations it is PLS hard to compute a locally optimal allocation in combinatorial auction. Furthermore, in the query model it is shown that finding a locally optimal allocation is as hard as finding a local maximum in the odd graph. Combining the same reduction with our communication hardness of local search on the odd graph, we get that:

The communication complexity of finding a locally optimal allocation between two players with submodular valuations is 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)}.

Local Search over Graphs

In this section we provide communication lower bounds on the communication complexity of local search over several families of graphs.

The following bound holds for the randomized communication complexity of SumLS:

CC(\textscSumLS(G))=Ω(N)CC(\textsc{SumLS}(G))=\Omega(\sqrt{N}), when GG is a specific constant-degree (36) graph with NN vertices.

CC(\textscSumLS(Hypn))=Ω(N)=Ω(2n/2)CC(\textsc{SumLS}(\textsf{Hyp}_{n}))=\Omega(\sqrt{N})=\Omega(2^{n/2}) where N=2nN=2^{n} is the number of vertices.

CC(\textscSumLS(H)=Ω(N)CC(\textsc{SumLS}(H)=\Omega(\sqrt{N}), when HH is a grid with a constant dimension (119) grid with NN vertices.

CC(\textscSumLS(Oddn))=Ω(2n/2)CC(\textsc{SumLS}(\textsf{Odd}_{n}))=\Omega(2^{n/2}).

We note that results 1, 2, and 3 are optimal since Aldous provides a randomized algorithm that finds a local maximum in these graph using O(N)O(\sqrt{N}) value queries. Result 4, on the other hand, is not necessarily optimal because the odd graph has N≈4nN\approx 4^{n} vertices, so in terms of the number of vertices our lower bound is Ω(N)\Omega(\sqrt{N}).

Result 3 proves an optimal bound for a grid with a constant dimension, but this dimension is quite large (119). We are able to show that finding a local optimum in the three-dimensional grid is hard, but our lower bound in this case is only Ω(Nc)\Omega(N^{c}), for some constant c>0c>0 (in contrast to an optimal bound of Ω(N)\Omega(\sqrt{N}) for the 119119-dimensional grid). To prove this, we first show that finding a local maximum is hard even for degree 44 graphs.

There exists a constant c>0c>0 such that the randomized communication complexity of SumLS satisfies:

CC(\textscSumLS(G))≥NcCC(\textsc{SumLS}(G))\geq N^{c}, when GG is a specific degree 4 graph with NN vertices.

CC(\textscSumLS(GridN×N×)=NcCC(\textsc{SumLS}(\textsf{Grid}_{N\times N\times})=N^{c}.

The overall structure of the proofs of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 is similar, but the proofs use different techniques. The proof of Theorem 2.1 appears in Section 3 and the proof of Theorem 2.2 appears in Section 4.

Proof of Theorem 2.1

Our starting point is a communication variant of a pebbling game. In this problem, D=(V,E)D=(V,E) is a known directed acyclic graph. The input is a boolean assignment for the vertices b:V→{0,1}b:V\rightarrow\{0,1\} such that every source is true (b(v)=1b(v)=1) and every sink is false (b(v)=0b(v)=0). The output is a false vertex whose all predecessors are true (i.e., v∈Vv\in V such that b(v)=0b(v)=0 and b(u)=1b(u)=1 for all u∈Vu\in V, (u,v)∈E(u,v)\in E). Note that the problem is total.

The communication variant of the pebbling game Pebb(D) is defined by distributing the information b(v)∈{0,1}b(v)\in\{0,1\} of every vertex by a constant size index-gadget {0,1}3×→{0,1}\{0,1\}^{3}\times\rightarrow\{0,1\}.

In [Göös and Pitassi, 2014] it is shown that there exists a constant degree graph DD with NN vertices where both the randomized communication complexity of the problem is Θ(N)\Theta(\sqrt{N}). The proof is done in three steps.

We introduce an intermediate communication problem \textscVetoLS(G)\textsc{VetoLS}(G) where Alice holds the potential function and Bob holds a subset of valid vertices (equivalently, Bob vetoes the vertices that are not in the set that he holds). The goal is to find a valid local maximum: a valid vertex whose valid neighbours have (weakly) lower potential. Given a graph DD as above, we construct a constant degree graph GG with O(N)O(N) vertices and reduce Peb(D) to \textscVetoLS(G)\textsc{VetoLS}(G). This gives us an optimal communication lower bound for VetoLS for a concrete graph GG.

We define a certain notion of “embedding” of one graph into the other. We show that if G′G^{\prime} can be embedded in GG, then CC(\textscVetoLS(G′))≥CC(\textscVetoLS(G))CC(\textsc{VetoLS}(G^{\prime}))\geq CC(\textsc{VetoLS}(G)). We use this observation to prove optimal hardness bound of VetoLS over the hypercube by embedding GG into an hypercube of dimension log⁡(N)+c\log(N)+c for a constant cc.

For every graph GG, we show that CC(\textscVetoLS(G))≈CC(\textscSumLS(G))CC(\textsc{VetoLS}(G))\approx CC(\textsc{SumLS}(G)).

We now provide a detailed description of each step.

1 Starting Point: Pebbling Games

In Section 3.3 we use the concrete structure of the constant degree graph DD for which the hardness of the pebbling game is proved. Hence, we start with providing an explicit description of the graph DD.

The vertices of DD are given by V=[M3]×[M]×[M]×[M]V=[M^{3}]\times[M]\times[M]\times[M]. Each vertex v=(k1,k2,k3,k4)v=(k_{1},k_{2},k_{3},k_{4}) has six successors:

where the ±1\pm 1 addition in the last three coordinates is done modulo MM. The addition in the first coordinate is the standard addition. Thus, each vertex has six predecessors:

The sources of the graph are {(1,⋅,⋅,⋅)}\{(1,\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)\} and its sinks are {(M3,⋅,⋅,⋅)}\{(M^{3},\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)\}.

In [Göös and Pitassi, 2014] an optimal bound on the communication complexity is proved the following optimal bound on the communication of the following variant of pebbling games. In the communication problem \textscPebb(D)\textsc{Pebb}(D), Alice’s input is an assignment b:V×→{0,1}b:V\times\rightarrow\{0,1\}. Bob’s input is an index for each vertex I:V→I:V\rightarrow. The input satisfies b(v,I(v))=1b(v,I(v))=1 for every source vv, and b(v,I(v))=0b(v,I(v))=0 for every sink vv. The output is a vertex v∈Sv\in S such that b(v,I(v))=0b(v,I(v))=0 and for every predecessor uu of vv holds b(u,I(u))=1b(u,I(u))=1.

CC(\textscPebb(D))=Ω(M3)CC(\textsc{Pebb}(D))=\Omega(M^{3}). This bound also holds for randomized protocols.

2 Step 1: From Pebbling to VetoLS

Given a graph GG, the communication problem \textscVetoLS(G)\textsc{VetoLS}(G) is defined as follows. Alice’s input is a function f:V→[W]f:V\rightarrow[W]. Bob’s input is a non-empty subset S⊂VS\subset V. The output is a vertex v∈Sv\in S such that f(v)≥f(w)f(v)\geq f(w) for every w∈Sw\in S such that {v,w}∈E\{v,w\}\in E (i.e., for every valid neighbour). We show that the communication complexity of \textscVetoLS(G)\textsc{VetoLS}(G) is at least that of \textscPebb(D)\textsc{Pebb}(D), for some GG that is related to DD. Next we show how to obtain the graph GG from DD.

We construct the graph GG in two stages. First, given a graph DD of the pebbling game, let G′G^{\prime} be an undirected version of DD which additionally has an edge from every source of DD to some sink of DD. Let GG be the graph that is obtained from G′G^{\prime} by replacing each vertex in GG with three new vertices and duplicating the edges so that each new vertex is connected to all the copies of its neighbors in G′G^{\prime}. We call the graph GG the replication graph of DD.

Let DD be a graph and GG be its replication graph. The communication complexity of \textscVetoLS(G)\textsc{VetoLS}(G) is at least that of \textscPebb(D)\textsc{Pebb}(D).

Alice’s input in \textscPebb(D)\textsc{Pebb}(D) is an assignment b:V×→{0,1}b:V\times\rightarrow\{0,1\}. We use this to define the potential function ff that Alice holds in \textscVetoLS(G)\textsc{VetoLS}(G): for vertex v∈V′v\in V^{\prime} let f(v)=t(v)+6N\mathds1b(v)=0f(v)=t(v)+6N\mathds{1}_{b(v)=0}. Bob’s input in \textscPebb(D)\textsc{Pebb}(D) is the function I:V→I:V\rightarrow. Bob defines the set of valid vertices in \textscVetoLS(G)\textsc{VetoLS}(G) to be S={(v,I(v)):v∈V}S=\{(v,I(v)):v\in V\}. Namely, among the three copies of vv only the one with correct index is valid. This choice of valid vertices has the desirable property that the subgraph of valid vertices is precisely G′G^{\prime} and the assignment b(v,i)b(v,i) over the vertices of G′G^{\prime} is precisely the decomposed assignment b(v,I(v))b(v,I(v)).

We argue that the local maxima of ff are precisely all false vertices whose all incoming neighbours are true. Those are indeed local maxima, because their “predecessors” do not have the bonus of 6N6N and their “successors” have lower topological number. The source cannot be a local maximum because it is a “true” vertex and it is connected to a sink that is a “false” vertex. A true vertex (other than source) is not local maximum because its predecessor has higher topological number. Similarly, a false vertex with false predecessor is not local maximum. This leaves us only with false vertices whose predecessors are true. ∎

3 Step 2: Embedding the Bounded Degree Graph

In this step we define a certain notion of embedding of one graph into another. We will see that if a graph GG can be embedded into HH then the communication complexity of local search on HH is essentially at least as large as the communication complexity of local search on GG. We will then see how to embed the graph GG of the previous steps into the three dimensional grid, the hypercube, and the odd graph.

A vertex-isolated edge-disjoint (VIED) embedding of a graph G=(VG,EG)G=(V_{G},E_{G}) in a graph H=(VH,EH)H=(V_{H},E_{H}) is a pair of mappings φ:VG→VH\varphi:V_{G}\rightarrow V_{H} and χ:EG→P(H)\chi:E_{G}\rightarrow P(H), where P(H)P(H) is the set of simple paths on HH, such that:

For every edge {v,w}∈EG\{v,w\}\in E_{G}, the path χ({v,w})\chi(\{v,w\}) connects φ(v)\varphi(v) to φ(w)\varphi(w).

The interior vertices of the paths χ({v,w})\chi(\{v,w\}) and χ({v′,w′})\chi(\{v^{\prime},w^{\prime}\}) are disjoint (edge disjointness).

For every v∈VGv\in V_{G} and every {w,w′}∈EG\{w,w^{\prime}\}\in E_{G} such that v≠w,w′v\neq w,w^{\prime} holds d(φ(v),χ({w,w′}))≥2d(\varphi(v),\chi(\{w,w^{\prime}\}))\geq 2, where dd denotes the distance in HH of the vertex from the path (vertex isolation).

That is, in a VIED embedding every edge of GG is replaced by a path in HH that connects the corresponding vertices such that these paths do not share a vertex. Moreover, for every v∈VGv\in V_{G}, φ(v)\varphi(v) is isolated in the sense that no path passes through the neighbours of φ(v)\varphi(v).

Let GG be a graph and suppose it can be VIED embedded into some other graph HH. Then CC(\textscVetoLS(G))≤CC(\textscVetoLS(H))CC(\textsc{VetoLS}(G))\leq CC(\textsc{VetoLS}(H)).

Alice’s potential is defined as follows. For vertices w∈φ(VG)w\in\varphi(V_{G}) we define fH(φ(v))=fG(v)f_{H}(\varphi(v))=f_{G}(v). Consider a vertex w∈χ(EG)w\in\chi(E_{G}) that belongs to an edge {u,v}∈EG\{u,v\}\in E_{G}. Suppose that ww is the kk’th element in the path χ({u,v})\chi(\{u,v\}) and ll is the total length of this path. Define:

In all other vertices Alice’s potential will not play a role because these vertices will not be valid, thus we can simply set fH(w)≡0f_{H}(w)\equiv 0 for all other vertices.

We recall that Bob’s input in \textscVetoLS(G)\textsc{VetoLS}(G) is SG⊂VGS_{G}\subset V_{G}. We denote by EG(SG)⊂EGE_{G}(S_{G})\subset E_{G} the set of internal edges of SGS_{G}. Bob’s subset of valid vertices in HH is defined byBy χ(EG(SG))\chi(E_{G}(S_{G})) we obviously mean the corresponding vertices in these paths. SH=φ(SG)∪χ(EG(SG))S_{H}=\varphi(S_{G})\cup\chi(E_{G}(S_{G})).

If v∈VGv\in V_{G} is a valid local maximum, then φ(v)∈VH\varphi(v)\in V_{H} is a valid local maximum because all its valid neighbours are valid edges in which vv participates (here we use the isolation property), and the value along these edges is a weighted average of fG(v)f_{G}(v) and fG(u)≤fG(v)f_{G}(u)\leq f_{G}(v), where uu is a valid neighbour of vv.

We argue that there are no additional valid local maxima in HH. Indeed, if v∈VGv\in V_{G} is not a local maximum then φ(v)∈VH\varphi(v)\in V_{H} is not a local maximum because there is a valid edge where the potential increases. If w∈χ(EG(SG))w\in\chi(E_{G}(S_{G})), by distinctness, fG(u)≠fG(v)f_{G}(u)\neq f_{G}(v) therefore in one of the directions of the path χ({u,v})\chi(\{u,v\}) the potential increases. All other vertices are invalid. ∎

In the embeddings we use the specifics of the DAG DD for which the hardness of pebbling games is proved in Göös and Pitassi . We now explicitly describe the replication graph GG that is obtained from DD so that Proposition 3.2 can be applied.

Let G′G^{\prime} be the undirected version of the DAG DD for which the hardness of pebbling games is proved with additional edges that connect the sources and sinks of DD in a same way other vertices in DD are connected. Formally, the vertices of G′G^{\prime} are V=[M3]×[M]×[M]×[M]V=[M^{3}]\times[M]\times[M]\times[M], and the edges are:

Let GG be the graph that is obtained from G′G^{\prime} by replacing each vertex in GG with three new vertices and duplicating the edges so that each new vertex is connected to all the copies of its neighbors in G′G^{\prime}. Formally, the vertices of GG are {(v,i):v∈V,i∈}\{(v,i):v\in V,i\in\} and the edges are {((u,i),(v,j)):(u,v)∈E,i,j∈}\{((u,i),(v,j)):(u,v)\in E,i,j\in\}. Note that GG is a graph with 3M63M^{6} vertices and (constant) degree d=36d=36.

3.2 Embedding into the Hypercube

In this section we show how to embed the replication graph GG obtained in the previous step into the hypercube. Moreover, the embedding is such that the number of vertices in the hypercube increases only by a constant factor. This small blowup is crucial for obtaining an optimal 2n/22^{n/2} bound.

The graph GG (with 3M63M^{6} vertices) can be VIED-embedded into the nn’th-dimensional hypercube Hypn\textsf{Hyp}_{n} for n=6⌈log⁡M⌉+111n=6\lceil\log M\rceil+111. As a corollary, CC(\textscVetoLS(Hypn))=Ω(2n/2)CC(\textsc{VetoLS}(\textsf{Hyp}_{n}))=\Omega(2^{n/2}).

For clarity of exposition we assume that M=2cM=2^{c} is a power of 2. We start with some notations and properties of the graph GG. Recall that the vertices of GG are V=[M3]×[M]×[M]×[M]×V=[M^{3}]\times[M]\times[M]\times[M]\times. For a vertex v=(k1,k2,k3,k4,i)v=(k_{1},k_{2},k_{3},k_{4},i), k1k_{1} is called the layer of vv. Note that all edges connect kk layer vertices to k+1k+1 layer vertices. k1+k2+k3+k4mod  2k_{1}+k_{2}+k_{3}+k_{4}\mod 2 is called the parity of vv. ii is called the replication index of vv. We present an edge coloring of GG with 108108 colors in which no two adjacent edges are colored the same (a “valid” coloring). We first color all edges from layer 1 to layer 2 with 5454 colors. Given a vertex v=(k2,k3,k4)v=(k_{2},k_{3},k_{4}), edges are specified by a displacement d∈{±1,0,0),(0,±1,0),(0,0,±1)}d\in\{\pm 1,0,0),(0,\pm 1,0),(0,0,\pm 1)\} that operates on (k2,k3,k4)(k_{2},k_{3},k_{4}) and pair of replication indices i,j∈i,j\in (ii is the replication index of the vertex at layer 11 and jj is the replication index of the vertex at layer 22). Note that we have 6⋅9=546\cdot 9=54 such specifications. It is easy to verify that coloring these edges in 5454 different colors is a valid edge coloring. We proceed by coloring all edges between layers 22 and 33 with different 5454 colors using a similar coloring method. Similarly, all edges from layer 2k−12k-1 to layer 2k2k are colored as edges between layers 11 and 22 and all edges from layer 2k2k to layer 2k+12k+1 are colored as edges between layers 22 and 33. This defines an edge coloring of GG.

Now we present some notation. The vertices of the hypercube are partitioned into blocks as follows:

For i=1,...,5i=1,...,5 the ii’th index block consists of bits that represent the ii’th index. The sizes of the blocks are (3c,c,c,c,2)(3c,c,c,c,2) for i=1,2,3,4,5i=1,2,3,4,5 correspondingly.

A parity bit memorizes the parity of a vertex.

The counter block consists of 33 bits that serves as a counter to keep track of the block on which we currently apply the changes along the embedding path (see below).

Let (h1,...,hM3)(h_{1},...,h_{M^{3}}) be a Hamiltonian path of the 3c3c-dimensional hypercube. Let (h1′,...,hM′)(h^{\prime}_{1},...,h^{\prime}_{M}) be a Hamiltonian path of the cc-dimensional hypercube and (h1′′,...,h4′′)(h^{\prime\prime}_{1},...,h^{\prime\prime}_{4}) be a Hamiltonian path of the 22-dimensional hypercube. To define ϕ(v)\phi(v), we embed a vertex v=(k1,k2,k3,k4,i)v=(k_{1},k_{2},k_{3},k_{4},i) into the vertex of the hypercube whose first block is the bits of hk1h_{k_{1}}, the second block is hk2′h^{\prime}_{k_{2}}, then hk3′h^{\prime}_{k_{3}}, hk4′h^{\prime}_{k_{4}} and hk5′′h^{\prime\prime}_{k_{5}}. We set the parity bit to be the parity of vv, the edge block to 0, and the counter block to 0.

Note that the coloring of GG in 108108 colors naturally induces an order on the edges. Every vertex has at most one mm’th edge, and two adjacent vertices agree on the index of this edge. The mm’th edge of vv, from vv in layer k1k_{1} to uu in layer k1+1k_{1}+1, is defined by the following sequence of bit flipping.

The mm’th bit in the edge block is flipped to 1.

A single bit in the counter block is flipped to encode the integer 1.

A single bit in the first index block is flipped to encode the integer k1+1k_{1}+1.

A single bit in the counter block is flipped to encode the integer 2.

If the displacement of the edge is (±1,0,0)(\pm 1,0,0), a single bit in the second index block is flipped to encode the integer k2±1k_{2}\pm 1. If the displacement of the edge is (0,±1,0)(0,\pm 1,0), a single bit in the third index block is flipped to encode the integer k3±1k_{3}\pm 1. If the displacement of the edge is (0,0,±1)(0,0,\pm 1), a single bit in the fourth index block is flipped to encode the integer k3±1k_{3}\pm 1.

A single bit in the counter block is flipped to encode the integer 3.

The two bits of the fifth index block are flipped (one by one in a fixed order) to encode the integer jj (the replication index of uu).

The mm’th bit in the edge block is flipped back to 0.

It is easy to see that this path ends up at ϕ(u)\phi(u) (note that the parity of vv and uu is the same, and indeed we did not flip the parity bit). We argue that the defined paths are disjoint. It is sufficient to prove that given a node on the path one can recover the previous node. Given the color of the edge and the counter, it is immediate to recover the previous node in all intermediate steps excluding steps (3) and (5). In steps (3) and (5) it is unclear whether we should flip the corresponding index block or the counter block. To determine this we use the parity bit: In step (3), if the parity bit is equal to the parity of the encoded vertices, then it means that we did not flip yet a bit, and to get the previous vertex we set the counter block to encode 0. If the parity bit differs from the parity of the encoded indices, then it means that we have flip a bit, and to get the previous vertex we should flip a bit in the index block. In step (5) we do the opposite. If the parity bit differs from the parity of the encoded indices, then we flip the counter. If the parity bit is equal to the parity of the encoded indices, then we flip the index block.

It is easy to check that the embedding is vertex isolated because of the parity bit.

3.3 Embedding into the Grid

The graph GG (with 3M63M^{6} vertices) can be VIED-embedded in a constant-dimension grid with O(M6)O(M^{6}) vertices. As a corollary, CC(\textscVetoLS(Gridd))=Ω(N)CC(\textsc{VetoLS}(\textsf{Grid}_{d}))=\Omega(\sqrt{N}) for some constant-dimension grid with NN vertices.

(sketch) The embedding is very similar to the one we presented in Lemma 3.5 for embedding into the hypercube. In the proof of Lemma 3.5 we only used the fact that the hypercube has an Hamiltonian cycle. For the grid, we will take advantage of the observation that the two-dimensional grid has an Hamiltonian cycle.

Specifically, a vertex v=(k1,k2,k3,k4,i)v=(k_{1},k_{2},k_{3},k_{4},i) is embedded into the vertex of the grid whose first block is the bits of that correspond to a Hamiltonian cycle on GridM1.5×M1.5\textsf{Grid}_{M^{1.5}\times M^{1.5}}, blocks 2−42-4 are specified using the Hamiltonian cycle on GridM0.5×M0.5\textsf{Grid}_{M^{0.5}\times M^{0.5}}, and block 55 using the Hamiltonian cycle on Grid2×Grid2\textsf{Grid}_{2}\times\textsf{Grid}_{2}. We set the parity bit to be the parity of vv, the edge block to 0, and the counter block to 0. Applying very similar arguments to the proof of Lemma 3.5 we establish the embedding of GG into the grid [M1.5]2×[M0.5]6×111[M^{1.5}]^{2}\times[M^{0.5}]^{6}\times^{111}. ∎

3.4 Embedding into the Odd Graph

There exists a VIED embedding of Hypn\textsf{Hyp}_{n} in Oddn+2\textsf{Odd}_{n+2}. As a corollary, CC(\textscVetoLS(Oddn))=Ω(2n/2)CC(\textsc{VetoLS}(\textsf{Odd}_{n}))=\Omega(2^{n/2}).

We first embed Hypn\textsf{Hyp}_{n} in Hypn+1\textsf{Hyp}_{n+1} simply by ϕ1(v)=(v,0)\phi_{1}(v)=(v,0) and χ1({v,w})={(v,0),(w,0)}.\chi_{1}(\{v,w\})=\{(v,0),(w,0)\}. Obviously this embedding is edge disjoint (but not vertex isolated).

We now embed Hypn+1\textsf{Hyp}_{n+1} in Oddn+2\textsf{Odd}_{n+2}. We refer to each vertex of Hypn+1\textsf{Hyp}_{n+1} as a subset S⊂[n+1]S\subset[n+1]. We denote S+n+1={i+n+1:i∈S}S+n+1=\{i+n+1:i\in S\}. We denote Tc=[n+1]∖TT^{c}=[n+1]\setminus T (this notation will be relevant for subsets of [n+1][n+1] rather than subsets of [2n+3][2n+3] as the vertices of Oddn+2\textsf{Odd}_{n+2}). The embedding is defined by

It is easy to check that this indeed defines a valid path on Oddn+2\textsf{Odd}_{n+2}. All the defined paths are disjoint because given a vertex on a path T∪(T′+n)∪{2n+3}T\cup(T^{\prime}+n)\cup\{2n+3\} we can identify the edge: S=T′S=T^{\prime} and ii is the unique element that is missing from both sets TT and T′T^{\prime}.

Now we define the embedding of Hypn\textsf{Hyp}_{n} in Oddn+2\textsf{Odd}_{n+2} to be the decomposition of these two embeddings; I.e., ϕ(v)=ϕ2(ϕ1(v))\phi(v)=\phi_{2}(\phi_{1}(v)) and χ(e)=χ2(χ1(e))\chi(e)=\chi_{2}(\chi_{1}(e)). The embedding (ϕ,χ)(\phi,\chi) is edge disjoint because both embeddings (ϕ1,χ1)(\phi_{1},\chi_{1}) and (ϕ2,χ2)(\phi_{2},\chi_{2}) are edge disjoint. Now we prove that (ϕ,χ)(\phi,\chi) is vertex isolated. A vertex ϕ2(ϕ1(v))=S∪(Sc+2n)\phi_{2}(\phi_{1}(v))=S\cup(S^{c}+2n) has n+2n+2 neighbours in Oddn+2\textsf{Odd}_{n+2}. Among these neighbours, n+1n+1 participate in an embedding of the outgoing edges of S∈Hypn+1S\in\textsf{Hyp}_{n+1}. So there is a single neighbour, Sc∪(S+n+1)S^{c}\cup(S+n+1), who is suspected to belong to an embedding of an independent edge. Note that Sc∪(S+n+1)=ϕ2(Sc)S^{c}\cup(S+n+1)=\phi_{2}(S^{c}) and Sc∈Hypn+1S^{c}\in\textsf{Hyp}_{n+1} does not belong to the embedding of Hypn\textsf{Hyp}_{n} in Hypn+1\textsf{Hyp}_{n+1}: indeed, for every vertex v∈Hypnv\in\textsf{Hyp}_{n} the complementary vertex (v,0)‾=(v‾,1)∈Hypn+1\overline{(v,0)}=(\overline{v},1)\in\textsf{Hyp}_{n+1} does not belong to the embedding of Hypn\textsf{Hyp}_{n} in Hypn+1\textsf{Hyp}_{n+1} (neither to ϕ1(VHypn)\phi_{1}(V_{\textsf{Hyp}_{n}}) nor to χ1(EHypn)\chi_{1}(E_{\textsf{Hyp}_{n}})). ∎

4 Step 3: From VetoLS to SumLS

First, recall that the potential function gets values in [W][W]. We reduce the problem \textscVetoLS(G)\textsc{VetoLS}(G) to \textscSumLS(G)\textsc{SumLS}(G). Alice’s potential remains unchanged (i.e., fA(v):=fG(v)f_{A}(v):=f_{G}(v)). Bob fixes some valid vertex v∗∈Sv^{*}\in S and sets his potential as follows: fB(v):=0f_{B}(v):=0 if v∈Sv\in S, otherwise he sets fB(v)=−d(v,v∗)⋅(W+1)f_{B}(v)=-d(v,v^{*})\cdot(W+1), where dd is the distance in GG. Indeed every valid local maximum vv is a local maximum of the sum because all the valid neighbours have lower sum of potentials fA(v)+fB(v)=fG(v)≥fG(w)=fA(v)+fB(v)f_{A}(v)+f_{B}(v)=f_{G}(v)\geq f_{G}(w)=f_{A}(v)+f_{B}(v) and all invalid neighbours have negative sum of potentials fA(w)+fB(w)≤W−(W+1)<0f_{A}(w)+f_{B}(w)\leq W-(W+1)<0. It is easy to check that every valid vertex that is not a local maximum is not a local maximum of the sum. Finally, every invalid vertex vv is not a local maximum of the sum because the neighbour ww in the direction of the shortest path to v∗v^{*} has higher sum of potentials:

We apply this reduction on the graphs considered in Lemmas 3.6, 3.5 and 3.7 to deduce the theorem.

Proof of Theorem 2.2

The overall structure of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.1.

We start with a local-search-related communicationally-hard problem over some graph HH.

We use the intermediate problem \textscVetoLS(G)\textsc{VetoLS}(G), where GG is constructed from HH.

We embed GG in the three-dimensional grid.

We reduce \textscVetoLS(Grid)\textsc{VetoLS}(\textsf{Grid}) to \textscSumLS(Grid)\textsc{SumLS}(\textsf{Grid}).

However, in order to be able to embed GG in the three-dimensional grid, the degree of GG should be very low; at most 6. The pebbling game result of [Göös and Pitassi, 2014] does not serve our purposes because the degree of the graph GG is 36. Hence, our starting point is some different local-search-related communicationally hard problem over some degree 3 graph HH. In Step 1, we carefully modify HH to GG by increasing the degree only by 1; i.e., GG is degree 4 graph. Now, in Step 2 we are able to embed GG in the three-dimensional grid. Step 3 is identical to that in the proof of Theorem 2.1.

1 Step 0: The Query Complexity of Local Search and its Simulated Variant

In the problem \textscQuLS(H)\textsc{QuLS}(H) there is a graph HH and a function hh that gives a value h(v)h(v) for every vertex. The function hh can only be accessed via queries h(v)h(v). Furthermore, for each two vertices v,uv,u are distinct: h(v)≠h(u)h(v)\neq h(u). The goal is to find a local maximum of hh while minimizing the number of queries.

Santha and Szegedy [Santha and Szegedy, 2004] introduced a general connection between the query complexity of the local search problem and the expansion of a graph. Since random 33-regular graphs are expanders with high probability, we have that there exists a degree 3 graph HH with NN vertices for which finding a local maximum requires poly(N)\textsf{poly}(N) queries. However, their construction does not assume that h(v)≠h(u)h(v)\neq h(u) for every two vertices vv and uu. This is easy to fix: let h′(v)=2N⋅h(v)+vh^{\prime}(v)=2N\cdot h(v)+v (where v∈[N]v\in[N] denotes the index of vv). Observe that each local maximum of h′h^{\prime} is also a local maximum of hh and that the query h′(v)h^{\prime}(v) can be computed by one query h(v)h(v), so the number of queries required to find a local maximum of h′h^{\prime} is at least the number of queries required to find a local maximum of hh. We therefore have:

There exists a degree 3 graph HH with NN vertices and a function h′h^{\prime} such that every vertex has a distinct value for which finding a local maximum requires poly(N)\textsf{poly}(N) queries.

The simulation theorems provides us a recipe to produce problems with high communication complexity, given a problem with high query complexity. In particular, [Göös et al., 2017, Anshu et al., 2017] suggest the index-gadget recipe, which starting from \textscQuLS(H)\textsc{QuLS}(H) is translated to the following communication problem \textscSimLS(H)\textsc{SimLS}(H): for each vertex v∈Hv\in H, Alice holds an array of valuations (f(v,i))i∈[M](f(v,i))_{i\in[M]} where f(v,I(v))=h(v)f(v,I(v))=h(v) andE.g., M=N256M=N^{256} in [Göös et al., 2017]. M=poly(N)M=\textsf{poly}(N). Bob holds the correct index I(v)∈[M]I(v)\in[M]. Their goal is to compute a local maximum of the function f(v,I(v))f(v,I(v)). Direct application of the simulation theorems to our setting gives that:

2 Step 1: The Communication Complexity of VetoLS

In this step we prove the communication hardness of VetoLS on a certain bounded degree graph. We recall the definition of \textscVetoLS(G)\textsc{VetoLS}(G). Alice’s input is a function fG:V→[W]f_{G}:V\rightarrow[W]. Bob’s input is a non-empty subset S⊂VS\subset V. The output is a vertex v∈Sv\in S such that fG(v)≥fG(w)f_{G}(v)\geq f_{G}(w) for every w∈Sw\in S such that {v,w}∈E\{v,w\}\in E (i.e., for every valid neighbour).

Unlike the communication pebbling game problem that uses index gadgets of size 3, the simulated QuLS problem uses gadgets of size M=polyNM=\textsf{poly}N (NN is the number of vertices of GG). The idea in the proof of Theorem 2.1 is to replicate each vertex according to the gadget size, and connect every vertex with all its replicated neighbours. This idea is impractical here, because the degree of the resulting graph will be huge. Instead, we replace each replicated vertex with degree 3M3M by a carefully chosen binary tree structure in order to reduce the degree.

Without loss of generality we assume that M=2aM=2^{a} is a power of 2. We obtain our graph GG by replacing every vertex v∈Hv\in H by a tuple of MM graphs (Tout(v,i)∪Tin(v,i))i∈M(T^{out}(v,i)\cup T^{in}(v,i))_{i\in M}, where Tout(v,i)∪Tin(v,i)T^{out}(v,i)\cup T^{in}(v,i) denotes two binary trees with an overlapping root, both of depth log⁡(M3)=3a\log(M^{3})=3a (see Figure 1). Roughly speaking, the role of Tout(v,i)T^{out}(v,i) is to decode the correct indices of the three neighbours, and in parallel to split the outgoing edges from viv_{i}. The role of Tin(v,i)T^{in}(v,i) is simply to gather the incoming edges into viv_{i}.

More formally, the vertices of Tout(v,i)T^{out}(v,i) at depth dd are denoted by (ts(v,i))s∈{0,1}d(t_{s}(v,i))_{s\in\{0,1\}^{d}}. The vertices of Tin(v,i)T^{in}(v,i) at depth dd are denoted by (ts′(v,i))s∈{0,1}d(t^{\prime}_{s}(v,i))_{s\in\{0,1\}^{d}}. The vertices at depth 3a3a will be called leavesNote that they are leaves only with respect to the tree. In the graph GG they will not be leaves.. As was mentioned above, the vertex at depth 0 of these two trees coincides (i.e., t∅(v,i)=t∅′(v,i)t_{\emptyset}(v,i)=t^{\prime}_{\emptyset}(v,i)). Now we describe how the leaves of Tout(v,i)T^{out}(v,i) connect to the leaves of Tin(w,j)T^{in}(w,j) for w≠vw\neq v. For a leaf ts(v,i)∈Tout(v,i)t_{s}(v,i)\in T^{out}(v,i) we denote s=(j1,j2,j3)s=(j_{1},j_{2},j_{3}) where j1,j2,j3∈[M]j_{1},j_{2},j_{3}\in[M] are the indices of the three neighbors of vv, w1,w2,w3w_{1},w_{2},w_{3}. The leaf ts(v,i)∈Gt_{s}(v,i)\in G has a single edge to the tree Tin(w1,j1)T^{in}(w_{1},j_{1}), a single edge to the tree Tin(w2,j2)T^{in}(w_{2},j_{2}), and a single edge to the tree Tin(w3,j3)T^{in}(w_{3},j_{3}) (see Figure 1). In principle, we should specify which leaf exactly in Tin(w1,j1)T^{in}(w_{1},j_{1}) is connected to ts(v,i)t_{s}(v,i). However, since it will not play any role in our arguments, we just implement a counting argument to ensure that the number of neighbours from other trees of every leaf ts′′(w,j)t^{\prime}_{s^{\prime}}(w,j) is at most 3. If ww has a neighbour vv, then for every i∈[M]i\in[M] exactly M2M^{2} vertices ts(v,i)t_{s}(v,i) will encode the index jj. So from Tout(v,i)T^{out}(v,i) we have M⋅M2=M3M\cdot M^{2}=M^{3} incoming edges. Summing over the 3 neighbours we get 3M33M^{3} incoming edges. If we distribute them equally among the M3M^{3} vertices, we get 3 neighbours for each.

Alice’s potential function is defined by fG(ts′(v,i))=7af(v,i)+3a−∣s∣f_{G}(t^{\prime}_{s}(v,i))=7af(v,i)+3a-|s| and fG(ts(v,i))=7af(v,i)+3a+∣s∣f_{G}(t_{s}(v,i))=7af(v,i)+3a+|s|. Namely the potential in the tree Ts′(v,i)T^{\prime}_{s}(v,i) starts at a value of 7af(v,i)7af(v,i) in the leaves of Tin(v,i)T^{in}(v,i). It increases by 11 after every edge until it gets to the root. At the root we move to the tree Tout(v,i)T^{out}(v,i) where it proceeds to increase by 11 until it gets to the leaves of Tout(v,i)T^{out}(v,i) where the value of the potential is 7af(v,i)+6a7af(v,i)+6a.

Now we define the subset of valid vertices SS held by Bob. Let bin(i)∈{0,1}abin(i)\in\{0,1\}^{a} denote the binary representation of an index i∈[M]i\in[M]. We denote by nbin(v)=(bin(I(wi)))i=1,2,3nbin(v)=(bin(I(w_{i})))_{i=1,2,3} the binary representation of the triple of vv’s neighbours. For a binary string bb we denote by b[k]b_{[k]} its first kk elements. A vertex ts(v,i)∈St_{s}(v,i)\in S iff i=I(v)i=I(v) and s=nbin(v)[∣s∣]s=nbin(v)_{[|s|]} (recall that I(v)I(v) is Bob’s input in SimLS). Informally speaking the valid vertices are those where the tree Tout(v,i)T^{out}(v,i) (or Tin(v,i)T^{in}(v,i)) has the correct index, and if the vertex is in Tout(v,i)T^{out}(v,i) we require, in addition, that the prefix of the encoding of the neighbours’ indices will be correct.

Since the potential of Alice increases starting from the leaves of Tin(v,i)T^{in}(v,i) and ending at the leaves of Tout(v,i)T^{out}(v,i), and in addition for every valid vertex there exists a valid neighbour with higher (lower) depth in Tout(v,i)T^{out}(v,i) (in Tin(v,i)T^{in}(v,i)) the valid local maxima appear only on the leaves of Tout(v,i)T^{out}(v,i). Every valid leaf of Tout(v,i)T^{out}(v,i) has a potential of 7af(v,I(v))+6a7af(v,I(v))+6a (i.e., the correct potential) and is connected to leaves of Tin(wj,I(wj))T^{in}(w_{j},I(w_{j})) for j=1,2,3j=1,2,3 with a potential of 7af(wj,I(wj))7af(w_{j},I(w_{j})) (i.e., the correct potential of the neighbours). Note that the potential values are integers. Therefore, 7af(v,I(v))+6a≥7af(w,I(w))7af(v,I(v))+6a\geq 7af(w,I(w)) if and only if f(v,I(v))≥f(w,I(w))f(v,I(v))\geq f(w,I(w)). Hence, there is a one-to-one correspondence between valid local maxima of fGf_{G} with respects to the set if valid vertices SS and local maxima of hh over HH.

This completes the proof item 1 of the Theorem.

3 Step 2: Embedding the Degree 4 Graph Into the Grid

We VIED embed (see Definition 3.3) the degree 4 graph GG obtained in the previous step into the grid. We use Lemma 3.4 to deduce hardness of VetoLS over the grid.

Every degree 4 graph GG with NN vertices can be VIED-embedded in Grid4N×(2N+2)×2\textsf{Grid}_{4N\times(2N+2)\times 2}. As a corollary, CC(\textscVetoLS(GridN×N×2))=poly(N)CC(\textsc{VetoLS}(\textsf{Grid}_{N\times N\times 2}))=\textsf{poly}(N).

We embed the graph GG in the grid whose vertices are {3,4,...,4N+2}×{−1,0,...,2N}×{0,1}\{3,4,...,4N+2\}\times\{-1,0,...,2N\}\times\{0,1\}. We denote the vertices of GG by {vi}i∈[N]\{v_{i}\}_{i\in[N]} and we embed ϕ(vi)=(4i,0,0)\phi(v_{i})=(4i,0,0). We use (for instance) the structure of Figure 2 to place the four outgoing edges of (4i,0,0)(4i,0,0) at the points (4i−1,1,0),(4i,1,0),(4i+1,1,0)(4i-1,1,0),(4i,1,0),(4i+1,1,0) and (4i+2,1,0)(4i+2,1,0).

We denote by {ei}i∈[m]\{e_{i}\}_{i\in[m]} the edges in the graph GG. Note that m≤4N/2=2Nm\leq 4N/2=2N because the graph degree is 4. The embedding of the edges is by an increasing order e1,...,eme_{1},...,e_{m}. For an edge ei=(vj,vk)e_{i}=(v_{j},v_{k}) let rj∈{−1,0,1,2}r_{j}\in\{-1,0,1,2\} be the minimal index such that the vertex (4j+rj,1,0)(4j+r_{j},1,0) is not yet used by previous edges {ei′}i′<i\{e_{i^{\prime}}\}_{i^{\prime}<i}. Similarly we define rkr_{k}. The edge ei=(vj,vk)e_{i}=(v_{j},v_{k}) is embedded to the path:

where (x,y,z)↭(x,y′,z)(x,y,z)\leftrightsquigarrow(x,y^{\prime},z) denotes a straight line that consistently changes the second coordinate (similarly for (x,y,z)↭(x′,y,z)(x,y,z)\leftrightsquigarrow(x^{\prime},y,z)).

The embedding is VIED because all horizontal lines appear at (⋅,⋅,1)(\cdot,\cdot,1) while all vertical lines appear at (⋅,⋅,0)(\cdot,\cdot,0). The embedding is vertex isolated by the construction of Figure 2. ∎

Finally Step 3 is identical to Section 3.4. We use the reduction from VetoLS to SumLS to deduce the Theorem.

The Communication Complexity of Exact Potential Games

As a preliminary result, we demonstrate that determining whether a game is an exact potential games (under the uncoupled distribution of information) requires low communication. This result is in contrast to ordinal potential games (see Appendix A).

Consider a game with nn players and NN actions. There exists a randomized communication protocol that determines whether the game is an exact potential game or not that uses only poly(log⁡(N),n)\textsf{poly}(\log(N),n) bits of communication.

The proof is quite simple, and we demonstrate it here for 22-player games. Monderer and Shapley [Monderer and Shapley, 1996] show that a two-player game (A,B,uA,uB)(A,B,u_{A},u_{B}) is an exact potential game if and only if for every four actions a,a′∈Aa,a^{\prime}\in A, and b,b′∈Bb,b^{\prime}\in B we have

Namely, the sum of gains/losses from unilateral divinations over every cycle of size four should sum up to zero. Now each player checks, for every possible four-action cycle, whether the sum of changes in his utility equals the negative of the change in utility of the other player for the same cycle. Verifying this simultaneously for all cycles can be done by applying any efficient protocol for the equality problem (we recall that we focus on randomized communication protocols). For a general number of players, a similar characterization exists and we have to use protocols based on the “equal sum” problem as demonstrated below.

By [Monderer and Shapley, 1996], an nn-player game (A,u)(A,u) is an exact potential game if and only if for every pair of permutations π‾,π‾\overline{\pi},\underline{\pi} over [n][n] and for every pair of action profiles a,b∈Aa,b\in A we have

Simply speaking, for every sequence of unilateral deviations that starts at aa goes back and forth to bb, where each player changes his strategy from aia_{i} to bib_{i} once and from bib_{i} to aia_{i} once, the sum in the gains/losses of all players from the unilateral divinations should sum up to 0.

The players should check whether Equation (3) holds for all possible pairs of profiles a,b∈[N]na,b\in[N]^{n} and pairs of permutations π‾,π‾\overline{\pi},\underline{\pi} over [n][n]. The number of these equations is c=m2n(n!)2c=m^{2n}(n!)^{2}. Each player can generate from his private input a vector in {−2W,...,0,...,2W}c\{-2W,...,0,...,2W\}^{c} which captures the sum of changes in his utility for each one of the tuples (a,b,π‾,π‾)(a,b,\overline{\pi},\underline{\pi}). So the problem can be reduced to the following: Each player ii holds a vector vi∈{−2W,...,0,...,2W}cv_{i}\in\{-2W,...,0,...,2W\}^{c} and the goal of the players is to determine whether ∑i∈[n]vi=0c\sum_{i\in[n]}v_{i}=\textbf{0}_{c}. This variant of the equality problem has a poly(log⁡W,log⁡c)=poly(n,log⁡N)\textsf{poly}(\log W,\log c)=\textsf{poly}(n,\log N) randomized communication protocol [Nisan, 1993, Viola, 2015]. ∎

In contrast, identifying whether a game is an ordinal potential game is hard, even for randomized communication protocols. Identification of the ordinal potential property has a reduction to the disjointness problem. We relegate these reductions (for two-player and for nn-player games) to Appendix A. The contrast between the hardness of identifying whether a game is an ordinal potential game and the easiness of identifying whether a game is an exact potential game might give some hope that computing an equilibrium in exact potential games is much easier than in ordinal potential games. Unfortunately, our main results for this section show that finding a Nash equilibrium remains hard even for exact potential games.

We can also show hardness for the 2n2n-player 22-action case.

Consider the two-party promise communication problem where Alice holds the utilities of (ui)i∈[n](u_{i})_{i\in[n]} and Bob holds the utilities (ui)i∈[2n]∖[n](u_{i})_{i\in[2n]\setminus[n]} of an exact potential game, and they should output a pure Nash equilibrium of the game. The problem requires 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)} communication, even for randomized protocols.

This problem is obviously requires at least as much communication as the 2n2n-party communication problem where each player holds his own utility function.

In both theorems, we reduce from the problem of finding a local maximum (on a bounded degree graph in the two player case and on the hypercube in the nn player case) and show that the set of pure Nash equilibria corresponds exactly to the set of local maxima. The proofs of the Theorems appear in Sections 6 and 7.

In Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 we have demonstrated communicational hardness of two promise problems. Such hardness results are not rare in the literature. For instance, finding a pure Nash equilibrium in a game when it is promised that such an equilibrium exists.

To appreciate the novelty of our results we focus on a total variant of equilibrium search problem TotExPot: either find a Nash equilibrium or provide a succinct evidence that the game is not an exact potential game. By [Monderer and Shapley, 1996] such a succinct evidence, in the form of a violating cycle (see Equations (2),(3)), necessarily exists. More formally, in the problem \textscTotExPot(2,N)\textsc{TotExPot}(2,N) Alice holds the utility uAu_{A}, Bob holds a utility uBu_{B} of an N×NN\times N game, and the output is either a pure Nash equilibrium or a cycle of actions of size 4 that violates Equation (2). Similarly in the problem \textscTotExPot(2n,2)\textsc{TotExPot}(2n,2) Alice holds the utilities (ui)i∈n(u_{i})_{i\in n}, Bob holds the utilities (ui)i∈[2n]∖[n](u_{i})_{i\in[2n]\setminus[n]} of an 2n2n-player 2-action game, and the output is either a pure Nash equilibrium or a cycle of actions of size 4n4n that violates Equation (3).

In Proposition 5.1 we showed that low communication is needed to determine whether a game is an exact potential game or not (accompanied with an evidence in case it is not). From these observation along with Theorem 5.2 we deduce that

The total search problem \textscTotExPot(2,N)\textsc{TotExPot}(2,N) requires poly(N)\textsf{poly}(N) communication.

Similarly for the 2n2n-player 2-action case we have

The total search problem \textscTotExPot(2n,2)\textsc{TotExPot}(2n,2) requires 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)} communication.

Note that the non-deterministic complexity of \textscTotExPot(2,N)\textsc{TotExPot}(2,N) is log⁡(N)\log(N). Indeed a Nash equilibrium can be described by single action profile (Θ(log⁡N)\Theta(\log N) bits), and a violating cycle can be described by 44 action profiles. Each player can verify his best-reply condition and communicate a single bit to the opponent. Also verification of violating cycle can be done by communicating 4 valuations of utility. Similarly, we can show that the non-deterministic complexity of \textscTotExPot(2n,n)\textsc{TotExPot}(2n,n) is poly(n)\textsf{poly}(n). Thus again, our results demonstrate an exponential separation between the non-deterministic and the randomized communication complexity of a total search problem.

Proof of Theorem 5.2

We reduce the problem of finding a local maximum on a graph GG with degree 44 to finding a Nash equilibrium in an exact potential game with two players and NN actions. We then apply Theorem 2.2(1) to get our communication bound.

We construct the following exact potential game. For a vertex v∈Vv\in V we denote by ni(v)n_{i}(v) the ii’th neighbour of vv for i=1,2,3,4i=1,2,3,4. The strategy set of both players is A=B=V×[W]5A=B=V\times[W]^{5} (recall that the potentials in \textscSumLS(G)\textsc{SumLS}(G) get values in [W][W] and that W=poly(N)W=\textsf{poly}(N)). The interpretation of a strategy (v,x)∈A(v,x)\in A where x→=(x0,x1,...,x4)∈[W]5\overrightarrow{x}=(x_{0},x_{1},...,x_{4})\in[W]^{5} is (Alice’s reported) potential for vv and its four neighbours. This report induces a valuation for all vertices w∈Vw\in V by

A strategy (v,x→)(v,\overrightarrow{x}) is truthful if and only if x0=fA(v)x_{0}=f_{A}(v) and xi=fA(ni(v))x_{i}=f_{A}(n_{i}(v)) for all neighbours of vv (in short, x→=n(v)\overrightarrow{x}=n(v)). Similarly Bob’s strategy (w,y→)(w,\overrightarrow{y}) induces a valuation val(w,y→)(v)val^{(w,\overrightarrow{y})}(v) on all vertices v∈Vv\in V, and a truthful report is similarly defined.

The utilities of Alice and Bob are given by (recall that d(v,w)d(v,w) is the distance in the graph between two vertices vv and ww):

Namely, both players get large reward of 4W4W if they choose adjacent vertices, or the same vertex. Both players get large reward of 4W4W if they report truthfully their own valuations in the neighbourhood of their vertex. Both players get the sum of valuations of the two chosen vertices v,wv,w according to the report of the opponent. In addition Alice gets the (partial) potential of her vertex according to fAf_{A}, and Bob gets the potential of his vertex according to fBf_{B}.

We will see that the game can be “decomposed” to two exact potential games, and will use this “decomposition” to provide a potential function for our game. We will use the following basic properties of potential games. We recall the notation of (A1,A2,u1,u2)=(A,u)(A_{1},A_{2},u_{1},u_{2})=(A,u) for a two-player game, where each AiA_{i} is the action space of player ii and uiu_{i} is the utility function of player ii.

An identical interest game (A,u)(A,u) is a game in which u1=u2u_{1}=u_{2}. An identical interest game is an exact potential game with potential function φ=u1\varphi=u_{1}.

An opponent independent game is a game in which the utility of each player ii depends only on his own actions: ui(a1,a2)=ui(ai)u_{i}(a_{1},a_{2})=u_{i}(a_{i}) for every (a1,a2)∈A(a_{1},a_{2})\in A. Every opponent independent game is an exact potential game where the potential function is simply the sum of the utilities of the players.

For every pair of exact potential games (A,u′),(A,u′′)(A,u^{\prime}),(A,u^{\prime\prime}) with potentials φ′,φ′′\varphi^{\prime},\varphi^{\prime\prime}, the game (A,u′+u′′)(A,u^{\prime}+u^{\prime\prime}) is an exact potential game with potential φ=φ′+φ′′\varphi=\varphi^{\prime}+\varphi^{\prime\prime}.

Note that our game can be written as a sum of an identical interest game:

Therefore their sum is a potential game with potential:

The pure Nash equilibria of the game are precisely ((v,x→),(v,x→′))((v,\overrightarrow{x}),(v,\overrightarrow{x}^{\prime})) such that vv is a local maximum of fA+fBf_{A}+f_{B} and x→\overrightarrow{x} and x→′\overrightarrow{x}^{\prime} are truth reports of the values of vv and its neighbours according to fAf_{A} and fBf_{B}, respectively.

Pure Nash equilibria are the local maxima (with respect to a unilateral deviation) of the potential. It is easy to check that in a local maximum xx and yy are truth reports, because the gain in a truthful report is 4W4W whereas if the players do not report truthfully they lose this reward. However, Alice can gain at most val(v,x→)(w)+fA(v)≤2Wval^{(v,\overrightarrow{x})}(w)+f_{A}(v)\leq 2W from misreporting the value, and Bob’s loss is similar. Similarly, in a local maximum vv and ww are neighbours (or the same vertex), because the gain of 4W4W is lost if vv and ww are not neighbors, in which case Alice’s gain from the terms val(w,y→)(v)+val(v,x→)(w)+fA(v)val^{(w,\overrightarrow{y})}(v)+val^{(v,\overrightarrow{x})}(w)+f_{A}(v) is at most 3W3W. A similar argument holds for Bob. For a profile of strategies that satisfies the above the potential is equal to (see Equation (4)):

A profile where v≠wv\neq w is not a Nash equilibrium because by the distinctness assumption, fA(v)+fB(v)≠fA(w)+fB(w)f_{A}(v)+f_{B}(v)\neq f_{A}(w)+f_{B}(w), so if fA(v)+fB(v)<fA(w)+fB(w)f_{A}(v)+f_{B}(v)<f_{A}(w)+f_{B}(w) Alice can deviate to (w,y→)(w,\overrightarrow{y}) and increase the potential; Otherwise Bob can deviate to (v,x→)(v,\overrightarrow{x}) and increase the potential. Finally, a profile ((v,x→),(v,x→′))((v,\overrightarrow{x}),(v,\overrightarrow{x}^{\prime})) with truth reporting is clearly a Nash equilibrium if it is a local maximum of fA+fBf_{A}+f_{B}. If vv is not a local maximum of fA+fBf_{A}+f_{B}, then Alice will increase the potential (given in Equation (5)) if she deviates to the action (w,n(w))(w,n(w)) where ww is a neighbour of vv with fA(w)+fB(w)>fA(v)+fB(v)f_{A}(w)+f_{B}(w)>f_{A}(v)+f_{B}(v). ∎

Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 complete the proof of the theorem.

Proof of Theorem 5.3

The proof of Theorem 5.3 is done in two steps. First, we show a 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})} bound. This is the significant part, in terms of the deduced result and also in terms of the techniques. Thereafter, in Section 7.1 we improve the bound to 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)} building upon the arguments of this Section.

We start with proving the 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})} bound. Our starting point is the proof of the hardness of 22-player nn-actions exact potential games (Theorem 5.2). However, since we consider nn-player binary-action games, it is convenient to reduce the problem \textscSumLS(Hypn)\textsc{SumLS}(\textsf{Hyp}_{n}) (local search on the nn-th hypercube). We will get an exact potential game with Θ(n3)\Theta(n^{3}) players, where each player has only two actions.

The simplest idea that comes to mind is to consider a group of nn-players who will choose v∈Hypnv\in\textsf{Hyp}_{n}, and a group of (n+1)⌈log⁡W⌉(n+1)\lceil\log W\rceil players who will report the valuation vector x→\overrightarrow{x} of the vertex itself and its nn neighbours, and similarly for Bob. We would like to set the group of Alice’s players an identical utility that is similar to the utility of Alice in the two-player game. An obstacle that arises with this approach is that if the groups of Alice’s and Bob’s players are playing two adjacent vertices v,w∈Hypnv,w\in\textsf{Hyp}_{n} with truthful valuations, none of them will want to switch to the opponent’s vertex, even if at the adjacent vertex the sum of fA+fBf_{A}+f_{B} is higher. This follows from the fact if (v,x→)(v,\overrightarrow{x}) is a truthful valuation, then (w,x→)(w,\overrightarrow{x}) is not necessarily a truthful valuation (because the relevant vertices and their order is different with respect to vv and with respect to ww). Thus, players in Alice’s group will gain the difference in the potentials (at most 3W3W) but lose 4W4W because now the group report is not truthful. Note that the same obstacle does not arise in the two-player case. In the two-player case Alice could change the vertex vv and the report x→\overrightarrow{x} simultaneously. In the nn-player case we consider unilateral deviations that correspond to changes of single bits and thus such simultaneous deviations are impossible.

To resolve the above problematic issue, we modify the form of the report x→\overrightarrow{x} in the game.

Instead of reporting the values in the ball of radius 1 around vv (i.e., the neighbors of vv), each player reports the values in the ball of radius 2 around vv. In the hypercube, this means that the report consists of m=1+n+n(n−1)2m=1+n+\frac{n(n-1)}{2} valuations.

Instead of reporting the values in a fixed order (namely (v,n1(v),...,n4(v))(v,n_{1}(v),...,n_{4}(v))), the players jointly report pairs, where each pair consists of an index of a vertex vv and fA(v)f_{A}(v) (or fB(v)f_{B}(v)).

More formally, for Alice, we have a group of nn players with binary actions who jointly choose the vertex v∈{0,1}nv\in\{0,1\}^{n}. In other words, the action of the ii’th player in the group corresponds to the ii’th bit in the index of the vertex. We have a group of mnmn players with binary actions who jointly choose a list of mm vertices xv→=(xv1,...,xvm)∈({0,1}n)m\overrightarrow{xv}=(xv_{1},...,xv_{m})\in(\{0,1\}^{n})^{m}. Finally, we have a group of mb:=m⌈log⁡W⌉mb:=m\lceil\log W\rceil players with binary actions who jointly choose a list of mm valuations xf→=(xf1,...,xfm)∈({0,1}b)m\overrightarrow{xf}=(xf_{1},...,xf_{m})\in(\{0,1\}^{b})^{m}. We denote x→=(xv→,xf→)\overrightarrow{x}=(\overrightarrow{xv},\overrightarrow{xf}). Similarly to the two-player case, a report x→=(xv→,xf→)\overrightarrow{x}=(\overrightarrow{xv},\overrightarrow{xf}) defines a valuation function over all vertices. For a list xv→\overrightarrow{xv} we denote Imin⁡(xv→):={i∈[m]:xvi≠xvj for all j<i}I_{\min}(\overrightarrow{xv}):=\{i\in[m]:xv_{i}\neq xv_{j}\text{ for all }j<i\} the set of indices with first appearance of a vertex. The valuation is defined by

where val(⋅)∈[W]val(\cdot)\in[W] denotes the numerical value of the binary string. Note that in case of multiple appearances of ww in the list we choose the value at the first appearance. Similarly for Bob, we have three groups who jointly choose ww, yw→\overrightarrow{yw}, and yf→\overrightarrow{yf}. The report y→\overrightarrow{y} defines a valuation function valy→val^{\overrightarrow{y}} over all vertices. Note that the total number of players in the game is 2(n+m(n+b))=O(n3)2(n+m(n+b))=O(n^{3}).

Before we present the actual utilities we informally describe the prioritization according to which we set the utilities. In the two-player case there were only two levels of prioritization: the top level priority included the distance d(v,w)d(v,w) (the \mathds1d(v,w)≤1\mathds{1}_{d(v,w)\leq 1} term in the utility functions) and the truthfulness of the report (the \mathds1x=n(v)\mathds{1}_{x=n(v)} term in the utility functions). The bottom level priority included the remaining potential related terms (val(w,y→)(v),val(v,x→)(w),fA(v)val^{(w,\overrightarrow{y})}(v),val^{(v,\overrightarrow{x})}(w),f_{A}(v)). More formally by prioritization we mean that improving the higher priority term by 11 should increase the utility irrespective of how the lower priority terms change. Indeed the multiplier 4W4W was set in such a way. In the current construction, the prioritization levels are more involved, and we sketch them here from the highest priority to the lowest.

The list xv→\overrightarrow{xv} should contain vv and its neighbours.

The valuations xf→\overrightarrow{xf} should be correct for vv and its neighbours.

The potential related terms (the core of the proof).

The list xv→\overrightarrow{xv} should contain the vertices within a distance 2 from vv.

The valuations xf→\overrightarrow{xf} should be correct for vertices within a distance 2 from vv.

Now we describe what is the analogue of each one of these priorities in the nn-player case. Hereafter, d(⋅,⋅)d(\cdot,\cdot) will denote the hamming distance (in the corresponding dimension). We denote by Br(v)B_{r}(v) the ball of radius rr around vv with respect to the hamming distance.

\mathds1d(v,w)≤1\mathds{1}_{d(v,w)\leq 1} is translated to −d(v,w)⋅\mathds1d(v,w)≥2-d(v,w)\cdot\mathds{1}_{d(v,w)\geq 2}. Namely the loss is 0 in case the players choose the same vertex or adjacent vertices. Otherwise the loss increases with the distance.

Given vv, we denote by N1(v):={(v1,...,vm):{v1,...,vm}⊃B1(v)}⊂{0,1}mnN_{1}(v):=\{(v_{1},...,v_{m}):\{v_{1},...,v_{m}\}\supset B_{1}(v)\}\subset\{0,1\}^{mn}. Namely, N1(v)N_{1}(v) specifies vv and its neighbours. At the second priority we have −d(xv→,N1(v))-d(\overrightarrow{xv},N_{1}(v)).

Given vv and xv→\overrightarrow{xv}, for an index i∈Imin⁡(xv→)i\in I_{\min}(\overrightarrow{xv}) such that xvi∈B1(v)xv_{i}\in B_{1}(v) we have at the third priority the term −d(xf,bin(fA(xvi))-d(xf,bin(f_{A}(xv_{i})) when we recall that bin(z)∈{0,1}bbin(z)\in\{0,1\}^{b} represents the binary representation of the potential value z∈[W]z\in[W]. Note that this definition takes into account only the first appearance of every neighbour, which is consistent with the definition of valx→val^{\overrightarrow{x}}. For other indices i∈[m]i\in[m] the term will be identical but it will appear at the lowest sixth priority.

The profile (v,x→),(w,y→)(v,\overrightarrow{x}),(w,\overrightarrow{y}) defines a natural analogue of the two-player potential terms: valy→(v),valy→(w),fA(v),fB(w)val^{\overrightarrow{y}}(v),val^{\overrightarrow{y}}(w),f_{A}(v),f_{B}(w). These terms are at the forth priority.

Given vv, we denote by N2(v):={(v1,...,vm):{v1,...,vm}=B2(v)}⊂{0,1}mnN_{2}(v):=\{(v_{1},...,v_{m}):\{v_{1},...,v_{m}\}=B_{2}(v)\}\subset\{0,1\}^{mn} the lists that include precisely the set of all vertices within a radius 2 from vv. At the fifth priority we have −d(xv→,N2(v))-d(\overrightarrow{xv},N_{2}(v)).

Finally, similarly to item 3, given vv and xv→\overrightarrow{xv}, for every index i∈[m]i\in[m] we have at the sixth priority the term −d(xf,bin(fA(xvi))-d(xf,bin(f_{A}(xv_{i})).

Now we are ready to define the utilities. As was mentioned above all the players in Alice’s groups have identical utilities which is equal to:

when we set k1,...,k6k_{1},...,k_{6} as follows. We set k6=1k_{6}=1. Now we set k5k_{5} to be greater than the maximal difference of sixth priority terms, e.g., k5=2n2b>mbk_{5}=2n^{2}b>mb. Now we set k4k_{4} to be the greater than the maximal total difference of sixth and fifth priority terms, e.g., k4=2n3b>mb+k5(nm)k_{4}=2n^{3}b>mb+k_{5}(nm). Similarly we may proceed with k3=8Wn3bk_{3}=8Wn^{3}b, k2=8Wn5b2k_{2}=8Wn^{5}b^{2}, and k1=8Wn8b2k_{1}=8Wn^{8}b^{2}.

Similarly we define each member in Bob’s group to have the following identical utility function:

The defined (2n+2m(n+b))(2n+2m(n+b))-player binary action game is an exact potential game.

If we view the game as a two-player game where Alice chooses (s,x^)(s,\hat{x}) and Bob chooses (r,y^)(r,\hat{y}) the game is an exact potential game by similar arguments to those in Lemma 6.1. Namely it is the sum of two games where one is identical interest game and the other is opponent independent game. The potential function of the game is given by:

Note that by replacing Alice (Bob) by a group of n+m(n+b)n+m(n+b) players all with the same utility we only reduced the set of possible unilateral deviations. For each one of these unilateral deviation by the two-player result the change is the utility is equal to the change in the potential. ∎

Every pure Nash equilibrium of the defined (2n+2m(n+b))(2n+2m(n+b))-player binary action game is of the form (v,x→,v,y→)(v,\overrightarrow{x},v,\overrightarrow{y}) where vv is a local maximum of fA+fBf_{A}+f_{B} over the hypercube.

The proof proceeds by narrowing the set of equilibria candidates according to the prioritization levels, with a twist at the fourth priority level.

First, in every equilibrium d(v,w)≤1d(v,w)\leq 1 because otherwise there exists a player in Alice’s vv group who can switch his strategy and decrease the distance by 1. Such a switch increases the first term in the utility of the group by k1k_{1}. By the choice of k1k_{1}, any change in the other terms of utilities is smaller.

Second, in every equilibrium xv→∈N1(v)\overrightarrow{xv}\in N_{1}(v), because otherwise there exists a player in Alice’s xv→\overrightarrow{xv} group who can switch his strategy and decrease the distance by 1. Such a switch does not effect the first term of the utility, and it increases the second term by k2k_{2}. By the choice of k2k_{2}, any change in the other terms of utilities is smaller. Similarly for Bob we have yw→∈N1(w)\overrightarrow{yw}\in N_{1}(w).

Third, in every equilibrium for every i∈Imin⁡(xv→)i\in I_{\min}(\overrightarrow{xv}) such that xvi∈B1(v)xv_{i}\in B_{1}(v) we have xfi=bin(fA(xvi))xf_{i}=bin(f_{A}(xv_{i})). Simply speaking, all first appearances of elements in B1(v)B_{1}(v) (which indeed appear by the argument regarding the second priority level) have correct valuation. If it wasn’t so, then there exists a player in Alice’s xfi→\overrightarrow{xf_{i}} group who can switch his strategy and decrease the distance by 1. Such a switch does not affect the first two terms of the utility, and it increases the third term by k3k_{3}. By the choice of k3k_{3}, any change in the other terms of utilities is smaller. Similarly for Bob, all first appearances of elements in B1(w)B_{1}(w) have correct valuation.

Now we jump to the fifth and the sixth priority levels. Given that v,wv,w are neighbours (or the same vertex) and their values already appear in the report x→\overrightarrow{x} the terms of the utility in the fourth priority level are not affected by the vertices xvixv_{i} such that i∉Imin⁡(xv→)i\notin I_{\min}(\overrightarrow{xv}) or xvi∉B1(v)xv_{i}\notin B_{1}(v). Therefore, we can deduce that necessarily in equilibrium we have xv→∈N2(v)\overrightarrow{xv}\in N_{2}(v) because otherwise some player in the xv→\overrightarrow{xv} group can decrease the distance by 1 without affecting any of the first four terms, and increase the fifth term by k5k_{5}. Any change in the last terms is smaller. Similarly we can argue for the sixth priority level, that the values of xfixf_{i} for the corresponding indices do not affect any other term. From these arguments it follows that in any equilibrium both Alice (and Bob) report a list xv→\overrightarrow{xv} (yw→\overrightarrow{yw}) that contains exactly all the vertices in the ball of radius 2 around vv (ww), moreover all valuations of all these vertices are correct.

Now we go back to the fourth priority. Assume by way of contradiction that v≠wv\neq w. Similarly to the two-player case, the fourth term in the potential function of the game is valx→(w)+valy→(v)+fA(v)+fB(w)val^{\overrightarrow{x}}(w)+val^{\overrightarrow{y}}(v)+f_{A}(v)+f_{B}(w), which under all the above restrictions of equilibria is equal to fA(w)+fB(v)+fA(v)+fB(w)f_{A}(w)+f_{B}(v)+f_{A}(v)+f_{B}(w).

Assume by way of contradiction that v≠wv\neq w, then we may assume w.l.o.g. that fA(w)+fB(w)≥fA(v)+fB(v)+1f_{A}(w)+f_{B}(w)\geq f_{A}(v)+f_{B}(v)+1 (we recall that we may assume that the sum defers at adjacent vertices and has integer values), then there exists a player in Alice’s vv group who can switch his bit and turn the vertex vv into ww. Let us examine the effect of this change on the potential. The first priority level term remains 0. The key observation is that the second and third priority level terms also remain 0. Note that the list xv→\overrightarrow{xv} includes all the vertices within radius 2 from vv, and in particular all the vertices within radius 1 from ww. Similarly the valuations xf→\overrightarrow{xf} of these vertices remain correct. Therefore the potential increases by at least k4k_{4} in the first four terms, and any change in the fifth and sixth terms is smaller.

Finally for the case of v=wv=w where vv is not a local maximum we apply very similar arguments: There exists a player in Alice’s group who can increase the potential of the game by k3k_{3} and change only the fifth and sixth terms of the potential.

Lemmas 7.1, and 7.2 complete the proof of the 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})} bound.

The presented above reduction has Θ(n3)\Theta(n^{3}) players, which yields a lower bound of 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})} on the problem of finding a pure Nash equilibrium. Here we modify the reduction to have Θ(n)\Theta(n) players, which implies a lower bound of 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)} on the problem of finding a pure Nash equilibrium. The idea is to reduce the unnecessary “wasting” of players in the reduction. In the presented reduction Alice reports to Bob the valuations of all vertices within radius 2 around vv (there are Θ(n2)\Theta(n^{2}) such vertices). However, the arguments of the proof of Theorem 2.2 can be modified to show the existence of hard instances over the hypercube where for most of the neighbours within radius 2 from vv, Alice and Bob know the valuations of each other over these vertices. In fact, for these hard instances there exist only a constant number of neighbours for which Alice does not know Bob’s valuation, and Bob does not know Alice’s. In the modified reduction, Alice’s group will report only the valuation of the unknown vertices, which will require only O(n)O(n) players for her group.

We start with a modification of Lemma 3.5, which embeds the constant degree graph GG in Hypn\textsf{Hyp}_{n}. We present an embedding of GG in Hypn\textsf{Hyp}_{n} with the additional property that every ball of radius 2 in Hypn\textsf{Hyp}_{n} contains at most constant number of vertices of the embedding’s image. Formally, given an embedding (φ,χ)(\varphi,\chi) where φ:VG→{0,1}n\varphi:V_{G}\rightarrow\{0,1\}^{n}, χ:EG→P(Hypn)\chi:E_{G}\rightarrow P(\textsf{Hyp}_{n}), we denote the image of the embedding by Im(G)={w∈{0,1}n:w∈φ(VG)∪χ(EG)}Im(G)=\{w\in\{0,1\}^{n}:w\in\varphi(V_{G})\cup\chi(E_{G})\}.

Let GG be the graph with NN vertices that is defined in Section 3.2 (the constant degree graph for which Theorem 2.1(1) holds). The graph GG can be VIED-embedded in Hypn\textsf{Hyp}_{n} for n=O(log⁡N)n=O(\log N), such that for every w∈{0,1}nw\in\{0,1\}^{n} we haveMore concretely, n=3log⁡N+333n=3\log N+333 and ∣B2(w)∩Im(G)∣≤73|B_{2}(w)\cap Im(G)|\leq 73. ∣B2(w)∩Im(G)∣=O(1)|B_{2}(w)\cap Im(G)|=O(1).

We “sparse” the embedding of Lemma 3.5 to reach a situation where every pair of independent edges are embedded to paths that are within a distance of at least 3 one from the other. This can be done, for instance, by embedding GG in a hypercube of dimension n=3(log⁡N+111)n=3(\log N+111) rather than dimension n′=log⁡N+111n^{\prime}=\log N+111, when we replace every vertex in Hypn′\textsf{Hyp}_{n^{\prime}} by three copies of itself. Such a change multiplies the hamming distance by a factor of 3. For such an embedding the maximal number of vertices of Im(G)Im(G) in a ball or radius 2 is obtained at a vertex w∈ϕ(VG)w\in\phi(V_{G}) and is equal to 1+2⋅321+2\cdot 32; the vertex and two vertices of every one of the 36 embedded edges. ∎

We proceed with a short presentation of the arguments that prove Theorem 2.1(2) from Theorem 2.1(1), followed by a Corollary that will be essential in our reduction. The arguments below are very similar, but yet slightly defer from the proof that is presented in Section 3.

We reduce \textscSumLS(G)\textsc{SumLS}(G) to \textscSumLS(Hypn)\textsc{SumLS}(\textsf{Hyp}_{n}) using the VIED embedding (φ,χ)(\varphi,\chi) of Lemma 7.3. Let Im(G)⊂HypnIm(G)\subset\textsf{Hyp}_{n} be the image of the embedding and let w∗∈Im(G)w^{*}\in Im(G) be some fixed vertex. Given an instance (fA,fB)(f_{A},f_{B}) of \textscSumLS(G)\textsc{SumLS}(G) we define an instance (fA′,fB′)(f^{\prime}_{A},f^{\prime}_{B}) of \textscSumLS(Hypn)\textsc{SumLS}(\textsf{Hyp}_{n}) by

where in the case w∈χ({v,v′})w\in\chi(\{v,v^{\prime}\}) we assume that ww is the kk’th element in the path χ({v,v′})\chi(\{v,v^{\prime}\}) and ll is the total length of this path. Simply speaking, we set the functions fA′,fB′f^{\prime}_{A},f^{\prime}_{B} to have the values fA(v)f_{A}(v) on the embedded vertices φ(v)\varphi(v). On intermediate vertices along a path that embeds an edge we set the value to be a weighted average of the two extreme valuations. For vertices out of Im(G)Im(G) we set fA′(w)=fB′(w)f^{\prime}_{A}(w)=f^{\prime}_{B}(w) to be a negative constant that does not depend on the instance (fA,fB)(f_{A},f_{B}).

It can be easily checked that the local maxima of fA′+fB′f^{\prime}_{A}+f^{\prime}_{B} over Hypn\textsf{Hyp}_{n} are precisely {φ(v):v is a local maximum of fA+fB over G}\{\varphi(v):v\text{ is a local maximum of }f_{A}+f_{B}\text{ over }G\}.

Finding local maximum in Hypn\textsf{Hyp}_{n} with the promise of fA′(w)=fB′(w)=−d(w,w∗)f^{\prime}_{A}(w)=f^{\prime}_{B}(w)=-d(w,w^{*}) for all w∉Im(G)w\notin Im(G), requires 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)} communication.

Now we construct a potential game with Θ(n)\Theta(n)-players that solves the promise SumLS problem of Corollary 7.4.

We mimic the arguments of the previous 2n2^{\sqrt{n}} bound with one change: the reports x→\overrightarrow{x} and y→\overrightarrow{y} are done on vertices in B2(v)∩Im(G)B_{2}(v)\cap Im(G) rather than B2(v)B_{2}(v). By Lemma 7.3 it is sufficient to report 7373 vertices (rather than Θ(n2)\Theta(n^{2})). A report consists of x→=(xv→,xf→)\overrightarrow{x}=(\overrightarrow{xv},\overrightarrow{xf}) where xv→\overrightarrow{xv} is a 73-tuple of vertices, and xf→\overrightarrow{xf} is a 73-tuple of valuations. The valuation function valx→(w)val^{\overrightarrow{x}}(w) is modified to be valx→(w)=val(xfi)val^{\overrightarrow{x}}(w)=val(xf_{i}) if w=xviw=xv_{i} for i∈Imin⁡(xv→)i\in I_{\min}(\overrightarrow{xv}); Otherwise, if w∉Im(G)w\notin Im(G) we set valx→(w)=−d(w,w∗)val^{\overrightarrow{x}}(w)=-d(w,w^{*}); Otherwise, we set valx→(w)=0val^{\overrightarrow{x}}(w)=0. Similarly for Bob.

We also modify the definition of the neighbour vertices of v∈Hypnv\in\textsf{Hyp}_{n}:

Note that by the Lemma 7.3 N1(v),N2(v)≠∅N_{1}(v),N_{2}(v)\neq\emptyset for all vertices vv.

From here, we apply similar arguments to those in Section LABEL:sec:npot-pr to prove a reduction from the local search promise problem of Corollary 7.4 to pure Nash equilibrium in potential games. The only additional argument that is needed is that valx→,valy→val^{\overrightarrow{x}},val^{\overrightarrow{y}} have the correct valuation for all vertices w∉Im(G)w\notin Im(G) (in particular those within radius 2).

We are very grateful to Mika Göös and Aviad Rubinstein for drawing our attention to pebbling games Göös and Pitassi , which allowed us to prove optimal communication bounds for several families of graphs.

References

Appendix A Identifying Ordinal Potential Games

We will prove two results, one for two-player NN-action games and one for nn-player 22 action games. In both we use the following two-player two-action game for x,y∈{0,2}x,y\in\{0,2\}:

This game has a better-reply cycle if and only if x=y=2x=y=2.

Recognizing whether a two-player NN-action game is an ordinal potential game requires poly(N)\textsf{poly}(N) bits of communication, even for randomized protocols.

Denote by u′u^{\prime} the two-player 2N×2N2N\times 2N table that contains N×NN\times N copies of this game with the parameters (xi,j,yi,j)i,j∈[N](x_{i,j},y_{i,j})_{i,j\in[N]}. We denote by u′′u^{\prime\prime} the two-player 2N×2N2N\times 2N game with the payoffs u′′(a,b)=(3⌈a2⌉,3⌈b2⌉)u^{\prime\prime}(a,b)=(3\lceil\frac{a}{2}\rceil,3\lceil\frac{b}{2}\rceil). And we denote u=u′+u′′u=u^{\prime}+u^{\prime\prime}. The game uu has a better-reply cycle if and only if there exist i,j∈[N]i,j\in[N] such that xi,j=yi,j=2x_{i,j}=y_{i,j}=2. Indeed if xi,j=yi,j=2x_{i,j}=y_{i,j}=2, since we have added a constant payoff of 3i3i to player 11 (3j3j to player 2) to the (i,j)(i,j) copy of the game, the better reply cycle remains a better reply cycle in uu. If (xi,j,yi,j)≠(2,2)(x_{i,j},y_{i,j})\neq(2,2) for all i,ji,j then we have no better reply cycle within the copies of the 2×22\times 2 games, and we have no better reply cycles across the 2×22\times 2 games because at least one player has dominant strategy. Therefore the determination of ordinal potential property is as hard as disjointness, which requires poly(N)\textsf{poly}(N) communication, even with randomized communication. ∎

Recognizing whether an nn-player 22-action game is an ordinal potential game requires 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)} bits of communication, even for randomized protocols.

Consider an (n+2)(n+2)-player game where for each profile a∈{0,1}na\in\{0,1\}^{n} the last two players are playing the above 2×22\times 2 game with parameters xa,yax_{a},y_{a}. For the first nn players we set the utilities such that 11 is dominant strategy (e.g., ui(ai,a−i)=aiu_{i}(a_{i},a_{-i})=a_{i} for i∈[n]i\in[n]). Similarly to the previous arguments, the game contains a better reply cycle if and only if xa=ya=2x_{a}=y_{a}=2 for some a∈{0,1}na\in\{0,1\}^{n}. Again, we obtain a reduction to disjointness. ∎