Differentially Private Empirical Risk Minimization: Efficient Algorithms and Tight Error Bounds

Raef Bassily, Adam Smith, Abhradeep Thakurta

Introduction

Convex optimization is one of the most basic and powerful computational tools in statistics and machine learning. It is most commonly used for empirical risk minimization (ERM): the data set D={d1,...,dn}\mathcal{D}=\{d_{1},...,d_{n}\} defines a convex loss function L(⋅)\mathcal{L}(\cdot) which is minimized over a convex set C\mathcal{C}. When run on sensitive data, however, the results of convex ERM can leak sensitive information. For example, medians and support vector machine parameters can, in many cases, leak entire records in the clear (see “Motivation”, below).

In this paper, we provide new algorithms and matching lower bounds for differentially private convex ERM assuming only that each data point’s contribution to the loss function is Lipschitz and that the domain of optimization is bounded. This builds on a line of work started by Chaudhuri et al. .

Given a data set D={d1,...,dn}\mathcal{D}=\{d_{1},...,d_{n}\} drawn from a universe X\mathcal{X}, and a closed, convex set C\mathcal{C}, our goal is to

We measure the success of our algorithms by the worst-case (over inputs) expected excess empirical risk, namely

where θ^\hat{\theta} is the output of the algorithm, θ∗=arg⁡min⁡θ∈CL(θ;D)\theta^{*}=\arg\min_{\theta\in\mathcal{C}}\mathcal{L}(\theta;\mathcal{D}) is the true minimizer, and the expectation is only over the coins of the algorithm. Expected risk guarantees can be converted to high-probability guarantees using standard amplification techniques (see Appendix D for details).

Another important measure of performance is an algorithm’s (excess) generalization error, where loss is measured with respect to the average over an unknown distribution from which the data are assumed to be drawn i.i.d.. Our upper bounds on empirical risk imply upper bounds on generalization error (via uniform convergence and similar ideas); the resulting bounds are only known to be tight in certain ranges of parameters, however. Detailed statements may be found in Appendix F.

Motivation.

Convex ERM is used for fitting models from simple least-squares regression to support vector machines, and their use may have significant implications to privacy. As a simple example, note that the Euclidean 1-median of a data set will typically be an actual data point, since the gradient of the loss function has discontinuities at each of the did_{i}. (Thinking about the one-dimensional median, where there is always a data point that minimizes the loss, is helpful.) Thus, releasing the median may well reveal one of the data points in the clear. A more subtle example is the support vector machine (SVM). The solution to an SVM program is often presented in its dual form, whose coefficients typically consist of a set of p+1p+1 exact data points. Kasiviswanathan et al. show how the results of many convex ERM problems can be combined to carry out reconstruction attacks in the spirit of Dinur and Nissim .

Differential privacy

is a rigorous notion of privacy that emerged from a line of work in theoretical computer science and cryptography . We say two data sets D\mathcal{D} and D′\mathcal{D}^{\prime} of size nn are neighbors if they differ in one entry (that is, ∣D△D′∣=2\left|\mathcal{D}\triangle\mathcal{D}^{\prime}\right|=2). A randomized algorithm A\mathcal{A} is (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differentially private (Dwork et al. ) if, for all neighboring data sets D\mathcal{D} and D′\mathcal{D}^{\prime} and for all events SS in the output space of A\mathcal{A}, we have

Algorithms that satisfy differential privacy for ϵ<1\epsilon<1 and δ≪1/n\delta\ll 1/n provide meaningful privacy guarantees, even in the presence of side information. In particular, they avoid the problems mentioned in “Motivation” above. See Dwork , Kasiviswanathan and Smith , Kifer and Machanavajjhala for discussion of the “semantics” of differential privacy.

Setting Parameters.

We will aim to quantify the role of several basic parameters on the excess risk of differentially private algorithms: the size of the data set nn, the dimension pp of the parameter space C\mathcal{C}, the Lipschitz constant LL of the loss functions, the diameter ∥C∥2\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2} of the constraint set and, when applicable, the strong convexity Δ\Delta.

We may take LL and ∥C∥2\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2} to be 1 without loss of generality: We can set ∥C∥2=1\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}=1 by rescaling θ\theta (replacing by θ\theta with θ⋅∥C∥2\theta\cdot\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}); we can then set L=1L=1 by rescaling the loss function L\mathcal{L} (replacing L\mathcal{L} by L/L\mathcal{L}/L). These two transformations change the excess risk by L∥C∥2L\|C\|_{2}. The parameter Δ\Delta cannot similarly be rescaled while keeping LL and ∥C∥2\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2} the same. However, we always have Δ≤2L/∥C∥2\Delta\leq 2L/\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}.

In the sequel, we thus focus on the setting where L=∥C∥2=1L=\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}=1 and Δ∈\Delta\in. To convert excess risk bounds for L=∥C∥2=1L=\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}=1 to the general setting, one can multiply the risk bounds by L∥C∥2L\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}, and replace Δ\Delta by Δ∥C∥2L\frac{\Delta\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}{L}.

1 Contributions

We give algorithms that significantly improve on the state of the art for optimizing non-smooth loss functions — for both the general case and strongly convex functions, we improve the excess risk bounds by a factor of n\sqrt{n}, asymptotically. The algorithms we give for (ϵ,0)(\epsilon,0)- and (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differential privacy work on very different principles. We group the algorithms below by technique: gradient descent, exponential sampling, and localization.

The gradient descent approach does not, to our knowledge, allow one to get optimal excess risk bounds for (ϵ,0)(\epsilon,0)-differential privacy. The main obstacle is that “strong composition” of (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-privacy Dwork et al. appears necessary to allow a first-order method to run for sufficiently many steps.

Exponential Sampling-based Algorithms.

We give a polynomial time algorithm that achieves the optimal excess risk, namely O(p/ϵ)O(p/\epsilon). Note that the achieved excess risk does not have any logarithmic factors which is shown to be the case using a “peeling-” type argument that is specific to convex functions. The idea of our algorithm is to sample efficiently from the continuous distribution on all points in C\mathcal{C} with density P(θ)∝e−ϵL(θ)\mathcal{P}(\theta)\propto e^{-\epsilon\mathcal{L}(\theta)}. Although the distribution we hope to sample from is log-concave, standard techniques do not work for our purposes: existing methods converge only in statistical difference, whereas we require a multiplicative convergence guarantee to provide (ϵ,0)(\epsilon,0)-differential privacy. Previous solutions to this issue (Hardt and Talwar ) worked for the uniform distribution, but not for general log-concave distributions.

Localization: Optimal Algorithms for Strongly Convex Functions.

The exponential-sampling-based technique discussed above does not take advantage of strong convexity of the loss function. We show, however, that a novel combination of two standard techniques—the exponential mechanism and Laplace-noise-based output perturbation—does yield an optimal algorithm. Chaudhuri et al. and showed that strongly convex functions have low-sensitivity minimizers, and hence that one can release the minimum of a strongly convex function with Laplace noise (with total Euclidean length about ρ=pΔϵn\rho=\frac{p}{\Delta\epsilon n} if each loss function is Δ\Delta-strongly convex). Simply using this first estimate as a candidate output does not yield optimal utility in general; instead it gives a risk bound of roughly pΔϵ\frac{p}{\Delta\epsilon}.

Lower Bounds.

We use techniques developed to bound the accuracy of releasing 1-way marginals (due to Hardt and Talwar for (ϵ,0)−(\epsilon,0)- and Bun et al. for (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-privacy) to show that our algorithms have essentially optimal risk bounds. The instances that arise in our lower bounds are simple: the functions can be linear (or quadratic, for the case of strong convexity) and the constraint set C\mathcal{C} can be either the unit ball or the hypercube. In particular, our lower bounds apply to special case of smooth functions, demonstrating the optimality of objective perturbation in that setting. The reduction to lower-bounds for 1-way marginals is not quite black-box; we exploit specific properties of the instances used by Hardt and Talwar , Bun et al. .

Finally, we provide a much stronger lower bound on the utility of a specific algorithm, the Huberization-based algorithm proposed by Chaudhuri et al. for support vector machines. In order to apply their algorithm to nonsmooth loss functions, they proposed smoothing the loss function by Huberization, and then running their algorithm (which requires smoothness for the privacy analysis) on the resulting, modified loss functions. We show that for any setting of the Huerization parameters, there are simple, one-dimensional nonsmooth loss functions for which the algorithm has error Ω(n)\Omega(n). This bound justifies the effort we put into designing new algorithms for nonsmooth loss functions.

Generalization Error.

2 Other Related Work

In addition to the previous work mentioned above, we mention several closely related works. A rich line of work seeks to characterize the optimal error of differentially private algorithms for learning and optimization Kasiviswanathan et al. , Beimel et al. , Chaudhuri and Hsu , Beimel et al. . In particular, our results on (ϵ,0)(\epsilon,0)-differential privacy imply nearly-tight bounds on the “representation dimension” Beimel et al. of convex Lipschitz functions.

Efficient implementations of the exponential mechanism over infinite domains were discussed by Hardt and Talwar , Chaudhuri et al. and Kapralov and Talwar . The latter two works were specific to sampling (approximately) singular vectors of a matrix, and their techniques do not obviously apply here.

Differentially private convex learning in different models has also been studied: for example, Jain et al. , Duchi et al. , Smith and Thakurta study online optimization, Jain and Thakurta study an interactive model tailored to high-dimensional kernel learning. Convex optimization techniques have also played an important role in the development of algorithms for “simultaneous query release” (e.g., the line of work emerging from Hardt and Rothblum ). We do not know of a direct connection between those works and our setting.

3 Additional Definitions

For completeness, we state a few additional definitions related to convex sets and functions.

4 Organization of this Paper

Our upper bounds (efficient algorithms) are given in Sections 2, 3, and 4, whereas our lower bounds are given in Section 5. Namely, in Section 2, we give efficient construction for (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differentially private algorithms for general convex loss as well as Lipschitz strongly convex loss. In Section 3, we discuss a pure ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm for general Lipschitz convex loss and outline an efficient construction for such algorithm. In Section 4, we discuss our localization technique and show how to construct efficient pure ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithms for Lipschitz strongly convex loss. We derive our lower bound for general Lipschitz convex loss in Section 5.1 and our lower bound for Lipschitz strongly convex loss in Section 5.2. In Section 6, we discuss a generic construction of an efficient algorithm for sampling (with a multiplicative distance guarantee) from a logconcave distribution over an arbitrary convex bounded set. As a by-product of our generic construction, we give the details of the construction of our efficient ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm from Section 3.2.

The appendices contain proof details and supplementary material: Appendix A shows that smoothing a nonsmooth loss function in order to apply the objective perturbation technique of Chaudhuri et al. can introduce significant additional error. Appendix B gives details on the application of localization in the setting of (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differential privacy. Appendix C provides additional details on the proofs of lower bounds. In Appendix D, we explain standard modifications that allow our algorithms to give high probability guarantees instead of expected risk guarantees. Finally, in Appendix F we discuss the how our algorithms can be adapted to provide guarantees on generalization error, rather than empirical error.

Gradient Descent and Optimal (ϵ,δ)italic-ϵ𝛿(\epsilon,\delta)-differentially private Optimization

In this section we provide an algorithm ANoise−GD\mathcal{A}_{\sf Noise-GD} (Algorithm 1) for computing θpriv\theta^{priv} using a noisy stochastic variant of the classic gradient descent algorithm from the optimization literature . Our algorithm (and the utility analysis) was inspired by the approach of Williams and McSherry for logistic regression.

All the excess risk bounds (16) in this section and the rest of this paper, are presented in expectation over the randomness of the algorithm. In Section D we provide a generic tool to translate the expectation bounds into high probability bound albeit at a loss of extra logarithmic factor in the inverse of the failure probability.

Note(2): Instead of using the stochastic variant in Algorithm 1, one can use the complete gradient (i.e., ▽L(θ;D)\bigtriangledown\mathcal{L}(\theta;\mathcal{D})) in Step 5 and still have the same utility guarantee as Theorem 2.4. However, the running time goes up by a factor of nn.

Algorithm ANoise−GD\mathcal{A}_{\sf Noise-GD} (Algorithm 1) is (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differentially private.

Over a domain of data sets Tn\mathcal{T}^{n}, if an algorithm A\mathcal{A} is ϵ′≤1\epsilon^{\prime}\leq 1 differentially private, then for any data set D∈Tn\mathcal{D}\in\mathcal{T}^{n}, executing A\mathcal{A} on uniformly random γn\gamma n entries of D\mathcal{D} ensures 2γϵ′2\gamma\epsilon^{\prime}-differential privacy.

To conclude the proof, we apply “strong composition” (Lemma 2.3) from . With probability at least 1−δ1-\delta, the privacy loss W=∑t=1n2WtW=\sum\limits_{t=1}^{n^{2}}W_{t} is at most ϵ\epsilon. This concludes the proof.

Let ϵ,δ′≥0\epsilon,\delta^{\prime}\geq 0. The class of ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithms satisfies (ϵ′,δ′)(\epsilon^{\prime},\delta^{\prime})-differential privacy under TT-fold adaptive composition for ϵ′=2Tln⁡(1/δ′)ϵ+Tϵ(eϵ−1)\epsilon^{\prime}=\sqrt{2T\ln(1/\delta^{\prime})}\epsilon+T\epsilon(e^{\epsilon}-1).

Let σ2=O(L2n2log⁡(n/δ)log⁡(1/δ)ϵ2)\sigma^{2}=O\left(\frac{L^{2}n^{2}\log(n/\delta)\log(1/\delta)}{\epsilon^{2}}\right). For θpriv\theta^{priv} output by Algorithm ANoise−GD\mathcal{A}_{\sf Noise-GD} we have the following. (The expectation is over the randomness of the algorithm.)

Let F(θ)F(\theta) (for θ∈C\theta\in\mathcal{C}) be a convex function and let θ∗=arg⁡min⁡θ∈CF(θ)\theta^{*}=\arg\min\limits_{\theta\in\mathcal{C}}F(\theta). Let θ1\theta_{1} be any arbitrary point from C\mathcal{C}. Consider the stochastic gradient descent algorithm θt+1=ΠC[θt−η(t)Gt(θt)]\theta_{t+1}=\Pi_{\mathcal{C}}\left[\theta_{t}-\eta(t)G_{t}(\theta_{t})\right], where E[Gt(θt)]=▽F(θt)E[G_{t}(\theta_{t})]=\bigtriangledown F(\theta_{t}), E[∥Gt∥22]≤G2E[\|G_{t}\|_{2}^{2}]\leq G^{2} and the learning rate function η(t)=∥C∥2Gt\eta(t)=\frac{\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}{G\sqrt{t}}. Then for any T>1T>1, the following is true.

Using the bound from (2) in Lemma 2.5 (i.e., set G=n2L2+pσ2G=\sqrt{n^{2}L^{2}+p\sigma^{2}}), and setting T=n2T=n^{2} and the learning rate function η(t)\eta(t) as in Lemma 2.5, gives us the required excess risk bound for Lipschitz convex functions. For Lipschitz and strongly convex functions we use the following result by .

Let F(θ)F(\theta) (for θ∈C\theta\in\mathcal{C}) be a λ\lambda-strongly convex function and let θ∗=arg⁡min⁡θ∈CF(θ)\theta^{*}=\arg\min\limits_{\theta\in\mathcal{C}}F(\theta). Let θ1\theta_{1} be any arbitrary point from C\mathcal{C}. Consider the stochastic gradient descent algorithm θt+1=ΠC[θt−η(t)Gt(θt)]\theta_{t+1}=\Pi_{\mathcal{C}}\left[\theta_{t}-\eta(t)G_{t}(\theta_{t})\right], where E[Gt(θt)]=▽F(θt)E[G_{t}(\theta_{t})]=\bigtriangledown F(\theta_{t}), E[∥Gt∥22]≤G2E[\|G_{t}\|_{2}^{2}]\leq G^{2} and the learning rate function η(t)=1λt\eta(t)=\frac{1}{\lambda t}. Then for any T>1T>1, the following is true.

Using the bound from (2) in Lemma 2.6 (i.e., set G=n2L2+pσ2G=\sqrt{n^{2}L^{2}+p\sigma^{2}}), λ=nΔ\lambda=n\Delta, and setting T=n2T=n^{2} and the learning rate function η(t)\eta(t) as in Lemma 2.6, gives us the required excess risk bound for Lipschitz and strongly convex convex functions. ∎

Exponential Sampling and Optimal (ϵ,0)italic-ϵ0(\epsilon,0)-private Optimization

In this section, we focus on the case of pure ϵ\epsilon-differential privacy and provide an optimal efficient algorithm for empirical risk minimization for the general class of convex and Lipschitz loss functions. The main building block of this section is the well-known exponential mechanism .

First, we show that a variant of the exponential mechanism is optimal. A major technical contribution of this section is to make the exponential mechanism computationally efficient which is discussed in Section 3.2.

In this section we only deal with loss functions which are Lipschitz. We provide an ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm (Algorithm 2) which achieves the optimal excess risk for arbitrary convex bounded sets.

Algorithm 2 is ϵ\epsilon-differentially private.

In the following we prove the utility guarantee for Algorithm Aexp−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf exp-samp}.

Let θpriv\theta^{priv} be the output of Aexp−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf exp-samp} (Algorithm 2 above). Then, we have the following guarantee on the expected excess risk. (The expectation is over the randomness of the algorithm.)

Consider a differential cone Ω\Omega centered at θ∗\theta^{*} (see Figure 1). We will bound the expected excess risk of θpriv\theta^{priv} by O(pL∥C∥2ϵ)O\left(\frac{pL\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}{\epsilon}\right) conditioned on θpriv∈Ω∩C\theta^{priv}\in\Omega\cap\mathcal{C} for every differential cone. This immediately implies the above theorem by the properties of conditional expectation.

Let Γ\Gamma be a fixed threshold (to be set later) and let R(θ)=L(θpriv;D)−L(θ∗;D){\sf R}(\theta)=\mathcal{L}(\theta^{priv};\mathcal{D})-\mathcal{L}(\theta^{*};\mathcal{D}) for the purposes of brevity. Let the marked sets AiA_{i}’s in Figure 1 be defined as

Instead of directly computing the probability of θpriv\theta^{priv} being outside A1A_{1}, we will analyze the probabilities for being in each of the AiA_{i}’s individually. This form of “peeling” arguments have been used for risk analysis of convex loss in the machine learning literature (e.g., see ) and will allow us to get rid of the extra logarithmic factor that would have otherwise shown up in the excess risk if we use the standard analysis of the exponential mechanism in .

Since Ω\Omega is a differential cone and since R(θ){\sf R}(\theta) is continuous on C\mathcal{C}, it follows that within Ω∩C\Omega\cap\mathcal{C}, R(θ){\sf R}(\theta) only depends on ∥θ−θ∗∥2\|\theta-\theta^{*}\|_{2}. Therefore, let r1,r2,⋯r_{1},r_{2},\cdots be the distance of the set boundaries of A1,A2,⋯A_{1},A_{2},\cdots from θ∗\theta^{*}. (See Figure 1.) One can equivalently write each AiA_{i} as follows:

The following claim is the key part of the proof.

Convexity of R(θ){\sf R}(\theta) for all θ∈C\theta\in\mathcal{C} implies that ri−ri−1≤ri−1−ri−2r_{i}-r_{i-1}\leq r_{i-1}-r_{i-2} for all i≥3i\geq 3.

Since by definition θ∗\theta^{*} is the minimizer of R(θ){\sf R}(\theta) within C\mathcal{C} and R(θ){\sf R}(\theta) is convex, we have R(θ2)≥R(θ1){\sf R}(\theta_{2})\geq{\sf R}(\theta_{1}) for any θ1,θ2∈C∩Ω\theta_{1},\theta_{2}\in\mathcal{C}\cap\Omega such that ∥θ2−θ∗∥2≥∥θ1−θ∗∥2\|\theta_{2}-\theta^{*}\|_{2}\geq\|\theta_{1}-\theta^{*}\|_{2}. This directly implies the required bound. ∎

Now, the volume of the set AiA_{i} is given by Vol(Ai)=κ∫ri−1rirp−1dr{{\sf Vol}(A_{i})}=\kappa\int\limits_{r_{i-1}}^{r_{i}}r^{p-1}dr for some fixed constant κ\kappa. Hence,

where the last two inequalities follows from Claim 3.3. Hence, we get the following bound on the probability that the excess risk R(θpriv)≥4Γ{\sf R}(\theta^{priv})\geq 4\Gamma conditioned on θpriv∈C∩Ω\theta^{priv}\in\mathcal{C}\cap\Omega (For brevity, we remove the conditioning sign from the probabilities below).

where the last inequality follows from the fact that (i−1)p≤3p⋅(2i−4)p(i-1)^{p}\leq 3^{p}\cdot\left(2^{i-4}\right)^{p} for i≥4i\geq 4. Hence, for every t>0t>0, if we choose Γ=2L∥C∥2ϵ((p+1)ln⁡3+t)\Gamma=\frac{2L\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}{\epsilon}\left(\left(p+1\right)\ln 3+t\right), then, conditioned on θpriv∈C∩Ω\theta^{priv}\in\mathcal{C}\cap\Omega, we get

Since this is true for every t>0t>0, we have our required bound as a corollary.

In this section, we give a high-level description of a computationally efficient construction of Algorithm 2. Our algorithm runs in polynomial time in n,pn,p and outputs a sample θ∈C\theta\in\mathcal{C} from a distribution that is arbitrarily close (in the multiplicative sense) to the distribution of the output of Algorithm 2.

Since we are interested in an efficient pure ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm, we need an efficient sampler with a multiplicative distance guarantee. In fact, if we were interested in (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta) algorithms, efficient sampling with a total variation guarantee would have sufficed which would have made our task a lot easier as we could have used one of the exisiting algorithms, e.g., . In , it was shown how to sample efficiently with a multiplicative guarantee from the unifrom distribution over a convex bounded set. However, what we want to achieve here is more general, that is, to sample efficiently from any given logconcave distribution defined over a convex bounded set. To the best of our knowledge, this task has not been explicitly worked out before, nevertheless, all the ingredients needed to accomplish it are present in the literature, mainly .

We highlight here the main ideas of our constrution. Since such construction is not specific to our privacy problem and could be of independent interest, in this section, we only provide the high-level description of this construction, however all the details of such construction and the proof of our main result (Theorem 3.4 below) are deferred to Section 6.

There is an efficient version of Algorithm 2 that has the following guarantees.

Privacy: The algorithm is ϵ\epsilon -differentially private.

Utility: The output θpriv∈C\theta^{priv}\in\mathcal{C} of the algorithm satisfies

Running time: Assuming C\mathcal{C} is in isotropic position, the algorithm runs in timeThe case where C\mathcal{C} is not in isotropic position is discussed below.

In fact, the running time of our algorithm depends on ∥C∥∞\|\mathcal{C}\|_{\infty} rather than ∥C∥2\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}. Namely, all the ∥C∥2\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2} terms in the running time can be replaced with ∥C∥∞\|\mathcal{C}\|_{\infty}, however, we chose to write it in this less conservative way since all the bounds in this paper are expressed in terms of ∥C∥2\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}.

Before describing our construction, we first introduce some useful notation and discuss some preliminaries.

where dμ(q)dν(q)\frac{d\mu(q)}{d\nu(q)} (resp., dν(q)dμ(q)\frac{d\nu(q)}{d\mu(q)}) denotes the ratio of the two measures (more precisely, the Radon-Nikodym derivative).

3 Our construction

We use the grid-walk algorithm of for sampling from a logconcave distribution defined over a cube as a building block. Our construction is described as follows:

Enclose the set C\mathcal{C} with a cube AA with edges of length τ\tau.

Obtain a convex Lipschitz extension Lˉ(.;D)\bar{\mathcal{L}}(.;\mathcal{D}) of the loss function L(.;D)\mathcal{L}(.;\mathcal{D}) over AA. This can be done efficiently using a projection oracle.

Define F(θ)≜e−ϵ6L∥C∥2Lˉ(θ;D)−ψˉα(θ), θ∈AF(\theta)\triangleq e^{-\frac{\epsilon}{6L\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}\bar{\mathcal{L}}(\theta;\mathcal{D})-\bar{\psi}_{\alpha}(\theta)},~{}\theta\in A, for a specific choice of α=O(ϵn∥C∥2)\alpha=O(\frac{\epsilon n}{\|C\|_{2}}) (See Section 6 for details).

Run the grid-walk algorithm of with FF as the input weight function and AA as the input cube, and output a sample θ\theta whose distribution is close, with respect to Dist∞{\sf Dist}_{\infty}, to the distribution induced by FF on AA which is given by F(θ)∫v∈AF(v)dv, θ∈A\frac{F(\theta)}{\int\limits_{v\in A}F(v)dv},~{}\theta\in A.

Localization and Optimal Private Algorithms for Strongly Convex Loss

It is unclear how to get a direct variant of Algorithm 2 in Section 3 for Lipschitz and strongly convex losses that can achieve optimal excess risk guarantees. The issue in extending Algorithm 2 directly is that the convex set C\mathcal{C} over which the exponential mechanism is defined is “too large” to provide tight guarantees.

Next, we instantiate the generic ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm in the second step with our efficient exponential mechanism of Section3.1 (Algorithm 2) to obtain an algorithm with optimal excess risk bound (Theorem 4.3).

Note: The localization technique is not specific to pure ϵ\epsilon-differential privacy, and extends naturally to (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta) case. Although it is not relevant in our current context, since we already have gradient descent based algorithm which achieves optimal excess risk bound. We defer the details for the (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta) case to Appendix B.

Details of the generic algorithm: We first give a simple algorithm that carries out the desired localization step. The crux of the algorithm is the same as to that of the output perturbation algorithm of . The high-level idea is to first compute θ∗=arg⁡min⁡θ∈CL(θ;D)\theta^{*}=\arg\min\limits_{\theta\in\mathcal{C}}\mathcal{L}(\theta;\mathcal{D}) and add noise according to the sensitivity of θ∗\theta^{*}. The details of the algorithm are given in Algorithm 3.

Algorithm 4 is ϵ\epsilon-differentially private.

The privacy guarantee follows directly from the composition theorem together with the fact that Aout−pertϵ2\mathcal{A}^{\frac{\epsilon}{2}}_{\sf out-pert} is ϵ2\frac{\epsilon}{2}-differentially private (see ) and that Agen−Lipϵ2\mathcal{A}^{\frac{\epsilon}{2}}_{\sf gen-Lip} is ϵ2\frac{\epsilon}{2}-differentially private by assumption. ∎

In the following theorem, we provide a generic expression for the excess risk of Algorithm 4 in terms of the expected excess risk of any given algorithm Agen−Lip\mathcal{A}_{\sf gen-Lip}.

for some function FF, then the output θpriv\theta^{priv} of Algorithm 4 satisfies

where θ∗=arg⁡min⁡θ∈CL(θ;D)\theta^{*}=\arg\min\limits_{\theta\in\mathcal{C}}\mathcal{L}(\theta;\mathcal{D}).

The proof follows from the fact that, in Algorithm Aout−pertϵ2\mathcal{A}^{\frac{\epsilon}{2}}_{\sf out-pert}, the norm of the noise vector ∥b∥2\|b\|_{2} is distributed according to Gamma distribution Γ(p,4LΔϵn)\Gamma(p,\frac{4L}{\Delta\epsilon n}) and hence satisfies

Note that the second term on the right-hand side above becomes O(1n2)O(\frac{1}{n^{2}}). From our lower bound (Section 5.2 below), F(.,n,.,.,.)F(.,n,.,.,.) must be at least Ω(1n)\Omega(\frac{1}{n}). Hence, we have

which completes the proof of the theorem. ∎

Instantiation of Algorithm Agen−Lipϵ2\mathcal{A}^{\frac{\epsilon}{2}}_{\sf gen-Lip} with the exponential sampling algorithm: Next, we give our optimal ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm for Lipschitz strongly convex loss functions. To do this, we instantiate the generic Algorithm Agen−Lip\mathcal{A}_{\sf gen-Lip} in Algorithm 4 with our exponential sampling algorithm from Section 3.1 (Algorithm 2), or its efficient version Algorithm Aeff−exp−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf eff-exp-samp} (See Section 3.2) to obtain the optimal excess risk bound. We formally state the bound in Theorem 4.3) below. The proof of Theorem 4.3 follows from Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 4.2 above.

Suppose we replace Agen−Lipϵ2\mathcal{A}^{\frac{\epsilon}{2}}_{\sf gen-Lip} in Algorithm 4 with Algorithm 2 (Section 3.1), or its efficient version Algorithm 7 (See Theorem 3.4 and Section 6 for details). Then, the output θpriv\theta^{priv} satisfies

where θ∗=arg⁡min⁡θ∈CL(θ;D)\theta^{*}=\arg\min\limits_{\theta\in\mathcal{C}}\mathcal{L}(\theta;\mathcal{D}).

Lower Bounds on Excess Risk

Before we state and prove our lower bounds, we first give the following useful lemma which gives lower bounds on the L2L_{2}-error incurred by ϵ\epsilon and (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differentially private algorithms for estimating the 11-way marginals of datasets over {−1p,1p}p\{-\frac{1}{\sqrt{p}},\frac{1}{\sqrt{p}}\}^{p}. This lemma is based on the results of and , however, for the sake of completeness, we give a detailed proof of this lemma in Appendix C.

where q(D)=1n∑i=1ndiq(\mathcal{D})=\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}d_{i}.

where q(D)=1n∑i=1ndiq(\mathcal{D})=\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}d_{i}.

In this section, we give lower bounds for both ϵ\epsilon and (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta) differentially private algorithms for minimizing any convex Lipschitz loss function L(θ;D)\mathcal{L}(\theta;\mathcal{D}). We consider the following loss function. Define

We use Part 2 of Lemma 5.1 and follow the same lines of the proof of Theorem 5.2. ∎

2 Lower bounds for Strongly Convex Functions

The proof follows directly from (7) and Part 1 of Lemma 5.1. ∎

The proof follows directly from (7) and Part 2 of Lemma 5.1. ∎

Hence, our upper bounds in Sections 2 and 4 imply that our lower bounds are tight for all values of L,∥C∥2,L,\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}, and Δ\Delta for which Δ∥C∥2L=Ω(1)\frac{\Delta\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}{L}=\Omega(1). In other words, in the general case (where Δ∥C∥2L\frac{\Delta\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}{L} is not necessarily Ω(1)\Omega(1)), these lower bounds are tight up to a factor of Δ∥C∥2L\frac{\Delta\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}{L}.

Efficient Sampling from Logconcave Distributions over Convex Sets and The Proof of Theorem 3.4

In this section, we discuss a generic construction of an efficient algorithm for sampling from a logconcave distribution over an arbitrary convex bounded set. Such algorithm gives a multiplicative distance guarantee on the distribution of its output, that is, it outputs a sample from a distribution that is within a constant factor (close to 1) from the desired logconcave distribution. As a by-product of our generic construction, we give the construction of our efficient ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm Aeff−exp−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf eff-exp-samp} whose construction is outlined in Section 3.2 and prove Theorem 3.4. As argued in Section 3.2, we will assume that the convex set is already in isotropic position. The reader may refer to Section 3.2 for the details of dealing with the general case (where the set is not necessarily isotropic) and the effect of that on the running time.

We start by the following lemma which describes Algorithm Acube−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf cube-samp} for sampling from a distribution proprtional to a given logconcave function FF defined over a hypercube AA.

Let PP be a lazy, time reversible Markov chain over a finite state space Γ\Gamma. Then, the time t∞t_{\infty} required for relative L∞L_{\infty} convergence of ϵ′\epsilon^{\prime} is at most 1+∫4π∗4/ϵ′4dxxΦ2(x)1+\int_{4\pi^{*}}^{4/\epsilon^{\prime}}\frac{4dx}{x\Phi^{2}(x)}. Here, Φ(x)=inf⁡{ϕS:π(S)≤x}\Phi(x)=\inf\{\phi_{S}:\pi(S)\leq x\} where ϕS\phi_{S} denotes the conductance of the set S⊆ΓS\subseteq\Gamma and π∗\pi^{*} is the minimum probability assigned by the stationary distribution.

For clarity and completeness, we give a proof of this lemma here.

For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that C\mathcal{C} is closed. Actually, this is no loss of generality since we can always redefine ff such that it is defined on the closure of C\mathcal{C} which is possible because ff is continuous on C\mathcal{C}. We use a standard extension in literature. Namely, define

where the inequality in the first line follows from the fact that yλy_{\lambda} is the minimzer (w.r.t. yy) of gy(xλ)g_{y}(x_{\lambda}) and the inequality in the third line follows from the convexity of ff and the L2L_{2}-norm. This completes the proof of the lemma. ∎

Now, we give the construction of Algorithm Ainit−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf init-samp} followed by a Lemma asserting the probabilistic guarantee discussed above.

where the second inequality in the first line follows from the Lipschitz property of fˉ\bar{f} and the second inequality in the second line follows from the fact that e−x≥1−xe^{-x}\geq 1-x and (1−x)p−1≥1−px(1-x)^{p-1}\geq 1-px. On the other hand, we can upper bound Iout\mathcal{I}_{\sf out} as follows.

where the last inequality follows from the setting of α\alpha we made in Algorithm 5. Since this is true for any differential cone as described above, this proves that Ainit−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf init-samp} outputs θ~∈C\widetilde{\theta}\in\mathcal{C} with probability at least 1/21/2.

Let μ^Good\hat{\mu}_{\sf Good} denote the conditional distribution of θ~\widetilde{\theta} (the output of Algorithm Aeff−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf eff-samp}) conditioned on the event that Ainit−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf init-samp} outputs a sample in C\mathcal{C} in one of the mm iterations of the for loop. From Lemma 6.4, it is easy to see that the probability measure of the output of Aeff−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf eff-samp} can be expressed as

The running time of Aeff−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf eff-samp} is at most O(m⋅TAinit−samp)O(m\cdot T_{\mathcal{A}_{\sf init-samp}}) where TAinit−sampT_{\mathcal{A}_{\sf init-samp}} is the running time of Ainit−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf init-samp} (which is of the same order as that of Acube−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf cube-samp} given in Lemma 6.1). Note that Step 7 can be carried out in linear time using standard methods in literature. Finally, by plugging in our choice for the value of mm gives the expression in the lemma statement. This completes the proof. ∎

In this section, we show a straightforward construction for our efficient Algorithm Aeff−exp−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf eff-exp-samp} (referred to in Section 3.2) based on the construction established above for efficient logconcave sampling. Based on the results established above in this section, we give a proof of Theorem 3.4 which will also be fairly straightforward. First, fix a dataset D\mathcal{D}. Our goal is to construct an efficient version of Algorithm Aexp−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf exp-samp} (Algorithm 2 from Section 3.1). To do this, we simply run Algorithm Aeff−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf eff-samp} (Algorithm 6 above) with the function ff instantiated with the scaled decomposable loss function ϵ6L∥C∥2L(.;D)\frac{\epsilon}{6L\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}\mathcal{L}(.;\mathcal{D}) defined over the convex bounded set C\mathcal{C} (which is assumed to be in isotropic position as discussed in Section 3.2). Hence, η\eta in our case is nϵ6∥C∥2\frac{n\epsilon}{6\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}. Namely, as shown below, our ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm Aeff−exp−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf eff-exp-samp} is an instantiation of Aeff−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf eff-samp} on inputs C, ϵ6L∥C∥2L(.;D), nϵ6∥C∥2,\mathcal{C},~{}\frac{\epsilon}{6L\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}\mathcal{L}(.;\mathcal{D}),~{}\frac{n\epsilon}{6\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}, and ϵ3\frac{\epsilon}{3}.

The choice of the scaling factor ϵ6L∥C∥2\frac{\epsilon}{6L\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}} of the loss function and the multiplicative distance guarantee of ϵ3\frac{\epsilon}{3} is tuned to yield an ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm. To see this, we rely on the following simple lemma given in .

Proof of Theorem 3.4: Having Lemmas 6.5 and 6.6 in hand, the proof of Theorem 3.4 becomes straightforward. First, we show differential privacy of Algorithm 7. For any dataset D\mathcal{D}, let μD\mu^{\mathcal{D}} be the distribution of θ\theta proportional to e−ϵ6L∥C∥2L(θ;D)e^{-\frac{\epsilon}{6L\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}\mathcal{L}(\theta;\mathcal{D})}. Note that μD\mu^{\mathcal{D}} is the distribution of the output of Algorithm Aexp−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf exp-samp} (Algorithm 2 from Section 3.1) when ϵ\epsilon is replaced with ϵ3\frac{\epsilon}{3}. Let μ^D\hat{\mu}^{\mathcal{D}} be the distribution of the output θpriv\theta^{priv} of Aeff−exp−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf eff-exp-samp} (Algorithm 7 above). From Lemma 6.5, it follows that Dist∞(μ^D,μD)≤ϵ3{\sf Dist}_{\infty}\left(\hat{\mu}^{\mathcal{D}},\mu^{\mathcal{D}}\right)\leq\frac{\epsilon}{3}. Hence, from Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 6.6, we reach the fact that Aeff−exp−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf eff-exp-samp} is ϵ\epsilon-differentially private.

To show the utility guarantee of Aeff−exp−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf eff-exp-samp}, we first observe that the distribution of the output θpriv\theta^{priv} is close with respect to Dist∞{\sf Dist}_{\infty} to (i.e., within a constant factor of) the distribution of the output of Aexp−samp\mathcal{A}_{\sf exp-samp} (Algorithm 2 from Section 3.1), and hence, the utility analysis follows the same lines of Theorem 3.2.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Santosh Vempala and Ravi Kannan for discussions about efficient sampling algorithms for log-concave distributions over convex bodies. In particular, Ravi suggested the idea of using a penalty term to reduce from sampling over C\mathcal{C} to sampling over the cube.

References

Appendix A Straightforward Smoothing Does Not Yield Optimal Algorithms

In (9) the noise b∼N(0,8log⁡(1/δ)ϵ2)b\sim\mathcal{N}(0,\frac{8\log(1/\delta)}{\epsilon^{2}}). In the results to follow, we show that for any choice of the Huberization parameter hh, there exists data sets of size nn from the domain above where the excess risk for objective perturbation will be provably worse than our results in this paper. We present the results for the (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differential privacy case, but the same conclusions hold for the pure ϵ\epsilon-differential privacy case.

For every h>0h>0, there exists D\mathcal{D} such the excess risk for the objective perturbation algorithm in (9) satisfies:

Consider the data set D1\mathcal{D}_{1} with n3\frac{n}{3} entries being (x=−1,y=1)(x=-1,y=1) and 2n3\frac{2n}{3} entries being (x=1,y=−1)(x=1,y=-1). In the following lemma we lower bound the excess risk on D1\mathcal{D}_{1} for a given huberization parameter hh.

Let ϵ,δ\epsilon,\delta be the privacy parameters with ϵ\epsilon being a constant (<1<1) and δ=Ω(1n4)\delta=\Omega\left(\frac{1}{n^{4}}\right). For the data set D1\mathcal{D}_{1} mentioned above, the excess risk for objective perturbation (9) is as follows. For all h>0h>0, we have

Consider a data set D2\mathcal{D}_{2} which has exactly max⁡{n2−132h,0}\max\{\frac{n}{2}-\frac{1}{32h},0\} entries with (x=−1,y=1)(x=-1,y=1) and min⁡{n2+132h,n}\min\{\frac{n}{2}+\frac{1}{32h},n\} entries with (x=1,y=1)(x=1,y=1). In the following lemma we lower bound the excess risk on D2\mathcal{D}_{2} for a given huberization parameter hh.

Let ϵ,δ\epsilon,\delta be the privacy parameters with ϵ\epsilon being a constant (<1<1) and δ=Ω(1n4)\delta=\Omega\left(\frac{1}{n^{4}}\right). Let h<1log⁡nh<\frac{1}{\log n} be a fixed Huberization parameter. Then for the data set D2\mathcal{D}_{2} mentioned above, the excess risk for objective perturbation (9) is as follows.

Solving for θpriv\theta^{priv}, we have θpriv=min⁡{ϵ4,4ϵnh}+4bϵh\theta^{priv}=\min\left\{\frac{\epsilon}{4},4\epsilon nh\right\}+4b\epsilon h. By assumption h<1/log⁡nh<1/\log n and w.p. ≥2/3\geq 2/3 we have ∣b∣≤8log⁡(1/δ)ϵ|b|\leq\frac{8\sqrt{\log(1/\delta)}}{\epsilon}. Therefore, w.p. ≥2/3\geq 2/3, we have θpriv≤ϵ\theta^{priv}\leq\epsilon.

Finally combining Lemmas A.3 and A.2 completes the proof of Theorem A.1. ∎

Algorithm Agen−str−convex(ϵ,δ)\mathcal{A}^{(\epsilon,\delta)}_{\sf gen-str-convex} is (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differentially private.

The privacy guarantee follows directly from the composition theorem together with the fact that Aout−pert(ϵ2,δ2)\mathcal{A}^{(\frac{\epsilon}{2},\frac{\delta}{2})}_{\sf out-pert} is (ϵ2,δ2)(\frac{\epsilon}{2},\frac{\delta}{2})-differentially private and that Agen−Lip(ϵ2,δ2)\mathcal{A}^{(\frac{\epsilon}{2},\frac{\delta}{2})}_{\sf gen-Lip} is (ϵ2,δ2)(\frac{\epsilon}{2},\frac{\delta}{2})-differentially private by assumption. ∎

for some function FF, then the output θpriv\theta^{priv} of Agen−str−convex(ϵ,δ)\mathcal{A}^{(\epsilon,\delta)}_{\sf gen-str-convex} satisfies

The proof follows the same lines of the proof of Theorem 4.2 except for the fact that, in Algorithm Aout−pert(ϵ2,δ2)\mathcal{A}^{(\frac{\epsilon}{2},\frac{\delta}{2})}_{\sf out-pert}, the noise vector bb is Gaussian and hence using the standard bounds on the norm of an i.i.d. Gaussian vector, we have

We set ζ=3log⁡(n)\zeta=\sqrt{3\log(n)} and the rest of the proof follows in the same way as the proof of Theorem 4.2. ∎

Appendix C Proof of Lemma 5.1

We restate Part 1 of the lemma here for convenience.

where q(D)=1n∑i=1ndiq(\mathcal{D})=\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}d_{i}.

We use a standard packing argument. Variants of such argument have appeared in several places in literature, e.g., and . We first construct K=2p/2K=2^{p/2} points d(1),...,d(K)d^{(1)},...,d^{(K)} in {−1p,1p}p\{-\frac{1}{\sqrt{p}},\frac{1}{\sqrt{p}}\}^{p} such that for every distinct pair d(i),d(j)d^{(i)},d^{(j)} of these points, we have

It is easy to show the existence of such set of points using the probabilistic method (for example, the Gilbert-Varshamov construction of a linear random (2p/2,p)(2^{p/2},p)-binary code over {−1p,1p}\{-\frac{1}{\sqrt{p}},\frac{1}{\sqrt{p}}\} achieves this property).

Fix ϵ>0\epsilon>0. Define n∗=120pϵn^{*}=\frac{1}{20}\frac{p}{\epsilon}. Let’s first consider the case where n≤n∗n\leq n^{*}. We construct KK datasets D(1),...,D(K)\mathcal{D}^{(1)},...,\mathcal{D}^{(K)} where for each i∈[K]i\in[K], D(i)\mathcal{D}^{(i)} contains n copies of d(i)d^{(i)}. Note that for all i≠ji\neq j,

Let A\mathcal{A} be any ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm for answering qq. Suppose that for every D(i),i∈[K]\mathcal{D}^{(i)},i\in[K], with probability at least 1/21/2, ∥A(D(i))−q(D(i))∥2<116\|\mathcal{A}\left(\mathcal{D}^{(i)}\right)-q\left(\mathcal{D}^{(i)}\right)\|_{2}<\frac{1}{16}, i.e., for every i∈[K]i\in[K], Pr⁡[A(D(i))∈B(D(i))]≥12\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}\left(\mathcal{D}^{(i)}\right)\in\mathcal{B}\left(\mathcal{D}^{(i)}\right)\right]\geq\frac{1}{2} where for any dataset D\mathcal{D}, B(D)\mathcal{B}(\mathcal{D}) is defined as

Note that for all i≠ji\neq j, D(i)\mathcal{D}^{(i)} and D(j)\mathcal{D}^{(j)} differ in all their nn entries. Since A\mathcal{A} is ϵ\epsilon-differentially private, for all i∈[K]i\in[K], we have Pr⁡[A(D(1))∈B(D(i))]≥12e−ϵn\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}\left(\mathcal{D}^{(1)}\right)\in\mathcal{B}\left(\mathcal{D}^{(i)}\right)\right]\geq\frac{1}{2}e^{-\epsilon n}. Since, by (11) abd (12), all B(D(i)), i∈[K],\mathcal{B}\left(\mathcal{D}^{(i)}\right),~{}i\in[K], are mutually disjoint, then

which implies that n>n∗n>n^{*} for sufficiently large pp which is a contradiction to the fact that n≤n∗n\leq n^{*}. Hence, there must exist a dataset D(i)\mathcal{D}^{(i)} for some i∈[K]i\in[K] on which A\mathcal{A} makes an L2L_{2}-error which is at least 116\frac{1}{16} with probability at least 12\frac{1}{2}. Note also that the L2L_{2} norm of the sum of the entries of such D(i)\mathcal{D}^{(i)} is nn.

C.2 Proof of Part 2

where q(D)=1n∑i=1ndiq(\mathcal{D})=\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}d_{i}.

Appendix D Converting Excess Risk Bounds in Expectation to High-probability Bounds

In this paper all of our utility guarantees are in terms of the expectation over the randomness of the algorithm. Although all the utility analysis except for the gradient descent based algorithm (Algorithm 1) provide high-probability guarantees directly, in this section we provide a generic approach for obtaining high-probability guarantee based on the expected risk bounds. The idea is to run the underlying differentially private algorithm kk-times, with the privacy parameters ϵ/k\epsilon/k and δ/k\delta/k for each run. Let θ1priv,⋯θkpriv\theta^{priv}_{1},\cdots\theta^{priv}_{k} be the vectors output by the kk-runs. First notice that the vector θ1priv,⋯ ,θkpriv\theta^{priv}_{1},\cdots,\theta^{priv}_{k} is (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differentially private. Moreover if the algorithm has expected excess risk of F(ϵ,δ)F(\epsilon,\delta) (where FF is the specific excess risk function of ϵ\epsilon and δ\delta), then by Markov’s inequality there exist an execution of the algorithm i∈[k]i\in[k] for which the excess risk is 2F(ϵ/k,δ/k)2F(\epsilon/k,\delta/k) with probability at least 1−1/2k1-1/2^{k}.

One can now use the exponential mechanism from Algorithm 2, to pick the best θipriv\theta^{priv}_{i} from the list. By the same analysis of Theorem 3.2, one can show that with probability at least 1−ρ/21-\rho/2, the exponential mechanism will output a vector θpriv\theta^{priv} that has excess risk of max⁡iExcess_risk(θipriv)−O(L∥C∥2ϵlog⁡(k/ρ))\max\limits_{i}{\sf{Excess\_risk}}(\theta^{priv}_{i})-O\left(\frac{L\|\mathcal{C}\|_{2}}{\epsilon}\log(k/\rho)\right). Setting k=log⁡(2/ρ)k=\log(2/\rho), we have that with probability at lest 1−ρ1-\rho, the excess risk for θpriv\theta^{priv} is at most O(F(ϵlog⁡(1/ρ),δlog⁡(1/ρ)))O(F(\frac{\epsilon}{\log(1/\rho)},\frac{\delta}{\log(1/\rho)})). Placing this bound in context of the paper, the high probability bounds are only a polylog⁡(1/ρ)\text{poly}\log(1/\rho) factor off from the expectation bounds.

Appendix E Excess Risk Bounds for Smooth Functions

Appendix F From Excess Empirical Risk to Generalization Error

In this section, provide a generic tool to interpret our ERM results in the context of generalization error (true risk) bounds. For a given distribution τ\tau, let us define true risk for a model θ∈C\theta\in\mathcal{C} as follows.

Analogously, we define the excess risk for a given a given model θ\theta by ExcessRisk(θ){\sf ExcessRisk}(\theta).

Let D\mathcal{D} be a data set of nn data samples drawn i.i.d. from the distribution τ\tau. The following theorem from learning theory relates true excess risk to excess empirical risk.

Plugging in the utility guarantee for θpriv\theta^{priv} from Theorems 2.4 and 4.3, and using the expectation to high-probability bound trick from Appendix D, we obtain the following.

There exists an ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv\theta^{priv} such that with probability at least 1−γ1-\gamma over the randomness of sampling the data set D\mathcal{D} and the risk minimization algorithm, the following is true:

There exists an (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv\theta^{priv} such that with probability at least 1−γ1-\gamma over the randomness of sampling the data set D\mathcal{D} and the risk minimization algorithm, the following is true:

Combining with Theorem F.2, plugging in (17), and optimizing for Δ\Delta, we have the following:

There exists an ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv\theta^{priv} such that with probability at least 1−γ1-\gamma over the randomness of sampling the data set D\mathcal{D} and the risk minimization algorithm, the following is true:

There exists an (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv\theta^{priv} such that with probability at least 1−γ1-\gamma over the randomness of sampling the data set D\mathcal{D} and the risk minimization algorithm, the following is true:

While the dependence on nn for our private algorithms in Theorem F.3 matches the bounds for the corresponding non-private algorithms (see), unlike the non-private counter parts, the private algorithms have an explicit dependence on pp. We leave it as an open problem to figure out the right dependence on pp w.r.t. excess risk for private algorithms.

Generalized Linear Models (GLM).

There exists an ϵ\epsilon-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv\theta^{priv} such that with probability at least 1−γ1-\gamma over the randomness of sampling the data set D\mathcal{D} and the risk minimization algorithm, the following is true assuming n=ω((p/ϵ)2)n=\omega\left((p/\epsilon)^{2}\right):

There exists an (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv\theta^{priv} such that with probability at least 1−γ1-\gamma over the randomness of sampling the data set D\mathcal{D} and the risk minimization algorithm, the following is true assuming n=ω(p/ϵ2)n=\omega\left(p/\epsilon^{2}\right):

The above theorem follows from Theorem 2 in and the regularization trick above. Theorem F.4 shows that in case of GLM, we can essentially attain the non-private upper bound of O(L∥C∥2n)O(\frac{L\|C\|_{2}}{\sqrt{n}}) which is known to be tight: for example, if we consider a linear loss function then using a standard Central Limit Theorem argument (or using standard lower bounds on the minimax error in parametric estimation), one can show that the there exists a distribution on X\mathcal{X} for which the true excess risk is Ω(L∥C∥2n)\Omega\left(\frac{L\|C\|_{2}}{\sqrt{n}}\right).

For general Lipschitz loss functions, we provide a tool that can be used to obtain expectation (over algorithm’s random coins) guarantees on the excess risk (as opposed to the high probability guarantees given in Theorem F.3 above.)

Let θpriv\theta^{priv} denote the output of an (ϵ,0)(\epsilon,0)-differentially algorithm. We have

Let θpriv\theta^{priv} denote the output of an (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-differentially algorithm. We have

where the expectation in both cases is over the random coins of the algorithm.

We can use this lemma together with our ERM upper bounds for general Lipschitz functions to give the following expectation guarantees on the excess risk:

There is an (Θ(pn), 0)\left(\Theta\left(\sqrt{\frac{p}{n}}\right),~{}0\right)-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv\theta^{priv} such that the following is true:

There exists an (Θ(p1/4log⁡(n/δ)n),δ)\left(\Theta\left(\frac{p^{1/4}\log(n/\delta)}{\sqrt{n}}\right),\delta\right)-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv\theta^{priv} such that the following is true:

where the expectation in both cases is over the random coins of the algorithm.